DCPP VS. E.M. AND C.G.IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CA.G., TI.G., ANDTA.G. (FG-12-0082-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)(CONSOLIDATED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0239-16T4
A-0242-16T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.M. and C.G.,

Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF
Ca.G., Ti.G., and Ta.G., minors.
_____________________________________________________

Argued October 3, 2017 – Decided October 12, 2017

Before Judges Fisher and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex
County, Docket No. FG-12-0082-16.

Deric Wu, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant E.M. (Joseph
E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Kourtney J.A. Knop, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).

Bruce P. Lee, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant C.G. (Joseph E. Krakora,
 Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Lee, on the
briefs).

Lisa D. Cerasia, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Ms. Cerasia, on the brief).

Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Black,
on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants E.M. (Elena) and C.G. (Carl) are the parents of

C.G. (Carl, Jr.), Ti.G. (Teresa), and Ta.G. (Tanya), who were born

in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. On June 29, 2013, the

Division of Child Protection and Permanency removed these children1

from their home on an emergent basis because both Elena and Carl

had been incarcerated. Carl was charged (and later convicted) of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and Elena was charged

with evidence tampering. The family judge, after a three-day trial,

terminated Elena and Carl's parental rights to the three children.2

1
Elena has four other children, none of whom are now or were then
in her care. Those four other children reside with their maternal
grandparents; their relationship to Elena is not at issue here.
2
In July 2014 in an earlier action, both Elena and Carl executed
identified surrenders of the children in favor of the children's
maternal grandparents, who, however, eventually expressed an
inability or unwillingness to adopt. Consequently, the Division

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 Elena and Carl separately appeal the judgment terminating

their parental rights,3 arguing the judge's findings were based on

less than substantial evidence. Carl also argues that the

Division's expert, Dr. Barry A. Katz, who performed psychological

evaluations of both defendants and who evaluated defendants'

relationships with the children, provided only a net opinion and,

therefore, Carl claims the judge erred in relying upon Dr. Katz's

opinions in terminating his parental rights.

Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care,

custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606

(1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999).

"The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been

deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' and 'rights far

more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558

(1972) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and

strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as

commenced this action, again seeking the termination of
defendants' parental rights.
3
The appeals were consolidated and are both decided by way of
this opinion.

3 A-0239-16T4
being in the interests of the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-

1(a); see also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.

The constitutional right to the parental relationship,

however, is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.

R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.

v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest

must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from

harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382,

397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To

effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for

determining when a parent's rights must be terminated in a child's

best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division

prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:

(1) The child's safety, health or development
has been or will continue to be endangered by
the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to
eliminate the harm facing the child or is
unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm
. . .;

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts
to provide services to help the parent correct
the circumstances which led to the child's
placement outside the home and the court has
considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and

4 A-0239-16T4
 (4) Termination of parental rights will not
do more harm than good.

See also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.

The experienced judge applied these legal standards when

examining the proofs and weighing the evidence. Because we are

required to defer to a trial judge's findings when based on

substantial credible evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.

v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012), we find insufficient merit in

Elena and Carl's arguments to warrant further discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We provide only these brief

comments.

As to Elena's arguments on the first prong, the judge found

she placed the children at risk of both physical and emotional

harm "due to her alcoholism and mental health problems," her

"violent tendencies," and "[h]er lack of judgment." The judge also

found Carl failed to live up to his parental obligations, as

demonstrated by, among other things, his drug use and criminal

involvement.

On the second prong, the judge found that both Elena and Carl

have been unable or unwilling to correct the harm facing the

children since removal. The judge found Elena

has acknowledge[d] [] mental health problems
since at least age thirteen. She concedes that
medicine and therapy has not helped her with
her anger outbursts. In this case[,] two of

5 A-0239-16T4
 her children were involved in her outbursts
and in the initiating [June 29, 2013] incident
[Elena] states she either stabbed someone or
him them with a hammer. . . . She [] suffer[s]
from black outs. The alcohol dependency has
not abated since 2012. She has engaged in
numerous detoxification and outpatient
treatment programs but continues engaging in
addictive behavior while in the programs.

The judge also found insufficient Elena's excuses for failing to

engage in a recommended inpatient program.

The judge found that Carl had committed "multiple drug

offenses" before the children were born and has been incarcerated

at times since their birth because of drinking and the stabbing

of someone in the marital home. Carl violated the terms of

probation after the children's removal and failed to fulfill the

conditions imposed by treatment programs as the Division attempted

to reunite him with his children. Indeed, the judge recognized

that even when the plan of reunification was "going well" in 2014,

Carl chose to move back in with Elena and "joined her in

addict[ive] behaviors," demonstrating to the judge that Carl "does

not appreciate the danger and risk" of his choices.

While incarcerated, Carl was diagnosed with schizophrenia and

post-traumatic stress disorders, and the judge found his "short[-

]termed compliance with programs" "does not foreshadow future

success." The judge, therefore, rejected the idea that Carl "can

6 A-0239-16T4
be relied upon to change his ways and provide stability for his

children within a reasonable period of time."

We need not discuss the judge's findings on the third prong;

that prong was undoubtedly met. And, as to the fourth, we defer

to the judge's determination that the children have done "very

well with [their] foster mother." They are, according to the judge,

"smart and socially adept" as demonstrated by their ability to

endure the circumstances and the ebbing of any expectation their

parents will provide for their needs.

Because all the findings were supported by substantial

evidence deserving of credit, we affirm substantially for the

reasons provided by Judge Jane B. Cantor in her well-reasoned

thirty-five-page opinion.

Affirmed.

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