IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-1303
Filed: 17 October 2017
New Hanover County, No. 16 CVD 0692
JESSICA ELAINE VANN BRADLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
JOSHUA LENNON BRADLEY, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 July 2016 by Judge Jeffrey Evan
Noecker in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9
August 2017.
Rice Law, PLLC, by Mark Spencer Williams, Christine M. Sprow, and Ashton
Overholt, and The Law Firm of Mark Hayes, by Mark L. Hayes, for plaintiff-
appellee.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Jonathan E. Hall, Matthew H. Mall,
and Michael J. Crook, for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
During the four-year marriage of Joshua and Jessica Bradley, they lived — at
various times — in England, Australia, New Jersey, and New York. However, they
were married in North Carolina, and over the course of their marriage Joshua
engaged in various acts to maintain his ties with this state. The sole issue in this
appeal arising from Jessica’s divorce action is whether the trial court correctly
concluded that North Carolina possessed personal jurisdiction over Joshua. Because
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Opinion of the Court
we conclude that Joshua had sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina such
that the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a North Carolina court is consistent with
principles of due process, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Joshua’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Factual and Procedural Background
Joshua was born and raised in Virginia. Jessica is from North Carolina. The
parties first met in Virginia while Jessica was in graduate school and Joshua was in
law school. After Jessica completed her schooling in Virginia, she returned to North
Carolina to complete her Master’s Degree. She was living in North Carolina with her
parents (the “Vanns”) in Bladen County at the time that she and Joshua married.
Upon Joshua’s graduation from the University of Virginia School of Law in
2009, he was admitted to the New York bar and began working at a law firm in New
York City. As part of his employment with the firm, he was sent to work on temporary
assignments in various locations. At the time the couple married, Joshua was on a
temporary assignment to Sydney, Australia.
Jessica and Joshua had two wedding ceremonies — both of which took place in
Bladen County. The first was a “legal marriage ceremony” in March 2011, and the
second was a “formal” ceremony in August 2011. For each ceremony, Joshua flew to
North Carolina for a few days and then returned to Australia.
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The parties lived in Australia as a married couple from September 2011 until
July 2013. In July 2013, Joshua was recalled by his employer to the firm’s New York
office. The parties resided in New York for two months and then moved to New Jersey
in October 2013 where they leased real property and lived for nine months.
In May or June 2014, Joshua received another temporary assignment to work
in London, England. The parties moved to London and lived there from July 2014
until June 2015. Because they were moving abroad, they decided to store various
items of their personal property in a storage unit. Joshua contacted Jessica’s father,
Jesse Vann (“Mr. Vann”), and asked him to rent a storage unit in Fayetteville, North
Carolina for this purpose. Mr. Vann agreed to do so and rented the storage unit in
his own name. Joshua proceeded to ship various property — including marital
property of the parties — to Mr. Vann, which he placed in the storage unit in
Fayetteville. Joshua continuously paid the fees associated with the storage unit for
the next 23 months.
While the parties were living abroad, Joshua arranged for a portion of their
mail to be sent to the Vanns’ home in North Carolina, and they also received
additional mail at his parents’ home in Virginia and at his employer’s address in New
York. Among the items of mail he received at the Vanns’ home were certain “boxed
shipments.”
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In May 2014, the parties learned that Jessica was pregnant. During the
pregnancy, the parties had two baby showers in the United States — one in Bladen
County, North Carolina and one in Virginia. The parties’ child, Eden, was born on 1
February 2015 in London, England.
In May 2015, the parties agreed that they would live apart for a period of time.
The family flew to Virginia where Jessica and Eden began living with Joshua’s
parents.
In June 2015, Joshua and Jessica officially decided to separate. Jessica and
Eden moved from Joshua’s parents’ home in Virginia to live with her parents in
Bladen County. At the time this action commenced, Jessica was living in North
Carolina with Eden, and Joshua was still living in London.
On 1 March 2016, Jessica filed a complaint in New Hanover County District
Court seeking child custody, child support, post-separation support, alimony,
equitable distribution, and attorneys’ fees. On 1 April 2016, Joshua filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. On 14 April 2016,
he filed an affidavit in support of his motion. Four days later, he filed an amended
motion to dismiss.
A hearing was held on Joshua’s amended motion to dismiss on 15 June 2016
before the Honorable Jeffrey Evan Noecker. Prior to the hearing, Joshua filed a
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second affidavit. On 13 July 2016, the trial court entered an order denying Joshua’s
amended motion to dismiss and concluding that it possessed personal jurisdiction
over Joshua. Joshua filed a timely notice of appeal.
Analysis
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have appellate
jurisdiction to hear Joshua’s appeal. See Duval v. OM Hospitality, LLC, 186 N.C.
App. 390, 392, 651 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2007) (“[W]hether an appeal is interlocutory
presents a jurisdictional issue, and this Court has an obligation to address the issue
sua sponte.” (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). “A final judgment is
one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially
determined between them in the trial court.” Id. (citation omitted). Conversely, an
order or judgment is interlocutory if it does not settle all of the issues in the case but
rather “directs some further proceeding preliminary to the final decree.” Heavner v.
Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 332, 326 S.E.2d 78, 80, disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 601,
330 S.E.2d 610 (1985).
“Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders
and judgments.” Paradigm Consultants, Ltd. v. Builders Mut. Ins. Co., 228 N.C. App.
314, 317, 745 S.E.2d 69, 72 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The
prohibition against interlocutory appeals “prevents fragmentary, premature and
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unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final judgment
before it is presented to the appellate courts.” Russell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 136
N.C. App. 798, 800, 526 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2000) (citation and brackets omitted).
However, “[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from
an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the
defendant . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) (2015). Thus, Joshua has a right of
immediate appeal. See Meherrin Indian Tribe v. Lewis, 197 N.C. App. 380, 384, 677
S.E.2d 203, 207 (2009) (holding that “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) allows . . . for an
immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction”),
disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 806, 690 S.E.2d 705 (2010).
II. Personal Jurisdiction
Joshua contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(2) as to Jessica’s claims for child support, post-separation support,
alimony, and equitable distribution.1 “The standard of review of an order
determining personal jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial court are
supported by competent evidence in the record.” Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540,
543, 716 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted),
1 Joshua does not contest the fact that the trial court possesses jurisdiction with respect to the
parties’ child custody dispute. “The jurisdiction of the courts of this State to make child custody
determinations is controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 50A-3 . . . .” Hart v. Hart, 74 N.C. App. 1, 5-6, 327
S.E.2d 631, 635 (1985). “Personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent is not a requirement under
the [statute].” Id. at 7, 327 S.E.2d at 635.
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disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 574, 724 S.E.2d 529 (2012). We have held that “[t]he
trial court’s determination regarding the existence of grounds for personal
jurisdiction is a question of fact.” Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, 159 N.C. App. 355, 357, 583
S.E.2d 707, 710 (2003), aff’d per curiam, 358 N.C. 372, 595 S.E.2d 146 (2004).
The determination of whether the trial court can properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant is a two-part inquiry. First, the North Carolina
long-arm statute must permit the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
must comport with the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 671, 541 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).2
“In order to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with due process, the trial court must evaluate whether the defendant has certain
minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Eluhu, 159 N.C.
App. at 358, 583 S.E.2d at 710 (2003) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). “The relationship between the defendant and the forum state must be such
that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into a North Carolina
court.” Bell, 216 N.C. App. at 544, 716 S.E.2d at 872 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
2 Joshua does not dispute that North Carolina’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over him by a North Carolina court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (2015).
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Factors for determining existence of minimum contacts
include (1) quantity of the contacts, (2) nature and quality
of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause
of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state,
and (5) convenience to the parties.
Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 617, 532 S.E.2d 215, 219
(citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353
N.C. 261, 546 S.E.2d 90 (2000).
“The Court must also weigh and consider the interests of and fairness to the
parties involved in the litigation.” Sherlock v. Sherlock, 143 N.C. App. 300, 304, 545
S.E.2d 757, 761 (2001) (citation omitted). However, as the United States Supreme
Court has stated:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the defendant would
suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to
litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 499-
500 (1980).
As an initial matter, we note that the United States Supreme Court has held
the mere fact that a defendant’s wedding ceremony took place in a particular state
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does not — by itself — establish personal jurisdiction over him by the courts of that
state. See Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, 142
(1978) (“[W]here two New York domiciliaries, for reasons of convenience, marry in
the State of California and thereafter spend their entire married life in New York,
the fact of their California marriage by itself cannot support a California court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over a spouse who remains a New York resident . . . .”); see
also Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 163, 258 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1979) (citing
Kulko for proposition that England lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant
despite fact that parties were married in London because there was “no indication in
the record that England was the parties’ matrimonial domicile or that there were any
contacts other than the marriage itself sufficient to justify imposing upon defendant
the burden of defending suit in England”).
Therefore, in order for North Carolina’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over
Joshua, he must have had sufficient contacts with North Carolina to satisfy due
process standards. Before analyzing the trial court’s findings in its 13 July 2016
order, we find it instructive to review prior case law from our appellate courts on this
subject.
A. Cases Where No Personal Jurisdiction Existed
In Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985), the parties were married
in Illinois, but after four years of marriage they separated. The plaintiff took custody
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of their young daughter and moved to North Carolina. For ten years, the defendant
mailed child support payments to the plaintiff and visited the child in North Carolina.
Id. at 478, 329 S.E.2d at 665. When the defendant stopped payments after ten years,
the plaintiff sued him for child support in North Carolina while he was living in
Tokyo, Japan. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the court
did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied the motion. Id.
On appeal, our Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in denying
the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 478, 329 S.E.2d at 666. The Court ruled
that “the defendant ha[d] engaged in no acts with respect to North Carolina by which
he ha[d] purposefully availed himself of the benefits, protections and privileges of the
laws of this State.” Id. at 480-81, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
In the instant case the child’s presence in North Carolina
was not caused by the defendant’s acquiescence. Instead, it
was solely the result of the plaintiff’s decision as the
custodial parent to live here with the child. As previously
noted, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that
unilateral acts by the party claiming a relationship with a
non-resident defendant may not, without more, satisfy due
process requirements. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). We conclude that Kulko compels a finding that
this defendant did not purposefully avail himself of the
benefits and protections of the laws of this State. A
contrary conclusion would discourage voluntary child
custody agreements and subject a non-custodial parent to
suit in any jurisdiction where the custodial parent chose to
reside. See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S.
84, 93 (1978).
Id. at 479, 329 S.E.2d at 666.
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The Court also determined that the defendant’s six visits over ten years to
North Carolina to visit the child were insufficient to confer jurisdiction over him. Id.
In comparing the case to Kulko, the Court observed that
[t]he father’s visits to California in Kulko were fewer and
more distant in time from the litigation than were the
visits in this case. The visits by this defendant to North
Carolina, however, were no less temporary than those in
Kulko and were so unrelated to this action that he could
not have reasonably anticipated being subjected to suit
here.
Id. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
Finally, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “the presence of the child and
one parent in North Carolina might make this State the most convenient forum for
the action.” Id. However, the Court ruled that this fact alone “does not confer
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). The
Court stated that it was “mindful that North Carolina has an important interest in
ensuring that non-resident parents fulfill their support obligations to their children
living here[,]” but that “[a]bsent the constitutionally required minimum
contacts . . . this interest will not suffice to make North Carolina a proper forum in
which to require the defendant to defend the action . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
In Carroll v. Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453, 363 S.E.2d 872 (1988), the plaintiff and
defendant were married in Washington and owned real and personal property in that
state. After the parties separated, the plaintiff moved to North Carolina. Id. at 455,
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363 S.E.2d at 874. The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in North Carolina for
divorce, child custody, child support, and equitable distribution. Id. at 453, 363
S.E.2d at 872-73. In determining that it possessed personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, the trial court took into consideration the fact that “certain property of the
parties was located in North Carolina.” Id. at 455, 363 S.E.2d at 874.
On appeal, we held that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because he had never lived in North Carolina and the record did not specify
whether he had consented to his personal property being brought into North
Carolina. Id. at 456, 363 S.E.2d at 874. In so holding, we stated that
[t]he fact that there exists some personal property in North
Carolina in which the defendant may have an interest
because of the equitable distribution statutes is not alone
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant or his
property. If there was evidence the defendant brought the
property into North Carolina or consented to the placement
of property in North Carolina, this would be some evidence
of contacts with the forum State, the defendant and the
litigation. This however, would not itself necessarily be
decisive concerning the issue of jurisdiction.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Tompkins v. Tompkins, 98 N.C. App. 299, 390 S.E.2d 766 (1990), involved a
suit by the plaintiff against the defendant in North Carolina seeking alimony and
equitable distribution, alleging that the defendant had committed adultery during
the marriage. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, asserting that the complaint contained no evidence that the parties were
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married in North Carolina, that he was living in the state, or that the misconduct
had occurred in the state. Id. at 302, 390 S.E.2d at 768. Moreover, the defendant
argued that he had
left the State of North Carolina more than three and one-
half years prior to the commencement of this action, had
resided in South Carolina since that time, owned no
property in North Carolina, conducted no business in this
State, and had not invoked the protection of North
Carolina law for any purpose or reason since leaving this
State.
Id. at 300, 390 S.E.2d at 767. The plaintiff, in turn, contended that because the
defendant had “abandoned” her in North Carolina while they were legally married,
he had sufficient contacts with the state. Id. at 304, 390 S.E.2d at 769.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, and we affirmed, stating
that
plaintiff’s allegations of defendant’s marital misconduct,
absent any allegations going to a nexus between such
misconduct and this State, are simply insufficient to
permit the reasonable inference that personal jurisdiction
over defendant could properly be acquired in this case. . . .
[T]he mere fact that the marriage is still in existence at the
time an action for alimony is initiated cannot of itself
constitute sufficient contacts to establish personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Were it otherwise,
this State could exercise personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant solely by virtue of a plaintiff’s unilateral
act of moving to North Carolina prior to the termination of
the marriage. This is plainly impermissible.
Id. at 304, 390 S.E.2d at 769-70 (citations omitted).
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In Shamley v. Shamley, 117 N.C. App. 175, 455 S.E.2d 435 (1994), the plaintiff
and defendant were married in New York. After twenty years of living in New Jersey,
the plaintiff began looking to buy houses, and eventually he bought a home in North
Carolina. Id. at 176-77, 455 S.E.2d at 436. The defendant accompanied him to North
Carolina, but she did not take part in purchasing the house. Id. at 181, 455 S.E.2d
at 438. While she was in North Carolina during another visit, the defendant
purchased an automobile, which she later had titled in New Jersey. Id. Upon the
parties’ separation, the plaintiff sued for absolute divorce and equitable distribution
in North Carolina, and the defendant brought a similar suit in New Jersey. Id. at
177, 455 S.E.2d at 436. The trial court determined that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant and dismissed the case. Id. at 177-78, 455 S.E.2d at
436.
On appeal, we affirmed, holding that the defendant’s “only voluntary contacts
with North Carolina were during a brief visit in which she looked at houses with
[plaintiff] and another visit in which she purchased an automobile . . . .” Id. at 182,
455 S.E.2d at 439. We concluded that she “could not, on the basis of these contacts,
reasonably anticipate being haled into court here.” Id.
Finally, Shaner v. Shaner, 216 N.C. App. 409, 717 S.E.2d 66 (2011), involved
parties who were married in New York and lived together as husband and wife for 41
years. Id. at 409, 717 S.E.2d at 67. Five years prior to their divorce, the couple moved
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to Mooresville, North Carolina to live near their adult children. Id. However, after
four months, the defendant returned to live in the couple’s New York home. Id. at
409, 717 S.E.2d at 67-68. The plaintiff subsequently purchased a home in Statesville,
North Carolina. Id. at 409, 717 S.E.2d at 68. She spent the final three years of the
marriage living at times in New York with the defendant and at other times in North
Carolina near her children, whom the defendant also briefly visited. Id. Upon the
parties’ separation, the plaintiff filed a complaint for post-separation support,
alimony, absolute divorce, and equitable distribution in North Carolina. Id. The
defendant moved to dismiss the action, and the trial court denied his motion,
concluding that it possessed personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 409-10, 717 S.E.2d
at 68.
On appeal, we determined that the defendant’s “limited contacts with North
Carolina” — including the four months that he lived in North Carolina with the
plaintiff — were “analogous to those in Shamley . . . .” Id. at 412, 717 S.E.2d at 69.
We concluded that “[b]ecause Defendant could not reasonably anticipate being haled
into court on the basis of these contacts, the trial court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Defendant would violate his due process rights.” Id.
B. Cases Where Personal Jurisdiction Was Found to Exist
In Holt v. Holt, 41 N.C. App. 344, 255 S.E.2d 407 (1979), the plaintiff was living
in Missouri and the defendant in Alabama when the plaintiff filed suit in North
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Carolina for alimony and child support. She argued that jurisdiction existed over the
defendant because he “own[ed] real property in North Carolina which could be used
to satisfy the divorce judgment.” Id. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 412. The trial court found
that personal jurisdiction existed because the parties had jointly purchased a house
in Montreat, North Carolina. Id. at 353, 255 S.E.2d at 413.
On appeal, we affirmed, holding that because the defendant was making
payments on the house but not paying the plaintiff spousal and child support “the
North Carolina property [wa]s certainly a part of the source of the underlying
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we reasoned that
not allowing plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over defendant
(who left the state of his domicil[e] less than one month
after being ordered to make such payments to his wife and
children, purchased real estate in North Carolina and
incurred financial obligations as a result thereof) could
clearly result in defendant being allowed to avoid the court
ordered payments by purchasing North Carolina real
estate. . . . Clearly, the cause of action here was a direct
and foreseeable outgrowth of defendant’s contacts with this
state.
Id. at 354, 255 S.E.2d at 413.
In Harris v. Harris, 104 N.C. App. 574, 581, 410 S.E.2d 527, 532 (1991), the
defendant was born in Virginia but attended public schools and universities in North
Carolina. Id. at 575, 410 S.E.2d at 528. He and the plaintiff were married in North
Carolina and established a marital residence in this State for three years during
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which time their first child was born. Id. For the remainder of their eighteen-year
marriage, the parties lived in Virginia, although they returned to visit family
members in North Carolina during that time. Even after moving to Virginia, the
defendant — who owned a dog training business — maintained business contacts
with dog trainers, sellers, and purchasers in North Carolina, traveling to the state
“at least once a year to participate in dog training exercises or dog shows and
competitions.” Id. at 576, 410 S.E.2d at 529. Upon the parties’ divorce, the plaintiff
and one of the parties’ children returned to live in North Carolina. Id.
The plaintiff filed an action for child support, and the defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 576. The trial court
concluded that personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant. Id.
Observing that “the defendant has substantial past and present contacts with
North Carolina[,]” this Court affirmed the trial court’s order, stating as follows:
The defendant moved to North Carolina at an early age and
lived here until 1974. He and the plaintiff were married
here in 1971, had a child here in 1973, and resided in North
Carolina as husband and wife for nearly three years before
moving to Virginia. While in Virginia, they maintained
contacts with family members in North Carolina, visiting
them during the various holidays. In 1989, the parties
separated and the plaintiff returned to North Carolina
with their third child and was joined later by their second
child. Since the parties’ separation, the defendant has
maintained his contacts with family members in this State,
visiting them on at least two occasions. Furthermore, the
defendant has established and maintained business
contacts in North Carolina and has travelled routinely to
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this State to participate in business-related activities.
Viewed in light of North Carolina’s important interest in
ensuring that non-resident parents fulfill their support
obligations to their children living here, the quantity,
nature, and quality of the defendant’s past and present
contacts with North Carolina support a finding of
“minimum contacts” and therefore support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him in our courts, probably the
most convenient forum for this action.
Id. at 581-82, 410 S.E.2d at 532 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Bates v. Jarrett, 135 N.C. App. 594, 521 S.E.2d 735 (1999), involved a wife and
husband who were married and lived in North Carolina for nearly eight years. Id. at
600, 521 S.E.2d at 739. Upon their divorce, the husband moved out of the state. The
wife sought a domestic violence protective order in Cumberland County, North
Carolina but failed to serve the husband. Nevertheless, the husband made an
appearance at a domestic violence hearing. Id. at 600-01, 521 S.E.2d at 739.
Upon the couple’s separation, the husband allowed the wife to bring the
couple’s Subaru into North Carolina, but then — without the wife’s consent — he sold
the car and conveyed the title to another couple who was living in North Carolina.
Id. The couple who bought the Subaru were involved in a motor vehicle accident
while driving the vehicle, and the insurance proceeds were paid to them. Id.
The wife filed suit against both the Subaru’s purchasers and her husband,
contending that she had not consented to the sale of the vehicle. Id. at 601, 521 S.E.2d
at 739. In the same lawsuit, she also filed an equitable distribution claim against her
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husband. Id. at 595, 521 S.E.2d at 736. The husband moved to dismiss the claim
against him, arguing that the trial court did not possess personal jurisdiction over
him. The trial court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the husband.
Id. at 596, 521 S.E.2d at 736.
On appeal, we held that personal jurisdiction existed over the husband. In so
holding, we observed that the marital couple had “resided in this State from 1985
until 1992 or 1993” and that the husband had “consented to [the wife] bringing the
Subaru to this State.” Id. at 600, 521 S.E.2d at 739. Moreover, we noted that the
husband “had additional contact with the State. He appeared at the domestic
violence hearing without being served with process.” Id. at 600, 521 S.E.2d at 739.
Finally, we reasoned that “the actions of [the husband] . . . involving the Subaru
constitute sufficient minimum contacts with the State such that he should have
reasonably anticipated being haled into Court here over the issues of possession and
ownership of this vehicle.” Id. at 601, 521 S.E.2d at 739.
In Lang v. Lang, 157 N.C. App. 703, 579 S.E.2d 919 (2003), the defendant and
his wife were married in Germany and remained married for twelve years. One
daughter — the plaintiff — was born of the marriage. After the marriage ended, the
couple agreed to a separation agreement whereby the defendant would pay spousal
and child support. “Sometime thereafter, defendant moved to Henderson County,
North Carolina.” Id. at 704, 579 S.E.2d at 921. There he became involved in the
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“business of selling real estate in Henderson County, North Carolina” and “signed, as
a seller, offers to purchase and contract for real property located in North
Carolina . . . .” Id. at 709, 579 S.E.2d at 923 (quotation marks omitted). At that time,
the plaintiff and her mother both sought support orders in North Carolina based upon
the defendant’s actions in choosing to live and conduct business activities within the
state. Id.
Thirty years after the separation agreement was executed, the plaintiff filed
another suit against the defendant in North Carolina to enforce the support judgment
she had previously secured against him. Id. at 704, 579 S.E.2d at 920-21. The
defendant argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him because he
“was never a resident or citizen of the State[,]” but the court denied his motion. Id.
at 704-05, 579 S.E.2d at 921. The trial court found, in pertinent part, that the
defendant had been “issued a North Carolina operator’s license[,]” had owned a
subdivision in Henderson County, North Carolina for ten years and was present in
the subdivision “hundreds of times[;]” had been showing homes in the subdivision and
“taking back mortgages to assist with the financing[;]” and had purchased and
registered a new automobile in North Carolina. Id. at 705-06, 579 S.E.2d at 921
(quotation marks omitted).
This Court held that the evidence of the defendant’s business activities
supported the trial court’s finding that his contacts in North Carolina were
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“continuous and systematic[.]” Id. at 709, 579 S.E.2d at 923. We concluded that these
contacts were “sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws and could therefore reasonably
anticipate being haled into court in North Carolina.” Id. (citation, quotation marks,
and brackets omitted).
In Butler v. Butler, 152 N.C. App. 74, 566 S.E.2d 707 (2002), the parties were
married in Florida and lived in the Bahamas during the first four years of their
marriage. After five years of marriage, the couple purchased a house together in
Moore County, North Carolina where the plaintiff and the couple’s daughters lived
for the remaining four years of the marriage. Id. at 75, 566 S.E.2d at 708. The
defendant continued living in the Bahamas but visited his family in North Carolina.
In addition, he maintained a membership with the “Moore County Hounds, a social
and sporting association and ha[d] participated in its activities in Moore County.” Id.
at 77, 566 S.E.2d at 709 (brackets omitted). When the parties separated, the plaintiff
sued in North Carolina for child support, alimony, post-separation support, and
equitable distribution. Id. at 75-76, 566 S.E.2d at 708. The defendant moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), but the trial court found that he had sufficient minimum
contacts with North Carolina to permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
him. Id. at 76, 566 S.E.2d at 708.
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We affirmed, holding as follows:
Defendant’s name appears on both the deed and the [Moore
County] home mortgage. Defendant testified that he was
convinced that North Carolina was the best place for his
daughter and stepdaughter to receive an education. Based
on this competent evidence, the trial court found as fact
that one reason defendant purchased the house in North
Carolina was to allow his daughter to be schooled here.
Following their move to North Carolina, defendant visited
plaintiff and the girls at least once a month for two years,
staying in the house for three or more days at a time.
During this period, plaintiff and defendant were still
married. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s
characterization of the house in Moore County as a
“marital residence.” In addition to visiting his family in
this State, defendant maintained a membership in Moore
County Hounds, a social and sporting association, and
participated in the association’s activities in Moore County.
Finally, the evidence shows that defendant further
benefitted from his connections with this State by using the
equity line of credit on the Moore County house for
business purposes.
Id. at 82, 566 S.E.2d at 712. For these reasons, we determined that “the record
supports the conclusion that defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of this State’s laws.” Id. at 83, 566 S.E.2d at 713.
In the present case, Jessica relies most heavily on our decision in Sherlock. In
that case, the parties were married in Durham, North Carolina but never actually
lived in the state, instead living abroad for the majority of their nearly sixteen-year
marriage. They “resided in Egypt, Korea, the Philippines, India, Indonesia,
Australia, and Thailand[,]” and “a six month stay in Georgia was the only time during
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Opinion of the Court
their marriage that they lived in the United States.” Sherlock, 143 N.C. App. at 304,
545 S.E.2d at 761. Upon their separation, the plaintiff sued the defendant in North
Carolina seeking post-separation support. Id. at 301, 545 S.E.2d at 759. The trial
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
On appeal, we determined that although the defendant was “seldom physically
present within the state,” he had sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina
for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 306, 545 S.E.2d at
762. In so holding, we summarized the defendant’s contacts with North Carolina as
follows:
(1) their marriage ceremony was performed in Durham,
North Carolina. Consequently, [the parties’] marriage
license was filed there, and the provisions of Chapter 52,
“Powers and Liabilities of Married Persons,” governed
various legal aspects of their relationship during the
marriage; (2) while he was overseas, the defendant used his
father-in-law’s Durham address to receive important mail,
including federal income tax documents; (3) between 1983
and 1989 the defendant’s salary was directly deposited into
a Wachovia bank account in Durham, North Carolina; (4)
between 1984 and 1995 the defendant had a North
Carolina drivers’ license. To obtain a license, the defendant
must have had at least a nominal “residence” in North
Carolina; (5) in 1984, the defendant executed a Power of
Attorney in Durham, and made Albert Sheehy, his father-
in-law, his Attorney in Fact. This document was filed in the
Durham County Registry; (6) in his capacity as Attorney in
Fact, Mr. Sheehy conducted business on behalf of plaintiff
and defendant while they were overseas; (7) in 1984, the
defendant made a Last Will and Testament, naming Mr.
Sheehy, of Durham, the executor of his will, and Mary
Meschter, also of Durham, as alternate executor; (8) from
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Opinion of the Court
1992 to 1995 the defendant retained Frank Brown, a
Durham accountant, to receive and pay bills on his behalf;
and (9) in 1992, plaintiff and defendant opened an
investment account with Edward D. Jones, Oxford, North
Carolina, consisting of IRA accounts, money market funds,
and mutual funds.
Id. at 304-05, 545 S.E.2d at 761.
Based on these contacts, we ruled that the defendant had “availed himself to
the privilege of conducting activities within North Carolina, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. at 305, 545 S.E.2d at 762 (citation, quotation
marks, and brackets omitted). In so holding, we emphasized the uniqueness of the
factual scenario in Sherlock:
This Court recognizes that a state does not attain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant simply by being the center of
gravity of the controversy or the most convenient location
for the trial of the action. In the ordinary divorce case, it
might be improper to assert jurisdiction over a defendant
who has spent so little time in the forum state. However,
the [parties’] history is unusual; their frequent moves from
one foreign country to another, and their failure to
establish a permanent home anywhere in the United
States or abroad, require this Court to evaluate their
situation on its own merits.
Id. at 306, 545 S.E.2d at 762 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
C. Application of Case Law to Present Action
In the present case, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of
fact:
14. Joshua took a position as an attorney with Sullivan &
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Opinion of the Court
Cromwell, LLP, a law firm with its headquarters in
New York, New York. At all times since accepting this
employment in October 2010, he has continued to be
employed with Sullivan & Cromwell and is presently
employed with this firm. Joshua’s employment
dictated the location the parties resided throughout
their marriage.
....
16. Joshua and Jessica are Husband and Wife, having
lawfully intermarried on or about 28 March 2011 in
Bladen County, North Carolina. This was a legal
marriage ceremony so that the parties could share one
visa application as a married couple to apply for a visa
to live in Australia while on temporary assignment
with Sullivan & Cromwell.
17. The parties’ marriage application, license and
certificate of marriage was [sic] filed in the Bladen
County Register of Deeds.
18. After the parties were legally married, Joshua flew to
Sydney[,] Australia in connection with his temporary
work assignment there for his employer on or about 5
May 2011. He returned to North Carolina on or about
11 August 2011 for the parties’ second wedding
ceremony.
19. The parties had a second “formal” marriage ceremony
to which friends and family were invited in Dublin,
North Carolina on 14 August 2011. Both parties
attended and participated in the event after which they
honeymooned in Europe.
20. With the approval of Jessica’s father, Jess[e] Van[n],
Joshua and Jessica used Mr. Vann’s mailing address
in Bladenboro, North Carolina as a home base for the
receipt of mail and boxed shipments while the parties
lived in Australia and then later London.
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Opinion of the Court
21. Joshua and Jessica used Jesse Vann’s mailing address
with his permission in Bladenboro, North Carolina as
their home base to receive mail while they lived in
Australia and London for such mail as:
a. One Child Matters, a sponsorship of a child (in
both names);
b. Citibank (joint account);
c. Capital One investing (which is an investment
account in Joshua’s sole name);
d. Citigroup (an account in Joshua’s sole name);
e. TD Ameritrade (an account in Joshua’s sole
name).
22. The North Carolina address served as their
headquarters for mail in the United States (although
Joshua also received some mail at his parents’ address
in Virginia and his employer’s address in New York.)
All of the mail was statements for credit cards and
investment accounts, which the Defendant
administered online. On one occasion, Mr. Vann did
overnight mail that perceived [sic] to be important to
the parties in London.
23. The parties lived together in Australia as a married
couple from on or about 3 September 2011 until July
2013.
24. In July 2013, the parties relocated to New York as
Joshua was recalled by his employer to the New York
Office. They lived in New York for approximately two
months after which they established a residence in
New Jersey.
25. The parties lived in New Jersey from October 2013
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Opinion of the Court
until May or June 2014 when Joshua undertook a
temporary work assignment at the law firm’s London
Office.
26. The parties lived together in London from July 2014
until June 2015.
27. Prior to moving to London, the parties discussed
storing items of personal property — much of it marital
property but some of it the separate property of Joshua
and some of it the separate property of Jessica — in
North Carolina while they were to be living in London
and they agreed to store the marital and separate
property in Fayetteville, North Carolina.
28. Joshua contacted Jesse Vann, Jessica’s father to see if
he would facilitate the rental of a storage unit in
Fayetteville and the receipt of the personal items.
29. On 27 June 2014, Joshua directed a moving company
engaged by his employer to wit: Sullivan and
Cromwell, to have marital property along with some of
his and Jessica’s separate property moved from New
Jersey to a storage unit in Fayetteville, North
Carolina. Joshua intentionally directed marital
property to the State of North Carolina.
30. On or about 16 July 2014, Jessica’s father, Jesse Vann,
rented a storage unit acting under instructions from
Joshua Bradley at ExtraSpaceStorage in Fayetteville,
North Carolina. Mr. Vann took off a day of work, drove
42 miles to rent the storage unit and signed to receive
the property that Joshua had sent to the unit from New
Jersey.
31. The unit was rented by Mr. Vann in his own name. By
agreement between Joshua and Mr. Vann, Joshua paid
the storage unit rental fees and has continued to do so
for twenty-three (23) months.
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Opinion of the Court
32. Mr. Vann acted as the agent of Joshua in renting the
storage unit in North Carolina and receiving the goods
on behalf of Joshua. Joshua arranged for Jesse Vann
to act in this capacity.
33. The parties learned they were expecting a child in May
2014.
34. A baby shower was held 26 October 2014 in Dublin,
North Carolina which Jessica and Joshua both
attended. Both parties also attended a baby shower
in . . . Virginia.
35. There was one child born of the parties’ marriage to
wit: EDEN JOEL VANN BRADLEY born 1 February
2015 in London, England.
36. In late May 2015, Joshua suggested, and the parties
agreed, that Jessica return to the United States with
the baby. The parties flew back to the United States in
June with EDEN after which Joshua returned to work
in London while Jessica and Eden lived with Joshua’s
parents in Virginia for approximately one month until
relocating to North Carolina.
37. Joshua has been and admits to being in the State of
North Carolina on at least the following dates:
a. 25 March 2011 through 29 March 2011
b. 4 May 2011 through 5 May 2011
c. 11 August 2011 through 15 August 2011
d. 3 June 2012 through 15 June 2012
e. 27 November 2013 through 30 November 2013
f. 20 December 2013 through 26 December 2013
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Opinion of the Court
g. 17 April 2014 through 21 April 2014
h. 20 June 2014 through 29 June 2014
i. 25 October 2014 through 1 November 2014
38. At no time after the parties were married did the
parties live together as husband and wife within the
State of North Carolina. The parties never purchased
real property within the State of North Carolina. There
is no evidence that Joshua ever had a NC [d]river’s
license or filed taxes in the State.
....
40. Joshua admits that he “acquiesced to Plaintiff living in
North Carolina with the minor child following our
separation.” However, the Court finds that Joshua did
more than acquiesce and actually orchestrated events
which led to Jessica and Eden living in North Carolina
in that:
a. He flew back to the United States with Jessica
and Eden after discussing living apart for a while
and left them at his parents’ home in Virginia
and returned to London.
b. Jessica began living at his parents’ residence in
Virginia with EDEN and at her parent’s [sic]
home in North Carolina with EDEN.
c. At some point, Joshua communicated to Jessica
while she was residing with his parents in
Virginia and after he had returned to London
that their marriage was over.
d. Based on Joshua’s actions, it was foreseeable or
should have been foreseeable to Joshua that
Jessica would return to North Carolina with
Eden given his statements to her while she and
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Opinion of the Court
the minor child were residing with his parents in
Virginia.
e. Jessica had no other place to go and Joshua was
in London when he broke the news of their
separation.
f. It was foreseeable Jessica would return to the
State where her parents lived, where she grew
up, graduated high school and went to
undergraduate college.
g. Jessica went to North Carolina with Joshua’s
knowledge and with no objection from him.
h. Therefore, Jessica and the minor child, EDEN,
resides [sic] in this State as a result of the acts or
directives of Joshua.
....
43. Joshua engaged in purposeful conduct which directed
his activities through the State of North Carolina.
44. [Joshua] has filed an Affidavit wherein he admits that
North Carolina is the “home state” of the minor child,
EDEN, and that North Carolina has jurisdiction over
the claim of custody of the minor child under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA).
45. It would be inconvenient for the parties to litigate this
matter elsewhere in that:
a. Child Custody must be litigated in North
Carolina as North Carolina is the “home state”
under the UCCJEA, and the only state with
jurisdiction over Eden’s Custody.
b. Joshua must appear and defend the child
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Opinion of the Court
custody action in North Carolina if he wishes to
present evidence on the child custody issue.
c. It is therefore reasonable to expect him to travel
here and to litigate custody here.
d. It is illogical and inconvenient for the parties to
litigate child custody here and the remaining
claims in New Jersey even if New Jersey
determines it has personal jurisdiction over
Jessica.
e. It is convenient for the parties to litigate the
matter in North Carolina.
f. Joshua resides in London and must engage in
International travel to litigate this matter in
New Jersey or North Carolina. There is little
difference in the travel options and cost for him
in this regard.
g. Jessica resides in North Carolina.
h. If this Court granted Defendant’s motion, it
would require litigation in two states and the
parties to have two lawyers in two states. That
is inconvenient and is one factor that must be
considered.
46. All of Joshua’s actions taken together which have been
directed toward North Carolina along with his time in
the State, his marriage twice in the State, the use of
North Carolina as a “home base,” sending marital
property to be stored, maintained and kept even to this
day in North Carolina and his orchestration of events
which led to Jessica and Eden being in the State of
North Carolina are facts upon which this Court
considers highly relevant.
47. [Joshua] does not contest that North Carolina is the
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Opinion of the Court
“home state” under the UCCJEA for the minor child,
EDEN, nor does he contest that North Carolina has
authority to determine the issue of child custody
regardless of whether it has in personam jurisdiction
over him.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court made the following conclusions
of law:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this
action, the minor child whose custody is involved in
this action, and over the subject matter of this action.
2. North Carolina is the “home state” of the minor child,
EDEN, as that term is defined by N.C.G.S. 50A-201
(a)(l) and [it] is appropriate for this Court to assume
jurisdiction over this matter for the purposes of making
an initial child custody determination.
3. The Court should assume, and does assume continuing
jurisdiction over the child support matters raised in
this proceeding in conformity with the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C et. seq.
4. Personal jurisdiction over the Defendant is not
required to address child custody.
5. Statutory authority for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident Defendant exists
under North Carolina’s “long arm statute” as codified
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(12).
6. The Defendant has had reasonable notice of the claims
filed in North Carolina as he was properly served with
same.
7. The Defendant has purposefully availed himself of
conducting activities within the State of North
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Opinion of the Court
Carolina thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.
8. The Defendant “should reasonably” anticipate being
haled into court[ ] in North Carolina as a result of his
relationship with the State of North Carolina.
9. It is highly relevant that the Defendant directed
marital property to be sent to the State of North
Carolina and stored here. If Joshua’s items and marital
property had been damaged or destroyed in the storage
unit in Fayetteville, North Carolina, he would have a
cause of action in the State of North Carolina.
Likewise, if he neglected to pay the rental fee he could
reasonably be expected to be haled into Court in North
Carolina (at least through an interpleader action).
10. The Defendant has sufficient contacts with the State of
North Carolina to warrant assertion of personal
jurisdiction over him such that the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.
11. The quality and the nature of Defendant’s contacts
with the forum state make it such that it is reasonable
and fair to require him to conduct his defense in the
State of North Carolina.
12. Exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
Defendant complies with the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
The overwhelming majority of the above-quoted findings of fact are not
challenged by Joshua, and those unchallenged findings are therefore binding on
appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)
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Opinion of the Court
(“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is
presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”).3
Having thoroughly reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact, the record, and
the relevant case law, we agree with Jessica that Sherlock is the most analogous case
to the present action. Here, as in Sherlock, the couple lacked a permanent residence
during their marriage. Instead, Joshua and Jessica lived in various locations (both
within and outside the United States) as dictated by Joshua’s employer. Specifically,
during the four years of their marriage, the parties spent the majority of the time
living abroad in London and Australia but also lived in New Jersey for nine months
and in New York for two months.
Thus, the facts of the present case clearly demonstrate that this is not the
“ordinary divorce case[.]” Sherlock, 143 N.C. App. at 306, 545 S.E.2d at 762. As in
Sherlock, the parties’ “history is unusual; their frequent moves from one foreign
country to another, and their failure to establish a permanent home anywhere in the
United States or abroad, require this Court to evaluate their situation on its own
merits.” Id.
In considering the factors relevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis, we
first take note of the fact that Joshua and Jessica were married in North Carolina,
3 While Joshua challenges portions of Finding Nos. 32 and 40, he is only challenging them to
the extent that they contain the trial court’s determination that (1) Mr. Vann acted as Joshua’s
“agent[;]” and (2) Joshua “orchestrated” Jessica’s move to North Carolina following their separation.
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Opinion of the Court
participating in two separate wedding ceremonies. While Joshua is correct that
“marriage by itself cannot support a . . . court’s exercise of [personal] jurisdiction over
a spouse[,]” Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 142, the wedding ceremonies may
properly be considered in conjunction with Joshua’s other contacts with North
Carolina. We also note that a baby shower for the parties was held in North Carolina
to celebrate Jessica’s pregnancy.
Second, the trial court found as fact that the parties stored various items of
property — including marital property — in North Carolina. We deem significant
the fact that not only did Joshua consent to storing the property in this state but, in
addition, he (1) personally made several of the necessary arrangements for the
storage; and (2) continued to pay rental fees for the storage of the property for the 23-
month period preceding the hearing in the trial court. Although he could have instead
elected to store the property in New Jersey (where he and Jessica had lived for nine
months), in Virginia (where his parents resided), or in some other location, Joshua
affirmatively chose to do so in North Carolina.4
Joshua argues that the rental contract for the storage unit was in Mr. Vann’s
name rather than in Joshua’s own name. However, this distinction does not change
the fact that it was Joshua who affirmatively chose to store his and Jessica’s property
4 While the trial court did not make a finding as to the specific amount of property the couple
stored in North Carolina, evidence was presented at the hearing that the storage rental unit contains
a net weight of 2,552 pounds of personal property.
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Opinion of the Court
in North Carolina and continued to do so for almost two full years. In so doing, he
has sought to avail himself of “the benefits, protections and privileges of the laws of
this State.” See Miller, 313 N.C. at 480-81, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
Third, Joshua chose to have at least some portion of his mail directed to the
Vanns’ Bladen County mailing address. While he attempts to downplay the
significance of this factor by arguing that the mail was “unimportant,” the point
remains that — once again — he voluntarily chose North Carolina for this purpose.
Finally, while we recognize that the purpose of the due process analysis is to
protect the defendant’s due process rights, our case law nevertheless requires that we
also take into account as secondary factors the interest of the forum state and the
convenience of the parties. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of Greensboro, Inc., 80
N.C. App. 129, 132, 341 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1986) (citation omitted) (considering “[t]wo
secondary factors, interest of the forum state and convenience to the parties” in
applying minimum contacts analysis).
North Carolina has a recognized interest in this action in that the parties were
married in this state and Jessica and Eden are both residents of North Carolina. See
Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667 (“We are . . . mindful that North Carolina
has an important interest in ensuring that non-resident parents fulfill their support
obligations to their children living here.”); Butler, 152 N.C. App. at 82, 566 S.E.2d at
712 (“ . . . North Carolina has an important interest in the resolution of plaintiff’s
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Opinion of the Court
claims in the instant action, since plaintiff and the parties’ daughter currently reside
in this State.”).
Similarly, although the convenience of a forum alone cannot confer personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667
(citation omitted), we cannot ignore the fact that North Carolina is clearly the most
convenient forum for this action. It is undisputed that the child custody litigation
will be handled in North Carolina and that Joshua will likely be required to travel to
the state in connection with that proceeding. If Jessica were required to file the
present action in a separate jurisdiction, the parties would then have to
simultaneously litigate two lawsuits in two separate states — both arising from the
parties’ marriage. Furthermore, the portion of the couple’s marital property
currently located in the North Carolina storage unit will presumably be among the
items of property distributed in the equitable distribution proceeding.
We recognize that the contacts of the Sherlock defendant with North Carolina
were more extensive than Joshua’s contacts with this state in the present case.
However, we reject Joshua’s argument that the facts of Sherlock constitute a “floor”
for purposes of establishing sufficient minimum contacts in this context. To the
contrary, this Court expressly stated in Sherlock that “[t]he quantity and quality of
defendant’s contacts with North Carolina far exceed the ‘minimum contacts’ required
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Opinion of the Court
for jurisdiction . . . .” Sherlock, 143 N.C. App. at 306, 545 S.E.2d at 762 (emphasis
added).
In sum, based on our consideration of the relevant factors, we are satisfied that
Joshua has sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina such that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over him would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Id. at 302, 545 S.E.2d at 760 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Thus, we hold that the trial court possessed personal jurisdiction over
Joshua.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 13 July 2016 order.
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER, JR. and MURPHY concur.
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