2017 IL App (2d) 160395
Nos. 2-16-0395, 2-16-0396, 2-16-0403 cons.
Opinion filed October 17, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 15-CF-1835
)
DEREK J. PADDY, ) Honorable
) Donald M. Tegeler,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 15-CF-1836
)
JESSICA D. JOHNSON, ) Honorable
) Donald M. Tegeler,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 15-CF-1834
)
LEO W. COOK, ) Honorable
) Donald M. Tegeler,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
2017 IL App (2d) 160395
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JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion
Justices McLaren and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
ORDER
¶1 In this consolidated appeal, the State appeals from the judgments of the circuit court of
Kane County granting the motions of defendants, Derek J. Paddy, Jessica D. Johnson, and Leo
W. Cook, to suppress evidence found following a dog sniff of their vehicle. Because the traffic
stop was unduly prolonged, the dog sniff violated the fourth amendment. Thus, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendants were indicted on charges of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West
2014)), unlawful possession of 100 grams or more but less than 400 grams of a controlled
substance (heroin) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(B) (West 2014)), and
unlawful possession of 100 grams or more but less than 400 grams of heroin (720 ILCS
570/402(a)(1)(B) (West 2014)). Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized from an
automobile in which Johnson was the driver and Paddy and Cook were passengers. 1
¶4 The following facts are taken from the hearing on the motions to suppress. On November
11, 2015, Sergeant Ron Hain of the Kane County sheriff’s department was assigned to a special
operations unit conducting drug interdiction on Interstate 90. At approximately 1:18 p.m., as he
drove west on I-90 near Route 47, Sergeant Hain observed a westbound Chevrolet Impala with
Minnesota license plates, following a tractor-trailer. Although the Impala was traveling within
1
Each defendant was charged in a separate case and filed his or her own motion to
suppress. The trial court conducted a consolidated hearing. Defendants’ appeals have been
consolidated, and they have filed a consolidated brief.
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the posted speed limit, it appeared to be following the tractor-trailer too closely and some of its
windows were heavily tinted. Thus, Sergeant Hain decided to stop the Impala.
¶5 After stopping the Impala, Sergeant Hain approached the open front passenger-side
window. Cook was in the front passenger seat, and Paddy was seated in the rear behind Johnson.
According to Sergeant Hain, Cook’s face was pale, he was trembling, and he would look only at
Johnson. Paddy was very rigid, he was pressed against the backseat, and he stared out the
driver’s-side rear window. Sergeant Hain considered Cook and Paddy to be nervous.
¶6 Sergeant Hain asked Johnson for a driver’s license and proof of insurance. Johnson
provided her Minnesota driver’s license but did not provide an insurance card.
¶7 Because he was the only officer present, there were three occupants, and two of them
appeared nervous, Sergeant Hain asked Johnson to exit the vehicle. As they stood between the
Impala and the squad car, Sergeant Hain explained to Johnson that he stopped her because she
was following too closely and to discuss the tinted windows. Johnson acknowledged that the
windows were too dark and stated that she planned to have them fixed.
¶8 Sergeant Hain then asked Johnson to sit in the front passenger seat of the squad car. He
described their conversation as very polite and friendly.
¶9 After entering his squad car, Sergeant Hain began preparing a written warning for
following too closely. He also conducted a computer-records check, from which he learned that
the Impala was registered in Minnesota.
¶ 10 As they sat in the squad car, Johnson discussed her travel itinerary. She explained that
she had traveled from Redby, Minnesota, to Chicago, a 10-hour trip, to drop off a friend whose
relative had died. Johnson told Sergeant Hain that she had traveled to Chicago with Cook, who
was her boyfriend, and that Cook had brought along a friend to help with the driving. According
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to Sergeant Hain, Johnson said that they dropped off her friend and turned right around to head
back to Minnesota.
¶ 11 As Sergeant Hain was talking with Johnson, he requested that Detective Ryan Monaghan,
a K-9 handler, back him up. According to Sergeant Hain, Detective Monaghan was the only
officer in the unit available as backup.
¶ 12 Although Sergeant Hain had completed the written warning, he left it on the clipboard.
He then told Johnson to wait in the squad car while he spoke to Cook about an insurance card.
He exited the squad car and walked back to the front passenger window.
¶ 13 Sergeant Hain asked Cook to look for an insurance card. He also asked Cook for
identification and Paddy for his name and date of birth. Sergeant Hain described Cook as being
pale, having trembling hands, and having difficulty speaking due to a dry mouth. Based on his
17 years’ experience in law enforcement, Sergeant Hain considered Cook to be overly nervous.
According to Sergeant Hain, as he stood at the passenger window the second time, he saw green
flakes on Cook’s face, chest, and pants. Based on Sergeant Hain’s police training and
experience, he decided that the flakes appeared to be cannabis.
¶ 14 Cook told Sergeant Hain that he and Johnson had driven to Chicago to pick up Paddy.
Sergeant Hain considered Cook’s story contradictory to Johnson’s statement. Sergeant Hain had
Cook and Paddy exit the Impala. After obtaining consent from each, he searched them but found
no contraband. He did not handcuff either man at that point.
¶ 15 After explaining that he was going to conduct a K-9 sniff of the vehicle, Sergeant Hain
had Paddy stand in front of the Impala and had Cook stand to its rear. Sergeant Hain then
allowed Paddy to walk a short distance away to relieve himself. According to Sergeant Hain, it
is routine procedure to have the occupants exit a vehicle before a K-9 sniff.
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2017 IL App (2d) 160395
¶ 16 During the K-9 sniff, the dog, which was trained to passively alert to the odor of drugs by
sitting down, never did so. Instead, the dog was very excited and attempted to jump through the
window of the Impala. Detective Monaghan had to repeatedly command the dog to smell for
drugs, as the dog was distracted by Paddy’s return. According to Detective Monaghan, the dog
was trained to protect and previously there had been issues with the dog being distracted by
people in the vicinity of a searched vehicle.
¶ 17 Detective Monaghan explained that, even though the dog did not passively alert to the
odor of drugs, its behavior indicated that it smelled drugs in the Impala. He added that the dog
would indicate the presence of a drug odor by showing behavioral changes such as attention,
drive, focus, changing its breathing pattern, perking its ears, and jumping at an object to get to
the source of the odor. Factors that affect a dog’s sense of smell include wind and whether the
drugs are hidden in a deep compartment. It is not uncommon for a dog to try to go through a
window to get at the source of an odor. Although Detective Monaghan shook his head at the
conclusion of the K-9 sniff, he explained that he did so because he was frustrated by the dog
being distracted by Paddy. He told Sergeant Hain that the dog reacted to the odor of drugs in the
Impala.
¶ 18 James Stenfeldt, an expert in training drug-detection dogs, testified for defendants.
Stenfeldt admitted that Detective Monaghan and his dog were properly trained. He also admitted
that wind could affect a dog’s ability to smell drugs. After viewing a video recording of the dog
sniff in this case, Stenfeldt opined that the dog did not display a positive alert or otherwise
indicate that it smelled drugs. He admitted that there appeared to have been a fairly strong wind.
He conceded that a dog will get more excited, such as by breathing faster, perking its ears, and
jumping, when it smells drugs.
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2017 IL App (2d) 160395
¶ 19 After Detective Monaghan advised Sergeant Hain that the dog smelled drugs, Sergeant
Hain searched the Impala. He found cannabis flakes near the handle of the front passenger door
as well as a bullet in the map pocket of the door. He found a loaded handgun between the front
passenger seat and the center console. He then handcuffed Cook and Paddy. He then found a
second loaded handgun under the driver’s seat, $8,000 in Johnson’s purse, and a large amount of
heroin in a backpack in the trunk.
¶ 20 In ruling on the motions to suppress, the trial court noted that it had to decide three
possible issues: (1) whether the original stop was valid; (2) if so, whether there was an
unjustified prolonged detention; and (3) if the detention was lawful, whether the dog indicated
that there was an odor of narcotics coming from the vehicle such that there was probable cause
for the search.
¶ 21 As for the original stop, the trial court found that it was a very close call. Nonetheless, it
ruled that there was a valid basis to stop the Impala for following too closely.
¶ 22 Turning to whether the detention was unnecessarily prolonged, the trial court first noted
that, before writing the warning, Sergeant Hain had ascertained from the records check that the
vehicle was registered in Minnesota. The court further found that, even though Sergeant Hain
did not give the written warning to Johnson before he exited the squad car, the warning had been
completed at that point.
¶ 23 The trial court then addressed whether Sergeant Hain was allowed to go back to the car to
ask Cook for proof of insurance such that the stop was not improperly prolonged. In answering
that question, the court ruled that Illinois did not require a vehicle registered in another state to
comply with Illinois’s liability-insurance requirements. Because Sergeant Hain knew that the
vehicle was not registered in Illinois, and thus should have known that the liability-insurance
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requirements did not apply, he was acting without proper authority when he returned to the
vehicle to speak with Cook. Thus, the court concluded that the stop was illegally prolonged and
it granted the motions to suppress.
¶ 24 The State filed a certificate of impairment (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016))
and a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, the State contends that: (1) the traffic stop was not unduly prolonged by
Sergeant Hain’s return to the vehicle to ask Cook for an insurance card, because any mistake
regarding the requirement for proof of insurance was objectively reasonable; (2) Sergeant Hain
was entitled generally to ask, as part of a traffic stop, for proof of insurance; and (3) Sergeant
Hain had probable cause, independent of the dog sniff, to search the vehicle.
¶ 27 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate
court uses a two-part standard. People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 24. We afford great
deference to the trial court’s factual findings, reversing them only if they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 24. We review de novo, however, the trial
court’s ultimate legal ruling on whether suppression is warranted. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 24.
¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful
traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ____,
____, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). However,
a traffic stop that exceeds the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the fourth amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. Put another way, a seizure justified by a police-observed traffic
violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
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the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1612
(citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).
¶ 29 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a dog sniff during a
traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, unreasonably prolonged the time to complete the
purpose of the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. In answering that
question, the Court noted that the tolerable duration of a police inquiry in the traffic-stop context
depends on the dual needs of addressing the traffic violation that justified the stop and attending
to related safety concerns. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Because addressing
the traffic violation is the overall purpose of the stop, authority for the stop ends when tasks tied
to the traffic violation are, or reasonably should be, complete. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135
S. Ct. at 1614.
¶ 30 Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes
ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
Typically, such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
any outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Such checks serve the same objective of the
traffic code: the safe and responsible operation of a vehicle. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S.
Ct. at 1615.
¶ 31 A dog sniff, however, is a measure aimed at detecting evidence of crime. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Accordingly, it is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Thus, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as
part of the officer’s traffic mission. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
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¶ 32 In rejecting the government’s contention that an officer may incrementally prolong a
traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the overall duration of the stop remains
comparatively reasonable, the Court reiterated that a traffic stop that is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete the mission of the stop is unlawful. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
____, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. Thus, the critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or
after the officer issues the ticket, but whether conducting the dog sniff prolonged the stop.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
¶ 33 In this appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the mission of the traffic stop had been
completed such that the dog sniff unduly prolonged the stop, in violation of the fourth
amendment. It did.
¶ 34 The mission of the traffic stop was completed when Sergeant Hain finished the written
warning. As the State concedes, because Illinois law did not require Johnson to provide proof of
insurance, as her vehicle was properly registered in Minnesota (see 625 ILCS 5/3-402(B)(2)(a),
3-707 (West 2014)), Sergeant Hain mistakenly believed that he was authorized to return to the
vehicle to ask Cook for proof of insurance. That unjustified return to the vehicle unduly
prolonged the traffic stop.
¶ 35 The State maintains, however, relying on Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ____, 135 S.
Ct. 530 (2014), that, because the mistake of law was objectively reasonable, it did not
unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. We disagree.
¶ 36 In Heien, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a seizure of a vehicle via a
traffic stop is rendered unreasonable when the officer stops the vehicle based on a mistaken
understanding of the law. Heien, 574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 534. In resolving that issue, the
Court, acknowledging that the ultimate touchstone of the fourth amendment is reasonableness,
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recognized that reasonableness does not require perfection. Heien, 574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct.
at 536. As such, the fourth amendment allows for some mistakes by law enforcement. Heien,
574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 536. Those include mistakes of law. Heien, 574 U.S. at ____,
135 S. Ct. at 536-40.
¶ 37 In so holding, the Court emphasized that only objectively reasonable mistakes of law will
be tolerated. Heien, 574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 539. Thus, an officer can gain no fourth-
amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the law that he is duty-bound to enforce. Heien,
574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 539-40.
¶ 38 In holding that the officer in Heien made a reasonable mistake in believing that a vehicle
was required to have two working brake lights, the Court noted that the applicable statute was
reasonably subject to more than one interpretation and, moreover, had never been construed by
any North Carolina appellate court. Heien, 574 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
¶ 39 Applying Heien here, we conclude that Sergeant Hain’s mistaken belief that Illinois’s
liability-insurance requirements applied to a vehicle registered in Minnesota was not objectively
reasonable. That is so for the following reasons.
¶ 40 First, section 3-707(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) provides, in pertinent
part, that no person shall operate a motor vehicle unless it is covered by a liability insurance
policy. 625 ILCS 5/3-707(a) (West 2014). However, section 3-707 adds that only an operator of
a motor vehicle subject to registration under the Vehicle Code is subject to a penalty under
section 3-707. Further, section 3-402(B)(2)(a) of the Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part,
that vehicles subject to registration under the Vehicle Code do not include any vehicle operated
interstate and properly registered in another state. 625 ILCS 5/3-402(B)(2)(a) (West 2014).
When read together, those provisions unambiguously provide that a vehicle properly registered
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in Minnesota need not comply with the liability-insurance requirements of the Vehicle Code.
Thus, Sergeant Hain, who had ascertained that the vehicle was properly registered in Minnesota,
was not reasonable in his mistaken belief that Johnson needed to provide proof of insurance.
¶ 41 Moreover, an appellate court had previously held that section 3-707 did not apply to a
vehicle properly registered in another state. See People v. Benton, 322 Ill. App. 3d 958, 960-61
(2001). In doing so, the court held that sections 3-402(B)(2)(a) and 3-707, when read together,
unambiguously excepted from the liability-insurance requirements those vehicles properly
registered outside of Illinois. Benton, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 960-61. Because there was a prior
appellate court decision that definitively held that a vehicle registered in another state did not
have to comply with the liability-insurance requirements of the Vehicle Code, Sergeant Hain’s
contrary belief was not reasonable within the meaning of Heien.
¶ 42 Because the law unambiguously did not require Johnson to provide proof of insurance,
Sergeant Hain’s return to the vehicle to ask Cook for an insurance card did not promote any
proper purpose for the stop. Thus, it did not justify the continued detention of the vehicle.
¶ 43 Nor was the delay justified by the general authority during a traffic stop to request proof
of insurance. Although an officer is generally entitled, as an ordinary incident of a traffic stop, to
request proof of insurance (see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ____, 135 S. Ct. at 1615), it is not
reasonable to do so where, as here, the officer knows or should know that proof of insurance is
not required.
¶ 44 Because Sergeant Hain unduly prolonged the traffic stop when he returned to the vehicle
to ask Cook for proof of insurance, the evidence gathered thereafter—including Cook’s version
of the travel itinerary, the cannabis flakes seen on Cook, the additional indicia of Cook’s and
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Paddy’s nervousness, and the positive dog alert—was obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.
¶ 45 Finally, there was no probable cause, independent of the dog sniff, to search the vehicle.
As discussed, the evidence gathered when Sergeant Hain returned to the vehicle was
inadmissible, as it was gathered as part of an unlawful detention. Thus, the only facts relevant to
the issue of whether there was probable cause to search the vehicle were those about the travel
route and Cook’s and Paddy’s apparent nervousness during Sergeant Hain’s initial presence at
the vehicle. The trial court found, however, that Sergeant Hain’s testimony that Minnesota is a
destination for, and Chicago a source of, illegal drugs was alone insufficient to establish that
assertion. We agree. There needed to be some additional evidence to establish that Minnesota
and Chicago are endpoints of drug trafficking. Moreover, even if they are, merely driving to and
from those locations would not alone support probable cause to search for evidence of drug
trafficking. Nor was the abbreviated stay in Chicago particularly suspicious in light of Johnson’s
explanation that they had driven to Chicago to drop off a friend whose family member had died.
As for Cook’s and Paddy’s apparent nervousness, that alone was insufficient to provide probable
cause to search the vehicle. In sum, the evidence was insufficient to provide probable cause to
believe that the trio was involved in drug trafficking. Thus, there was no probable cause
independent of the dog sniff to justify the search of the vehicle.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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