NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4082-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TAAREEF ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted October 3, 2017 – Decided October 18, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No.
14-02-0173.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Michael D. Grillo,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the trial judge's denial of his motion
to suppress evidence. We affirm.
Prior to trial, defendant requested a Franks1 hearing
challenging the truthfulness of the affidavit establishing
probable cause for a warrant to search his house and person.
Defendant claims a Franks hearing was required based upon a
contradiction in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the
warrant. Alternatively, defendant argues that his suppression
motion should have been granted outright because the affidavit
contained conflicting information.
The search warrant in this case was issued based upon
information provided by a confidential informant (CI). The CI
contacted Detective Michael Castaldo about an individual, known
to the CI as "Slick,"2 who was distributing cocaine. The CI had
provided reliable information in the past leading to the arrest
of several individuals for controlled dangerous substance
offenses.
According to Castaldo's affidavit, the CI reported Slick was
selling cocaine. The CI said he would contact Slick to purchase
cocaine, and meet at a specific location to complete the
transaction. The CI described Slick as a thirty to thirty-five-
1
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d
667 (1978).
2
Defendant is also known as Slick.
2 A-4082-15T1
year-old black male, approximately five foot, ten inches tall, and
weighing approximately 170 pounds. The CI informed Castaldo that
Slick resided at a specific address on Elmer Street in Trenton.
The Mercer County Prosecutor's Office arranged for the CI to
carry out two controlled purchases of cocaine from Slick. Prior
to each purchase, Detective Joseph Paglione met with the CI and
searched the CI and his car for drugs and money. After ensuring
that the CI had no drugs or money, Paglione gave money to the CI
to complete the drug transactions.
In the first drug purchase, the CI called Slick. Paglione
was able to overhear the conversation between the two men. The
CI told Slick that he wanted to purchase cocaine. Slick told the
CI to meet him at a particular location. At the same time,
Castaldo was watching the Elmer Street house. Castaldo observed
a black male, fitting the description of Slick, leave the Elmer
Street house and proceed toward the pre-arranged location to meet
with the CI. Castaldo observed Slick reach his right hand into
the CI's vehicle and engage in a brief conversation.
For the second transaction, the same preliminary procedure
of searching the CI and his car was undertaken by Paglione prior
to the CI purchasing cocaine from Slick. During the second
meeting, Castaldo observed Slick enter the CI's car and sit for a
3 A-4082-15T1
few moments. After both transactions, Castaldo saw Slick return
to Elmer Street and enter the house.
After both meetings with Slick, the CI drove to another pre-
arranged location and met with Paglione. On both occasions, the
CI handed Paglione a quantity of suspected cocaine. The CI
described his interactions with Slick to Paglione, including Slick
handing over the suspected cocaine and the CI exchanging money for
the drugs. After both drug purchases, Paglione searched the CI
and his vehicle and found the car and the CI were "drug and money
free." Paglione returned to the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office
with the suspected cocaine. The substance purchased from Slick
by the CI tested positive for cocaine.
After observing the CI's transactions with Slick, Castaldo
submitted an affidavit in support of a warrant to search defendant
and his house. A search warrant was issued. The search of
defendant's home revealed controlled dangerous substances, cash,
and a shotgun. The search of defendant's person revealed
controlled dangerous substances. Defendant waived his rights and
provided a formal statement admitting that the drugs and gun
belonged to him. Defendant was then charged and indicted.
In a motion to suppress the drugs and other evidence,
defendant claimed the search warrant contained conflicting
information requiring a Franks hearing. The trial judge denied
4 A-4082-15T1
defendant's motion. After the denial of his suppression motion,
defendant entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced.
On appeal, defendant argues:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A FRANKS HEARING;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS FATALLY
CONTRADICTORY ON THE ISSUE OF CORROBORATION
OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT.
Appellate courts review a trial judge's ruling regarding the
need for an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State
v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd,
201 N.J. 229 (2010). When reviewing a determination on a motion
to suppress, appellate courts "must uphold the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."
State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). Appellate courts should
reverse only when the trial court's determination is "so clearly
mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
There is "a presumption of validity with respect to the
affidavit supporting the search warrant." Broom-Smith, supra, 406
N.J. Super. at 240 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171,
5 A-4082-15T1
98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 682 (1978)). To warrant
a Franks hearing, a defendant must make "a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant
in the warrant affidavit." Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98
S. Ct. at 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672. A defendant must also show
that the allegedly false statement was essential in finding
probable cause. Ibid. New Jersey adopted the Franks procedure
to review challenges to the veracity of a warrant affidavit. See,
e.g., State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
994, 100 S. Ct. 527, 62 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1979). However, a Franks
hearing is not required for every challenge to the veracity of a
warrant affidavit. "[A] Franks hearing is not directed at picking
apart minor technical problems with a warrant application; it is
aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law
enforcement agents. . . ." Broom-Smith, supra, 406 N.J. Super.
at 240.
"[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be
valid and . . . a defendant challenging its validity has the burden
to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance
of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'"
State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v.
Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983)). As such, reviewing courts
6 A-4082-15T1
"accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination
resulting in the issuance of the warrant." State v. Marshall, 123
N.J. 1, 72 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306,
122 L. Ed. 85 (1993) (citing State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116
(1968)).
Defendant claims that Castaldo's affidavit contained a
material misstatement made with reckless disregard of the truth.
Defendant argues the affidavit states both the CI and his vehicle
were "drug and money free" after the controlled drug purchase,
thus concluding that the transactions never resulted in any
physical drug evidence.
Defendant further claims that his motion to suppress should
have been granted outright. Defendant's support for this argument
is premised on his same argument that the warrant affidavit
contains conflicting information as to the finding of drugs and
money. Based on a straightforward reading of the affidavit, we
find no such conflict. The police searched the CI after he turned
over the drugs to be sure the CI had no money or drugs concealed
on his person or in his car.
As defendant failed to make any legitimate showing that the
affidavit included false or perjured statements or that the warrant
lacked probable cause, the trial court did not err in denying the
Franks hearing or the motion to suppress.
7 A-4082-15T1
Affirmed.
8 A-4082-15T1