FILED
Oct 23 2017, 10:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria Bailey Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cameron Tibbs, October 23, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1701-CR-154
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Hawkins, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G05-1603-MR-10589
Barnes, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Cameron Tibbs appeals his convictions for Level 6 Felony obstruction of justice
and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. We affirm.
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Issue
[2] The sole issue before us is whether the trial court properly denied Tibbs’s
motion to transfer his case to juvenile court after he was found not guilty of
murder.
Facts
[3] On December 13, 2015, LeStacia Harris drove Shanice Dozier and seventeen-
year-old Tibbs to a gas station/convenience store in Indianapolis. Tibbs and
Dozier waited outside in the car while Harris went inside to purchase some
items. While Harris was inside, Dozier noticed some cash lying on the ground.
She claimed she did not see anyone drop it, and she retrieved it while Tibbs
stayed in the car. As Dozier got back in the car, a man—David Bowman—
came running up to the car, claiming the cash was his. Bowman pushed down
one of the car windows and said, “I’m about to kill you right now if you don’t
give me my money back.” Tr. Vol. III. p. 16. Bowman put his hand into one
of his pockets as if reaching for a gun. As Bowman repeatedly said he was
going to kill Dozier, Tibbs said “No you’re not.” Id. at 19. After Bowman
again said, “Oh, yes, I am,” Tibbs pulled out a gun that he had in the car and
fatally shot Bowman in the chest. Id. Harris had returned to the car by this
point and immediately drove away. Dozier found a shell casing on the floor of
the car and gave it to Tibbs, and she believes he “got rid of it.” Id. at 36.
Neither the shell casing nor the gun was ever found.
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[4] The State charged Tibbs as an adult with murder, Level 6 felony obstruction of
justice, Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm, and Class A
misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. The State later dismissed
the dangerous possession of a firearm charge. While Tibbs was out on bond
awaiting trial and on home detention, and after he turned eighteen, he was
arrested and charged in Jackson County with aiding, inducing, or causing Level
3 felony armed robbery, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. At the murder trial, Tibbs claimed
self-defense, and the jury was instructed on that defense. The jury acquitted
Tibbs of murder but found him guilty of Level 6 felony obstruction of justice
and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.
[5] After the jury’s verdict but before the trial court entered judgment of conviction
and sentenced Tibbs, he petitioned to have his case transferred to juvenile court
for adjudication and disposition. At a hearing on the petition, he presented
testimony from a social worker and from his mother. The social worker
testified generally about juvenile brain development, differences between the
juvenile and adult criminal systems, and the disparate impact of an adult
criminal conviction versus a delinquency adjudication. Tibbs’s mother related
that he had never been arrested prior to the shooting of Bowman, that he had
not had serious discipline problems in school, and that he had extended family
willing to support him. The State did not present evidence at the hearing, but it
did submit a written memorandum of law arguing against transfer to juvenile
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court to which it attached the charging information and officer incident report
for the pending Jackson County charges.
[6] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
But for the violation of my orders, I’d send him back to juvenile
in a minute, even at age 18. But the violation of my orders also
includes the arrest in Jackson County, where a gun was involved
even if he didn’t have it. . . . It’s going to be up to someone else
to convince me that during that hour long drive there was no idea
what was going on. So the [sic] all of that information inclines
me to decide not to send this back to juvenile.
Tr. Vol. IV pp. 137-38. The trial court did not issue a written order denying
Tibbs’s motion to transfer, but the denial is reflected in the chronological case
summary. Tibbs now appeals.
Analysis
[7] Tibbs’s specific claim on appeal is that the trial court was required to enter
findings explaining why it denied his motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court and that the trial court’s oral statement at the conclusion of the hearing on
his motion was inadequate. Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-4 provides in part:
(a) The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an
individual for an alleged violation of:
(1) IC 35-41-5-1(a) (attempted murder);
(2) IC 35-42-1-1 (murder);
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(3) IC 35-42-3-2 (kidnapping);
(4) IC 35-42-4-1 (rape);
(5) IC 35-42-4-2 (criminal deviate conduct) (before its
repeal);
(6) IC 35-42-5-1 (robbery) if:
(A) the robbery was committed while armed with a
deadly weapon; or
(B) the robbery results in bodily injury or serious
bodily injury;
(7) IC 35-42-5-2 (carjacking) (before its repeal);
(8) IC 35-47-2-1 (carrying a handgun without a license), if
charged as a felony;
(9) IC 35-47-10 (children and firearms), if charged as a
felony; or
(10) any offense that may be joined under IC 35-34-1-
9(a)(2) with any crime listed in this subsection;
if the individual was at least sixteen (16) years of age but less than
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.
*****
(c) If:
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(1) an individual described in subsection (a) is charged
with one (1) or more offenses listed in subsection (a);
(2) all the charges under subsection (a)(1) through (a)(9)
resulted in an acquittal or were dismissed; and
(3) the individual pleads guilty to or is convicted of any
offense other than an offense listed in subsection (a)(1)
through (a)(9);
the court having adult criminal jurisdiction may withhold
judgment and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for
adjudication and disposition. In determining whether to transfer
jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition,
the court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall consider
whether there are appropriate services available in the juvenile
justice system, whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation
under the juvenile justice system, and whether it is in the best
interests of the safety and welfare of the community that the child
be transferred to juvenile court. . . .
[8] The language under which Tibbs filed his motion—subsection (c) of the
statute—was enacted in 2016 and has not yet been the subject of an appellate
opinion.1 Here, Tibbs had to be charged in adult court for murder under
subsection (a)(2). But, when he was acquitted of that charge and only convicted
of obstruction of justice and misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a
license, he was eligible for consideration of what might be called a “reverse
1
This amendment was effective July 1, 2016—after Tibbs committed these offenses but before his trial. The
State makes no argument that the statute was inapplicable to Tibbs.
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transfer” to juvenile court for disposition, rather than being convicted and
sentenced in adult court.
[9] The “reverse transfer” statute states that a trial court “may withhold judgment
and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition”
after consideration of several enumerated factors. “The term ‘may’ in a statute
ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion.” Tongate v.
State, 954 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. It logically
follows that a trial court’s ruling on a “reverse transfer” request would be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035,
1046 (Ind. Ct. App.2005) (noting that whether to grant a mistrial is within the
trial court’s discretion and is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of that
discretion), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or
when the trial court misinterprets the law. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616
(Ind. 2013).
[10] Tibbs does not directly challenge the merits of the trial court’s ruling. The
narrow inquiry here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not
entering more detailed findings supporting its decision to deny Tibbs’s “reverse
transfer” petition. Effectively, Tibbs contends the trial court misinterpreted the
law as not requiring detailed findings and that we should remand for the entry
of such findings. We disagree.
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[11] As a matter of statutory interpretation, we will not ordinarily read requirements
into clear and unambiguous statutes that are not there. Mitchell v. State, 813
N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The “reverse transfer”
statute contains no requirement that the trial court enter findings. If the
legislature had wanted to require such findings, it knows how to do so. See
Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding trial
court did not err in failing to enter findings in support of its denial of petition to
be removed from lifetime sex offender registry because statute only required
such findings if a petition was approved). In fact, there is an express statutory
requirement for a trial court to enter findings in support of a discretionary
decision to waive a juvenile into adult court. Ind. Code § 31-30-3-10. The
legislature chose not to enact such a requirement for a “reverse waiver,” and we
will not read one into the statute.
[12] Tibbs argues as a more general proposition that a trial court should enter
findings regarding a “reverse waiver” decision by relying upon our supreme
court’s non-statutory requirement that trial courts enter detailed statements in
support of sentences they impose upon defendants. See, e.g., Anglemyer v. State,
868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), aff’d on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
However, Tibbs has not cited any case that has applied the sentencing
statement requirement outside the context of sentencing. That requirement was
established for a number of reasons specific to sentencing and the constitutional
authority of Indiana appellate courts to review and revise sentences, including:
guarding against arbitrary and capricious sentences; providing an adequate
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basis for appellate review; contributing to the rationality and consistency of
sentences; explaining to the public and the defendant why a particular sentence
was imposed; fostering acceptance of the sentence by the defendant in the
furtherance of rehabilitation; and fostering acceptance of the sentence by the
public to promote confidence in the criminal justice system. Id. (quoting
Abercrombie v. State, 274 Ind. 407, 412, 417 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1981)).
[13] Aside from sentencing decisions, trial courts in Indiana generally have no
obligation to enter findings in support of their rulings in criminal cases. See
Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind. 1998).2 Tibbs contends that the
importance of a “reverse waiver” ruling should necessitate findings in support
of the denial of such a petition. Although such a ruling is indeed important, it
is not more so than a ruling on a motion to suppress, the outcome of which
could determine whether a prosecution can proceed, and which does not
require findings. Id. In fact, a trial court is not even required to enter findings
to support a judgment of conviction following a bench trial, which is the most
consequential decision a trial court can make. See Miller v. State, 72 N.E.3d 502,
517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 77 N.E.3d 1196, 1197
(Ind. 2017). We decline to impose a requirement that trial courts enter findings
in support of rulings on a motion for “reverse waiver” under Indiana Code
Section 31-30-1-4(c).
2
As the Willsey opinion noted, such findings generally are required in the federal courts, at least with respect
to pre-trial motions. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12(d).
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Conclusion
[14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion and was not required to enter
findings in support of its decision to deny Tibbs’s motion to transfer his case to
juvenile court. We affirm his convictions for Level 6 felony obstruction of
justice and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.
[15] Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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Cameron Tibbs v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion