IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0798
Filed October 25, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CRISTINA KAYE BRIONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
Strausser, District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals her conviction following a guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Shawn C. McCullough of The Law Office of Jeffrey L. Powell, P.L.C.,
Washington, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary C. Miller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.
Cristina Briones appeals her conviction for driving while barred, following a
guilty plea. Briones maintains she received ineffective assistance from trial
counsel; specifically, she claims counsel was ineffective because allowing her to
plead guilty “foreclose[ed] the possibility of challenging the issue of her driving
status” on appeal.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015). “To prove ineffective assistance,
the [applicant] must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘(1)
[her] trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted
in prejudice.’” State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010) (citation omitted).
Briones’s claim fails if either element is lacking. See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d
128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Although we often preserve claims of ineffective
assistance, where, as here, the record is adequate, we choose to decide the
issue on direct appeal. See State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010).
As we understand Briones’s claim, she is ultimately arguing there is no
factual basis to support her guilty plea and counsel was ineffective for allowing
her to plead guilty without a factual basis. In such a case, prejudice is inherent.
See State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999).
While Briones makes several statements that she was “unaware of her
license status” at the time of the guilty plea, knowledge of her driving status or
showing intent to drive while barred are not necessary elements of the crime.
See State v. Williams, No. 16-0894, 2017 WL 3524729, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
16, 2017) (en banc). Rather, the only two elements of the offense include: (1)
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Briones was operating a motor vehicle, and (2) her license was barred. See id.;
see also Iowa Code §§ 321.560, 321.561 (2017). The minutes of evidence
establish that Briones was stopped by a police officer while driving a vehicle on
January 20, 2017. Additionally, notice from the department of transportation
shows that Briones was barred from driving as of November 28, 2016, effective
until November 27, 2018. Thus, there is a factual basis to support Briones’s
guilty plea.
Whether Briones knew she was barred at the time she was stopped or at
the time she pled guilty is inapposite; Briones has not established counsel was
ineffective for allowing her to enter a guilty plea. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.