IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0547
Filed October 25, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY MICHAEL PLUNKETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Steven J.
Andreasen, Judge.
A defendant challenges his sentence for lascivious acts with a child.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Anthony Michael Plunkett pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child, in
violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(a), (2)(a) (2014). The district court
sentenced Plunkett to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed ten
years. In this appeal, Plunkett challenges his sentence. He contends the district
court abused its discretion in considering Plunkett’s employment history and
education history at the time of sentencing. Specifically, the district court
considered the fact Plunkett was unemployed and had not completed high school
or taken steps to obtain his GED.
We review Plunkett’s challenge to his sentence for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552–53 (Iowa 2015). This is a deferential
standard of review:
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing
decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of
sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the
offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.
It is equally important to consider the host of factors that weigh in
on the often arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender,
including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,
the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances
of reform . . . . The application of these goals and factors to an
individual case, of course, will not always lead to the same
sentence. Yet, this does not mean the choice of one particular
sentencing option over another constitutes error. Instead, it
explains the discretionary nature of judging and the source of the
respect afforded by the appellate process.
Judicial discretion imparts the power to act within legal
parameters according to the dictates of a judge’s own conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment of others. It is essential to judging
because judicial decisions frequently are not colored in black and
white. Instead, they deal in differing shades of gray, and discretion
is needed to give the necessary latitude to the decision-making
process. This inherent latitude in the process properly limits our
review. Thus, our task on appeal is not to second guess the
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decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.
Id.
Plunkett has failed to establish the district court abused its broad
sentencing discretion. The record reflects Plunkett had sexual intercourse with a
thirteen-year-old girl and impregnated her. In imposing sentence, the district
court considered this offense conduct as well as the defendant’s employment
history, education history, failure to take responsibility for his conduct, and lack of
remorse. The district court’s consideration of the defendant’s employment and
education history are permissible factors to consider at sentencing as each bears
on the defendant’s chances for reform. See Iowa Code § 907.5(1) (setting forth
sentencing considerations); State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995). In
addition, the information was contained in the presentence investigation report,
which was presented to the district court without objection. See Iowa Code
§ 901.5 (providing the district court shall receive and examine “all pertinent
information, including the presentence investigation report”). The district court
did not abuse its discretion in considering information contained in the
presentence investigation report and relevant to the sentencing decision.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.