NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2710-15T3
S.M.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
AND HEALTH SERVICES and CAMDEN
COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Respondent-Respondent.
_____________________________________
Submitted October 17, 2017 – Decided October 27, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Department of Human
Services, Division of Medical Assistance and
Health Services.
Schutjer Bogar LLC, attorneys for appellant
(John Pendergast, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Melissa Bayly, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner S.M. appeals a final decision by the Director of
the Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services that limited
her eligibility for Medicaid benefits because she maintained with
her son a joint bank account containing approximately $70,000. She
argues the Director did not fairly consider that her son was the
sole source of nearly $60,000 of those funds and, consequently,
the Director's final decision was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.
During the pendency of the appeal, S.M. moved to supplement
the record on appeal with the depository bank's letter which
purports to confirm that her son, M.M., was the sole source of
$50,000 deposited into the account in question.1 Our colleagues on
another panel left for us a ruling on that motion. We now grant
the motion to supplement, vacate the final agency decision, and
remand for further proceedings.
The record on appeal reveals that the Director's final
decision adopted, with some additional comments, an administrative
law judge's written recommendations formulated after an
1
The bank's letter provides that in February 2009, M.M.
transferred $50,000 cash from a joint checking account with S.M.
into a personal certificate of deposit in his name only, and then
transferred the funds in the certificate account back to the joint
checking account in November 2010. S.M. closed the joint checking
account on August 25, 2011, and a check was made to her alone. The
bank's letter reads, "All funds originated from [M.M.]
personally." That check – nearly $60,000 – was deposited on August
25, 2011 in another joint account; those funds are now being
attributed by S.M. by the Division. Our remand will provide the
mechanism by which any uncertainty about these funds may be
clarified.
2 A-2710-15T3
evidentiary hearing. After hearing the testimony of a county
welfare agency representative and M.M., the ALJ rejected S.M.'s
attempts to rebut the presumption of her access to the joint
account because of his negative view of M.M.'s credibility. That
is, the ALJ rejected the contention that a substantial portion of
the checking account was "derived from the sale of M.M.'s home,"
in which S.M. had no interest, because "M.M. became confrontational
and defensive during cross examination on the issue and this
detracted from his credibility." The Director adopted the ALJ's
determination with some additional comments regarding the fact
that S.M.'s social security checks were also deposited into the
account; although relevant, that finding does not preclude the
contention that M.M. provided a substantial portion of that account
from his own funds.
We normally do not disregard credibility findings because the
ALJ alone saw and heard the witnesses. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009). But, in
reviewing the transcript of the proceedings, we find no support
for the ALJ's view of M.M.'s credibility. The ALJ found M.M.
"confrontational" and "defensive" when cross-examined about the
source of the funds, but the cross-examination did not extend into
that issue. He was only questioned about his mother's physical
well-being and M.M.'s plan for his mother's future. Moreover,
3 A-2710-15T3
there is nothing about the brief cross-examination that would
remotely suggest M.M. was anything other than responsive. We, of
course, have no insight into M.M.'s demeanor, but without a greater
explanation from the factfinder we are left with the strong
impression that there has been a manifest denial of justice with
regard to this particular credibility finding that calls for our
intervention. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65
N.J. 474, 484 (1974); see also Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428
(2015).
Because the material questions surrounding the nature and
source of the checking account were resolved through what seems
to us a mistaken credibility finding, and because the information
provided by way of the motion to supplement raises legitimate
questions yet to be resolved about the impact of this checking
account on S.M.'s Medicaid eligibility, we vacate the final agency
decision and remand for further testimony and submission of
evidence regarding these factual questions about the source of the
funds.
The motion to supplement is granted, the final agency decision
vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
4 A-2710-15T3
S.M. VS. DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES AND CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES(DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICALASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES)
Combined Opinion