NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10165
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:09-cr-02720-RCC
v. MEMORANDUM *
VANESSA LYNN RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Vanessa Lynn Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the sentence of 12 months and 163 days imposed upon revocation of
probation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Rodriguez contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court ordered it to run consecutively to her state sentence. The district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall,
552 U.S. at 51; see also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) (court may impose sentence to run
consecutively to undischarged term of imprisonment “to achieve a reasonable
punishment for the instant offense”).
Moreover, contrary to Rodriguez’s contention, the district court did not
violate Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). The record reflects that, while
the district court urged Rodriguez to use her time in prison wisely, it did not
impose or lengthen the sentence to promote Rodriguez’s rehabilitation. See id. at
334 (federal court does not run afoul of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) by “discussing the
opportunities for rehabilitation within prison”). The court’s remarks about the
state parole system were directed to the issue of whether federal supervision after
Rodriguez’s release was warranted, which does not implicate Tapia. See United
States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.
2 16-10165