NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4942-15T3
OAK KNOLL VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRIS ANN JAYE,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
Argued October 12, 2017 – Decided October 30, 2017
Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Special Civil Part, Mercer
County, Docket No. DC-004807-15.
Chris Ann Jaye, appellant, argued the cause
pro se.
Steven R. Rowland argued the cause for
respondent (Brown Moskowitz & Kallen, PC,
attorneys; Mr. Rowland, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Chris Ann Jaye is a unit owner at Oak Knoll Village,
a condominium community in Clinton Township. She appeals from the
June 2, 2016 order denying her motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2016 order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff Oak
Knoll Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Oak Knoll). The
order awarded Oak Knoll damages for unpaid common element expense
assessments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:8B-17 and attorney's fees
incurred in pursuit of its collection action pursuant to N.J.S.A.
46:8B-21. After careful review of the record and applicable legal
principles, we affirm.
On June 8, 2015, Oak Knoll filed this collection action in
Hunterdon County on account of defendant's undisputed failure to
pay her common element expense assessments for 2015. On June 16,
2015, venue was transferred to Mercer County.
On July 7, 2015, defendant removed this action to the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis
of a proposed counterclaim against Oak Knoll under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692 to - 1692p. On July
9, 2015, Oak Knoll filed a motion to remand the case to the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Special Civil Part, and for a fee
award pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c). On July 30, 2015, United
States District Court Judge Peter G. Sheridan issued an order and
memorandum opinion granting Oak Knoll's motion to remand the case
back to the Superior Court but denying its application for fees.
In reaching that decision, Judge Sheridan applied well-settled law
that a federal question appearing in a counterclaim is insufficient
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to establish federal question jurisdiction before the District
Court. Finding no basis for federal question or diversity
jurisdiction, Judge Sheridan remanded the case to the Superior
Court, Special Civil Part.
On November 4, 2015, Oak Knoll filed a motion for summary
judgment, supported by a certification of Oak Knoll's property
manager, detailing the common element expense arrearages. On
November 30, 2015, defendant filed opposing papers. While Oak
Knoll's motion was pending, defendant filed several applications
in District Court to re-open the federal action. Judge Sheridan
denied each of those applications.
On February 25, 2016, the rescheduled return date of the
motion, the trial court heard oral argument. Defendant chose not
to appear. Defendant was permitted to present opposing oral
argument, however, on March 23, 2016. Defendant does not dispute
that she did not pay her common element expense assessments for
2015. After hearing this additional oral argument, the trial
court granted summary judgment to Oak Knoll, entering judgment in
the amount of $11,485.80, comprised of association fees of $4415
and attorney's fees of $7070.08.
On April 12, 2016, defendant moved for reconsideration of the
entry of judgment and a stay of post-judgment collection efforts
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pending appeal. The trial judge issued a June 2, 2016 order
denying defendant's motion.
On July 14, 2016, defendant filed this appeal. Defendant
then moved for leave to consider her appeal timely as to both the
earlier summary judgment ruling and the subsequent order denying
reconsideration. In an August 15, 2016 order, another panel of
this court ruled: "The motion is denied as to the March 23, 2016
order. The appeal is timely as to the June 2, 2016 order denying
reconsideration. The appeal is limited to that order."
Defendant later moved before this court for emergent relief
to remove the judgment and lien as well as a later lien obtained
by plaintiff as a result of her failure to pay her 2016
assessments.1 On August 11, 2016, yet another panel of this court
denied defendant's motion for emergent relief. The Supreme Court
also denied emergent relief.
Defendant accused the trial court of not reading the
condominium association agreement. We note that defendant did not
provide a copy of the agreement as part of the appellate record.
Defendant also failed to provide a transcript of the oral argument
1
Plaintiff has recovered a subsequent judgment against defendant
for unpaid 2016 common element expenses, Oak Knoll Village
Condominium Association v. Jaye, Docket No. HNT-DC-683-16.
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on February 25, 2016 and the additional oral argument and trial
court's oral decision on March 23, 2016. See R. 2:5-4(a).
Defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) the
Appellate Division lacks jurisdiction because no trial court order
has been properly certified as final; (2) default was improperly
entered against her; (3) the trial judge, who is retired on recall,
denied her due process and is incompetent, biased, and unfit; and
(4) plaintiff lacks standing because the plaintiff did not
authorize the commencement of this action and did not retain the
law firm representing plaintiff.
Defendant sued the trial judge twice in the past for his
actions as a judge. On that basis, defendant claims the trial
judge was biased and should have disqualified himself from hearing
the matter.
Under our rules, the judge of any court "shall be
disqualified" if the there is any reason "which might preclude a
fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably
lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g); see
also Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.17(B)(1) ("Judges shall
disqualify themselves if they have a personal bias or prejudice
toward a party or a party's lawyer. . . ."). "The disqualification
decision is initially left to the discretion of the trial court."
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 275-76 (1997). "[J]udges are not
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free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to
recuse itself unless the factual bases for its disqualification
are shown by the movant to be true or are already known by the
court." Id. at 276; see also State v. De Maio, 70 N.J.L. 220, 222
(E. & A. 1904).
Defendant did not file a motion to recuse the trial judge
pursuant to Rule 1:12-2. Nor does the record in this matter
disclose any basis to conclude that the trial judge should have
disqualified himself on the court's own motion. See R. 1:12-1.
"'Fundamental to any consideration of possible judicial
disqualification is a showing of prejudice or potential bias.'"
Marshall, supra, 148 N.J. at 276 (quoting State v. Flowers, 109
N.J. Super. 309, 312 (App. Div. 1970)). "Bias cannot be inferred
from adverse rulings against a party." Strahan v. Strahan, 402
N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008); see Marshall, supra, 148
N.J. at 276. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial judge
was biased against her.
The mere suggestion that the trial judge is biased because
defendant has previously sued him does not necessarily require
disqualification or render the judge's rulings void or improper.
"A judge shall not be automatically disqualified upon learning
that a complaint has been filed against the judge with the Advisory
Committee on Judicial Conduct, litigation naming the judge as a
6 A-4942-15T3
party, or any other complaint about the judge by a party." Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.17(E). "If, however, the judge
concludes that there is a reasonable basis to question the court's
impartiality, the judge may recuse himself or herself." Ibid. We
have carefully considered the entire record and find no reasonable
basis to question the trial judge's impartiality or any evidence
of bias. We are satisfied the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by not disqualifying himself.
Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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