MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 213
Docket: Yor-17-202
Submitted
On Briefs: October 24, 2017
Decided: November 2, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE ANASTASIA M.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The mother of Anastasia M. appeals from a judgment of the
District Court (Springvale, Foster, J.) terminating her parental rights to the child
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).1 She
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support both the court’s finding of
parental unfitness and its determination that termination is in Anastasia’s best
interest. Because the evidence supports the court’s factual findings and
discretionary determination, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear
and convincing evidence that the mother (1) is unwilling or unable to protect
the child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs,
1
The father’s parental rights to Anastasia were also terminated when he failed to secure new
counsel after asking the court to remove his previous attorney and subsequently failed to appear for
docket call or the termination hearing. The court found that the father had abandoned the child, and
he is not a party to this appeal.
2
and (2) is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for her within that
timeframe. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The court also found that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in Anastasia’s best interest. See
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). We review the factual findings supporting the
unfitness determination for clear error, see In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3,
155 A.3d 430, and apply the same standard to the factual findings supporting
the best interest determination, although we review the court’s ultimate
conclusion that termination is in the child’s best interest “for an abuse of
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial
court’s lens,” and giving the court’s judgment “substantial deference,”
In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 33, 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶3] The court based its determinations on the following findings of fact:
One of the most difficult sources of jeopardy to rectify in child
protection proceedings is the risk posed by domestic violence. In
those cases, often one parent is the victim of the other. The
dynamics of domestic violence, the interplay of power and control
between the parties, and internal and external pressures to reunify
as a family can undermine and delay reunification efforts. In a
process where time frames are tied to those reasonabl[y]
necessary to meet a child’s needs, that delay may be fatal to even
good-faith efforts to resolve jeopardy. [The mother] has an
intimate knowledge of domestic violence.
. . . .
3
Throughout this case, and particularly at trial, [the mother]
minimized her substance abuse. Although initially confirming in
her testimony that the issues presented in this matter were alcohol
abuse and domestic violence, minutes later she insisted that her
own use of alcohol was an issue for a “short period” of her life. . . .
Although she agreed at trial that she has a problem with alcohol,
[the mother] quickly added that she simply stays away from it.
But she doesn’t. She tested positive for the presence of
alcohol in January, June and September of 2016. The court does not
find [her] explanation, that the January and September tests were
attributable to her use of Nyquil, believable.
. . . .
Then there is the issue of misuse of other substances. [The
mother] has used marijuana regularly during this case. . . . [She]
mentioned that there had been discussion at one point of using a
prescribed benzodiazepine instead of the marijuana. Before her
prescriber was willing to do so, however, [the mother] needed to
go a month without using marijuana; she was unable to do so. She
was diagnosed with cannabis use disorder, moderate. [The
mother's medication-management provider’s] notes indicate she
had encouraged her client to stop using marijuana, to no avail.
[The mother] insists she has had no contact with [the father]
since early November of 2016. . . . As [the DHHS caseworker] noted
at trial, she has been told before by [the mother] that she and [the
father] have separated, only to discover that was not the case or
that the couple had reunited. As recently as December of 2016, [the
mother] received a text message from [the father] with a picture of
Anastasia. She admitted to [a visit supervisor] that she and [the
father] continued to communicate by telephone, although she did
not share that information with [the caseworker].
When asked what it would take for her to resolve the issue of
domestic violence in her relationship, [the mother] responded it
would require [the father] staying away from her.
4
. . . .
[The father] is not the only individual who has been abusive
to [the mother]. . . . [Her current therapist]’s preliminary treatment
plan recites that [the mother] “has been involved in multiple
relationships that have involved domestic violence.” He noted that
[the mother] would need to develop skills to establish and maintain
healthy boundaries in her relationships to successfully address this
issue. It is not simply a matter of [the father] staying away. [The
mother] has to decide to keep him away, acquire the ability to do
that, and then exercise that ability, both with [the father] and
others. Unfortunately, she has waited too long to do so.
. . . .
The Department did use reasonable efforts to reunify
Anastasia with her parents. [The caseworker] negotiated
reasonable reunification plans with each parent . . . . She made
referrals for services and transportation. She arranged regular
visitation between Anastasia and each parent. She convened
regular Family Team Meetings to review the status of reunification
and address issues . . . .
Anastasia remains in [her second] foster home, where she
was placed in April of 2016. She is a happy, healthy child with no
discernable developmental delays. She is closely and appropriately
bonded to the foster family, and they to her.
. . . .
[T]ime is a pivotal factor in this matter. Anastasia has been
out of her parents’ care for twenty months, a lifetime for a child
who is only two years old. [The mother] is, essentially, only
beginning the work she needs to do on her relationships and her
substance abuse. It is unclear if she will be successful in that
effort. . . . Neither parent can assume responsibility for Anastasia,
5
or address the risks they present to their daughter, within a time
frame necessary to meet her needs.
[¶4] Given these findings and the court’s other extensive, specific
findings of fact, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record,
the court did not err in its determination of unfitness nor did it err or abuse its
discretion in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with
a permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest. See In re Logan M.,
2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17,
889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Julie-Anne Blanchard, Esq., The Law Office of Julie-Anne Blanchard, LLC,
Biddeford, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Springvale District Court docket number PC-2015-35
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY