IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
SUSAN WHITE DOWLING, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
WIFE, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellant,
CASE NO. 1D16-2264
v.
ROBERT JASON DOWLING,
HUSBAND,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed November 6, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Robert M. Foster, Judge.
John N. Bogdanoff, The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm, The Villages, for Appellant.
Beth M. Terry, Law Office of Beth M. Terry, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Susan White Dowling, the former wife, appeals from a final judgment of
dissolution of marriage. We agree with her argument that the alimony award must
be recalculated, but otherwise affirm without comment.
On June 17, 2014, Ms. Dowling filed a petition for dissolution of marriage
from her husband Jason Dowling. After conducting discovery, the parties went to a
bench trial on issues related to the equitable distribution of assets and debt and to the
determination of entitlement to alimony. After hearing the evidence, the trial court
found Ms. Dowling’s net monthly income to be $5,418.81 and her monthly expenses
to be $6,199.28. The court found Mr. Dowling’s net monthly income to be
$11,729.31 and his monthly expenses to be $10,037.06. The court’s income and
expense findings were based on the parties’ financial affidavits which indicated that
Jason Dowling paid the full monthly amount of $2,053.98 on a line of credit owed
by the parties. Based on these numbers, the court found Jason Dowling had an ability
to pay alimony, and ordered him to pay durational alimony to his former wife of
$1,200 per month for five years.
In general, “[t]he primary factors to be considered in deciding to award
alimony are the needs of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay.” Motie
v. Motie, 132 So. 3d 1210, 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980)). An alimony award is insufficient if
it “does not ‘provide for the needs and necessities of life for a former spouse as they
were established during the marriage of the parties.’” Rhoads v. Rhoads, 213 So. 3d
968, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quoting Mallard v. Mallard, 771 So. 2d 1138, 1140
(Fla. 2000)).
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In this case, the trial court’s alimony calculation did not take into account the
change it ordered with respect to the parties’ payment of the $2,053.98/month line
of credit debt. The trial court made each party responsible to pay for one-half of that
debt, whereas the financial affidavits used to compute alimony assumed that Mr.
Dowling was paying it entirely himself. Making Ms. Dowling responsible for one-
half of this debt substantially increased her monthly expenses, and comparatively
lowered Mr. Dowling’s monthly expenses, so that their expenses were not accurately
reflected in the court’s findings. Indeed, adding a line-of-credit payment of over
$1,000 per month to Ms. Dowling’s expenses consumes almost all of the $1,200
alimony award and doesn’t appear to “provide for the needs and necessities of life
for a former spouse as they were established during the marriage of the parties.”
Rhoads, 213 So. 3d at 970 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we reverse the alimony award for reconsideration in light of the
court’s distribution of the marital debt. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
WOLF, OSTERHAUS, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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