UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7504
DERRICK LAMONT ROBERTSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CRAIG APKER,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:13-hc-02274-BO)
Submitted: October 20, 2017 Decided: November 8, 2017
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Derrick Lamont Robertson, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Seth Morgan
Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Derrick Lamont Robertson appeals the district court’s orders dismissing without
prejudice his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition and denying his motion for
reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for further proceedings.
Robertson challenges the district court’s dismissal of his pro se § 2241 petition as
duplicative of a counseled motion for reconsideration or, alternatively, for § 2241 relief,
which was filed on Robertson’s behalf under a separate case number (the “counseled
motion”). Concern for efficient judicial administration generally requires federal courts
to avoid duplicative federal litigation. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 468 F.3d 199, 206
& 207 n.6 (4th Cir. 2006). “[T]he general rule is that a suit is duplicative of another suit
if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two
actions.” I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986);
see Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on
other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). “Trial courts are afforded
broad discretion in determining whether to stay or dismiss litigation in order to avoid
duplicating a proceeding already pending in another federal court.” I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d
at 1551-52. “However, a court abuses its discretion when it enjoins a party from
proceeding in another suit that is not truly duplicative of the suit before it.” Smith v. SEC,
129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997).
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We have reviewed the record and discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to dismiss Robertson’s pro se § 2241 petition as duplicative of the
counseled motion, to the extent that both filings effectively seek the same relief from the
same criminal judgment in reliance on the same essential claims for relief. We also
observe, however, that the specific arguments raised in the counseled motion are not
identical to those raised in the pro se petition—notably, with respect to the request for
relief under § 2241. To the extent the arguments raised in the counseled motion are not
duplicative of Robertson’s pro se request for relief under § 2241 and § 2255(e), we vacate
the dismissal order in part and remand to permit the district court to consider these pro se
arguments in conjunction with the pending counseled motion. In so doing, we express no
opinion as to the merits of Robertson’s claims for relief, leaving consideration of those
issues to the district court in the first instance.
Accordingly, we grant leave to appeal in forma pauperis and affirm the district
court’s judgment in part, insofar as the pro se petition raises the same grounds for relief
as the counseled motion. However, we vacate the court’s judgement with respect to any
argument raised in the pro se petition under §2241, 2255(e) not encompassed in the
counseled motion. We grant Robertson’s motion to remand and deny as moot
Robertson’s petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
REMANDED
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