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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ISAAC JONES, : No. 486 WDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, March 1, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0002961-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2017
Isaac Jones appeals from the March 1, 2017 order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that dismissed his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546
(“PCRA”). We affirm.
The facts giving rise to appellant’s convictions stem from appellant’s
shooting of the victim, Jaymah Hartage. The record reflects that appellant
entered open guilty pleas in connection with that shooting to all elements of
the following crimes, with the exception of the element of serious bodily
injury: criminal attempt (murder); robbery (inflicts serious bodily injury);
aggravated assault (attempts to cause serious bodily injury); and firearms
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not to be carried without a license.1 Following entry of his guilty pleas, the
trial court reviewed Mr. Hartage’s medical records and determined that he
suffered serious bodily injury, which raised the maximum sentence that
appellant could have received on the criminal attempt conviction to 40 years
of imprisonment. (Notes of testimony, 10/16/12 at 12-14.) Subsequently,
however, the trial court sentenced appellant to 9 to 18 years of
imprisonment on the criminal attempt conviction, together with a concurrent
term of imprisonment of 2 to 4 years on the firearms violation. The trial
court imposed no further penalty on the remaining convictions.
The record reflects that appellant did not file a direct appeal, but filed
a pro se PCRA petition on December 9, 2013. The trial court appointed
PCRA counsel, and PCRA counsel filed an amended petition. The trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 26, 2017. By order dated
February 28, 2017, but docketed on March 1, 2017, the trial court denied
appellant’s PCRA petition. On March 28, 2017, appellant filed a notice of
appeal to this court. The trial court ordered appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant timely complied. The trial court then filed with this court the
memorandum that it filed at the time that it entered its March 1, 2017 order
denying appellant PCRA relief.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3701(a)(1), 2702(a)(1), and 6106, respectively.
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Was plea counsel ineffective in permitting Appellant
to enter an unknowing plea where the plea was
entered pursuant to a colloquy that failed to
establish a factual basis for the plea?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
In PCRA appeals, our scope of review “is limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 573 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation
omitted). Because most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we
employ a mixed standard of review. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d
875, 878 (Pa. 2009). We defer to the PCRA court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations supported by the record. Commonwealth v.
Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In contrast, we
review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.
Appellant’s issue asserts ineffective assistance of plea counsel.
In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, we presume that counsel is effective.
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 558 Pa. 532, 738 A.2d
435, 441 (Pa. 1999). To overcome this
presumption, Appellant must establish three factors.
First, that the underlying claim has arguable merit.
See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108,
661 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. 1995). Second, that counsel
had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction.
Id. In determining whether counsel’s action was
reasonable, we do not question whether there were
other more logical courses of action which counsel
could have pursued; rather, we must examine
whether counsel’s decisions had any reasonable
basis. See Rollins, 738 A.2d at 441;
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Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa. 153,
527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Finally, “Appellant
must establish that he has been prejudiced by
counsel’s ineffectiveness; in order to meet this
burden, he must show that ‘but for the act or
omission in question, the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.’” See Rollins, 738 A.2d
at 441 (quoting Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 357). A
claim of ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing
that the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of
these prongs. Commonwealth v. (Michael)
Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 221-22 (Pa.
2001); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258,
744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d
693, 701 (Pa. 1998) (“If it is clear that Appellant has
not demonstrated that counsel’s act or omission
adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings,
the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and
the court need not first determine whether the first
and second prongs have been met.”).
Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).
A criminal defendant has the right to effective
counsel during a plea process as well as during trial.
The law does not require that appellant be pleased
with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of
guilty. Instead, the defendant must show that
counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an
unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. The
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Therefore,
allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the
entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief
only if the ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter
an involuntary or unknowing plea.
Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must
be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered.
There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,
and the decision as to whether to allow a defendant
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to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of
the trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing,
a defendant must make a showing of prejudice
amounting to “manifest injustice.” A plea rises to
the level of manifest injustice when it was entered
into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently. A
defendant’s disappointment in the sentence imposed
does not constitute “manifest injustice.”
In order to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent plea, trial courts are required to ask the
following questions in the guilty plea colloquy:
1) Does the defendant understand the
nature of the charges to which he or she
is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
3) Does the defendant understand that he
or she has the right to a trial by jury?
4) Does the defendant understand that he
or she is presumed innocent until found
guilty?
5) Is the defendant aware of the
permissible ranges of sentences and/or
fines for the offenses charged?
6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is
not bound by the terms of any plea
agreement tendered unless the judge
accepts such agreement?
The guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively
demonstrate that the defendant understood what the
plea connoted and its consequences. Once a
defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is
presumed that he was aware of what he was doing,
and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon
him. In determining whether a guilty plea was
entered knowingly and voluntarily, a court is free to
consider the totality of the circumstances
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surrounding the plea. Furthermore, nothing in the
rule precludes the supplementation of the oral
colloquy by a written colloquy that is read,
completed, and signed by the defendant and made a
part of the plea proceedings.
Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(internal citations, brackets, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted).
Here, appellant focuses on the trial court’s failure to provide a factual
description of the Commonwealth’s charges during the oral plea colloquy and
claims that such a defect is enough to warrant withdrawal of his guilty pleas.
In determining whether a defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea,
however, we are free to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding that plea. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 513
(Pa. 2004).
In this case, the record demonstrates that appellant read, completed,
and signed an extensive written guilty plea form which the trial court
incorporated into the record at the guilty plea hearing. (Docket #10,
appellant’s written and executed guilty plea -- explanation of defendant’s
rights, 10/16/12; notes of testimony, 10/16/12 at 10-11.) On that form,
appellant affirmed, in writing, among other things, that (i) he discussed with
his attorney the factual basis of each charged offense; (ii) he admitted that
he committed the crimes and does not challenge or dispute the charges;
(iii) he discussed with his attorney the maximum possible sentences that the
trial court could impose; (iv) he understood that his plea must be voluntary
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and his rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived;
(v) no one forced him to enter the plea and that he did so of his own free
will; (vi) no threats were made to him to enter his plea; (vii) no one,
including his attorney, promised him anything in exchange for the guilty
plea; (viii) he was satisfied with the legal advice and legal representation of
his attorney; (ix) his attorney went over the meaning of the terms of his
guilty plea; and (x) he understood his rights. (Docket #10, appellant’s
written and executed guilty plea -- explanation of defendant’s rights,
10/16/12.)
Additionally, during the on-the-record oral examination at the guilty
plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. Do you fully and completely
understand what we’re doing?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
....
THE COURT: All right. Sir, has anyone forced,
threatened or coerced you in any way into making
your guilty plea here today?
[APPELLANT]: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: And, sir, has anyone promised you
anything in order to make this plea, with the
exception of any offer extended by the
Commonwealth?
[APPELLANT]: No, ma’am.
Notes of testimony, 10/16/12 at 7-8.
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At that point, the trial court set forth the charges against appellant,
together with the maximum penalties that appellant faced. (Id. at 8-9.)
Appellant acknowledged that he had discussed with his attorney and fully
and completely understood the nature and elements of each charge and the
maximum penalties associated with each charge. (Id. at 9-10.) The
following then took place:
THE COURT: Sir, you’ve completed for me a Guilty
Plea - Explanation of Defendant’s Rights form; is that
correct?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And, sir, did you complete this form
with the advice, assistance and supervision of your
attorney?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And, sir, did you answer all of the
questions in this form truthfully and honestly?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: It’s indicated by your signature, sir, on
page 11 of this form that you’ve read and
understood each question. Is that, in fact, true, sir?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
Id. at 10-11.
Following appellant’s acknowledgement of his signature on page 11 of
the written guilty plea colloquy, the trial court incorporated that plea into the
record. (Id. at 11.) Appellant then confirmed that he was pleading guilty to
the charges because he is, in fact, guilty. (Id.)
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In viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding appellant’s
guilty plea in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record
demonstrates that appellant entered a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
plea. Consequently, appellant has failed to establish plea counsel’s
ineffectiveness.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/13/2017
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Com. v. Jones, I.
Combined Opinion