NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN KNOX, known individually as a No. 17-35119
Matrix System Offender,
D.C. No. 6:16-cv-01750-KI
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
KATE BROWN, for the State of Oregon; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Steven Knox appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from
the denial of parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758
(9th Cir. 2014) (abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); Beets v.
County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Claims One and
Three challenging defendants’ deferral of Knox’s parole release date because
success on these claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Knox’s
confinement or its duration, and Knox failed to allege that his conviction or
sentence has been invalidated. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80-82 (2005)
(a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is barred if success “would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or its duration[,]” unless “the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to Knox’s contentions, Claims One and Three did not allege procedural
challenges that would “not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release.” Id. at
81.
The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Claim Two under the
Younger abstention doctrine because the district court was required to abstain from
interfering with Knox’s pending state court appeal, as all of the requirements for
abstention were met, and no exception to abstention applied. See ReadyLink
Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 758-59 (setting forth requirements for Younger
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abstention in civil cases); Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617, 621
(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining exceptions to Younger and concluding that claimed
constitutional violation “does not, by itself, constitute an exception to the
application of Younger abstention”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Knox’s motion for
reconsideration because Knox failed to state any grounds warranting relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e)).
In light of this disposition, we do not consider the merits of Knox’s claims,
and do not reach the question of whether denial of Knox’s motions for a
preliminary injunction was proper. See Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v.
City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 1286, 1291 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015).
Knox’s requests for judicial notice regarding defense counsel’s action in
state court proceedings, set forth in his reply brief and in Docket Entry No. 32, are
denied.
Knox’s request for an order barring defendants’ appearance at oral argument
(Docket Entry No. 35) is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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