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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-11488
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00173-BJD-JBT-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LARRY HALLAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 28, 2017)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Larry Hallam challenges his two-year prison sentence imposed for using
controlled substances in violation of his supervised release conditions. Hallam is
an opioid addict and lifelong drug abuser, and he contends that the district court
plainly erred by considering rehabilitation as a factor in imposing his two-year
sentence.
Hallam served a year in prison for stealing government property and then
began serving a three-year term of supervised release. The conditions of his
supervised release included the standard prohibition on the use of controlled
substances. About a year into his term of supervised release, Hallam’s probation
officer filed a petition alleging four violations for unlawful opioid use. Hallam
was arrested and incarcerated, and he admitted to the violations.
At Hallam’s revocation hearing the district court calculated his guidelines
range as three to nine months imprisonment with a maximum of two years.
Hallam agreed with the government’s recommendation of three to six months in
prison and no supervised release following imprisonment, stating that he was now
clean, that he needed to handle his addiction without supervision, and that he could
find services on his own if he needed help. He also stated that if he remained on
supervised release, he would get a prescription for pain pills so that he could take
them legally to help him with his back pain.
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The court then questioned Hallam about a traffic infraction that occurred
right before he was arrested for his supervised release violations. A police officer
stopped Hallam after he crossed over a fog line several times, and the court
expressed concern that Hallam could not stay in his lane because he was under the
influence. Hallam denied that he crossed over the line because he was under the
influence, but he admitted that the last time he was sober was when he was in
prison. The court raised the possibility of placing Hallam in a residential drug
treatment program if he remained on supervised release, but Hallam stated that he
would prefer a jail sentence, even one at the top of the guidelines range, and then
release from supervision.
The court found that Hallam violated his conditions of supervised release,
noting that the four opioid violations “evince[d] an inability to control [his]
consumption of controlled substances.” It sentenced Hallam to two years in
prison, after which he would be discharged from supervised release. The court
justified the variance based on Hallam’s “lack of success on supervised release,”
his “unwillingness to undergo inpatient treatment,” the “risk inherent in continual
drug abuse,” and the fact that prison was the “exclusive means of securing [his]
sobriety.”
Hallam contends that the district court impermissibly lengthened his
sentence to promote his rehabilitation from drug use, in violation of the Supreme
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Court’s holding in Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S. Ct. 2382,
2393 (2011), that “a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable
an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote
rehabilitation.” We extended that holding to prison terms imposed for supervised
release violations in United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1306, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2014). Hallam did not raise his Tapia objection at the revocation hearing, and
as a result we review only for plain error. Id. Under plain error review an
appellate court “may not correct an error the defendant failed to raise in the district
court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial
rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quotation marks omitted). If all of those conditions are satisfied, we “may then
exercise [our] discretion to notice [the] forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Even assuming that the district court plainly erred in considering
rehabilitation, Hallam cannot show that the error affected his substantial rights
because his “rehabilitative needs clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the
court’s reasoning.” United States v. Alberts, 859 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017).
Hallam relies on the court’s statement that prison was the “exclusive means” to
keep him sober as evidence that rehabilitation played a major role in his sentence,
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but cherry-picking that quote ignores the context of the entire revocation hearing.
The court imposed the two-year sentence based on Hallam’s history of drug abuse
and the need to ensure public safety, both of which are legitimate factors to
consider in sanctioning a supervised release violation. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), 3583(e). Hallam all but admitted that he remained sober
only while incarcerated, he rejected the option of enrolling in a residential drug
treatment program, and he stated that he would get a prescription for pain pills if
he remained on supervised release. In light of those statements, the court’s
question as to whether Hallam was under the influence when an officer stopped
him for crossing over a fog line indicates that the court was concerned that
Hallam’s drug abuse would endanger the public. That the court might have
believed that Hallam would benefit from two years in prison does not mean that it
impermissibly relied on rehabilitation in imposing his sentence. See United States
v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 282 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When a judge imposes prison, he
may wisely believe that it will have rehabilitative benefits, but those benefits
cannot be the reason for imposing it.”).
Hallam’s history of drug abuse and concern for public safety “drove the
district court’s sentencing decision,” and any consideration of rehabilitation played
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only a minor role, if any. 1 Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1312 (concluding that
defendant’s substantial rights were not impacted where the district court’s
“primary considerations were for the safety of the public and deterring others from
similar conduct”); see also United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir.
2012) (concluding that defendant failed to satisfy the third prong of plain error
review where the context of the “entire sentencing proceeding” showed that the
defendant’s “rehabilitative needs clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the
court’s reasoning,” as the judge “led off the discussion” with and emphasized the
defendant’s breach of trust). As a result, Hallam cannot show that any error
impacted his substantial rights.
AFFIRMED.
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The district court’s questions about placing Hallam in a residential drug treatment
program also do not show that rehabilitation played more than a minor role in its decision, as a
court “commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the
benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334, 131 S. Ct. at 2292.
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