MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 218
Docket: And-17-16
Submitted
On Briefs: June 29, 2017
Decided: November 28, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Concurrence/
Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.
FRED TAYLOR et al.
v.
MARK WALKER
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Fred and Eleanor Taylor appeal from a judgment of the Superior
Court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J.) vacating the District Court’s
(Lewiston, Oram, J.) order denying Mark Walker’s motion to set aside a small
claims judgment entered in the District Court (Ende, J.). Although the appeal is
interlocutory, given the legislative direction that small claims matters proceed
expeditiously, see 14 M.R.S. § 7481 (2016); M.R.S.C.P. 1, we address the appeal
pursuant to the judicial economy exception and remand for further
proceedings.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are set forth in the record. See M.R. Civ. P. 76F(a).
The Taylors are homeowners residing in Auburn. Walker is the president of an
insulation installation company. In the spring of 2015, the Taylors contracted
with Walker’s company to install foam insulation in their home. The Taylors
allege that the job was done unsatisfactorily and that the method Walker’s
company used to install the insulation damaged the home’s roof and siding. The
Taylors subsequently initiated a small claims action in the District Court against
Walker seeking damages of $4,256 plus costs. A hearing on the Taylors’
statement of claim was scheduled for July 5, 2016.
[¶3] On the day of the hearing, Walker failed to appear, and the court
(Ende, J.) entered a default judgment in favor of the Taylors. Later that same
day, Walker submitted to the court a letter in which he alleged that he had
appeared at the wrong courthouse, and when he realized his mistake, he made
efforts to get to the hearing in a timely fashion. In his letter, Walker alleged that
he finally arrived at the correct location approximately two-and-a-half-hours
after the hearing was scheduled to begin. The District Court accepted the letter
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as a motion to set aside the default judgment1 and in a handwritten order,
without conducting a hearing, the court (Oram, J.)2 denied that motion. The
court’s order states in pertinent part, “After considering the filings, [Walker’s]
motion to set aside default is denied.”
[¶4] Walker subsequently appealed to the Superior Court. See M.R.S.C.P.
11(a). The Superior Court vacated the District Court’s order denying Walker’s
motion to set aside the default judgment. It made factual findings, entered an
order setting aside the default, and remanded the matter to the District Court
for a hearing on the Taylors’ underlying claims. In its judgment, without
hearing from Walker and the Taylors, the Superior Court made various factual
findings and credibility determinations, found that the circumstances
described in Walker’s motion to set aside the default judgment constituted
excusable neglect, and therefore concluded that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying his motion. M.R.S.C.P. 9; M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Taylors
then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Superior Court denied. See
M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). They now appeal from the order setting aside the default.
1 M.R.S.C.P. 9, the rule governing motions to set aside small claims judgments, incorporates the
provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 60.
2 It is not clear from the record why the District Court judge who presided over the small claims
trial list was not the judge who acted on Walker’s motion to set aside the default.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Process for Appealing Small Claims Judgments
[¶5] The Superior Court has limited and specific authority when a small
claims matter is appealed. See 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2) (2016); 14 M.R.S.
§ 7484-A(1) (2016); M.R.S.C.P. 11(d). If a defendant appeals and seeks a trial
of the facts, the defendant must include a jury trial request and pay the required
fee for a jury trial in the Superior Court. See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); Revised Court
Fees Schedule and Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order
JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-16), § I(A)(3) (effective July 29, 2016). However,
a plaintiff, having chosen the small claims forum, may appeal only on questions
of law and cannot appeal and request another trial of the facts. See M.R.S.C.P.
11(d)(1).
[¶6] A party may appeal a small claims order to the Superior Court to
raise issues of law or, as is the case here, to challenge an exercise of discretion
not related to the court’s factual findings on the substance of a motion. See
M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(2). Thus, although the Superior Court may not decide facts
in a small claim appeal when acting in a purely appellate capacity, the court may
review challenges to the District Court’s application of the law or, in rare
circumstances, the Superior Court may review the District Court’s exercise of
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discretion in a making a determination that is not related to the trial of facts on
the merits of the claim. See id.
B. Final Judgment Rule
[¶7] Here, Walker appealed from the District Court’s exercise of
discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default. Thus, the Superior
Court’s authority was purely on questions of law. Nonetheless, it made
independent factual findings, vacated the District Court’s order, and remanded
the matter for a trial on the substance of the complaint.
[¶8] The matter is not yet final because there is further action to be taken
in the District Court. Griswold v. Town of Denmark, 2007 ME 93, ¶ 17, 927 A.2d
410. Therefore, the appeal to us is interlocutory and is not ripe for appellate
review unless an exception to the final judgment rule applies. See Doggett v.
Town of Gouldsboro, 2002 ME 175, ¶ 8, 812 A.2d 256 (“We have regularly held
that appeals from court orders remanding a matter to another court . . . for
further action are interlocutory appeals . . . .”); Aubry v. Town of Mt. Desert,
2010 ME 111, ¶ 5, 10 A.3d 662; Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71,
¶¶ 12-13, 974 A.2d 918. “A party urging that we reach the merits of an
otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating to us that one
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of th[e] exceptions to the final judgment rule justifies our reaching the merits
of the appeal.” Sanborn v. Sanborn, 2005 ME 95, ¶ 6, 877 A.2d 1075.
[¶9] Because the Superior Court’s authority did not extend to deciding
the facts related to the motion to set aside default, and because of the unique
and expedited nature of a small claims matter, see 14 M.R.S. § 7481; M.R.S.C.P. 1,
we conclude that the judicial economy exception applies. Accordingly, rather
than simply dismissing the matter without comment, we address the authority
of the Superior Court and the process on remand.
C. Superior Court Authority and Remand
[¶10] As noted above, the Superior Court vacated the District Court’s
order denying Walker’s motion to set aside the default judgment and entered
judgment in Walker’s favor on that motion. In doing so, the Superior Court
made certain factual findings that exceeded its authority and vacated an
exercise of the District Court’s discretion based on the facts that it found
independently, without the authority for fact finding or a record upon which to
review the facts. The District Court was authorized to deny the motion without
a hearing upon concluding that the facts alleged in Walker’s motion, even if
proved, did not constitute excusable neglect for the purposes of M.R.
Civ. P. 60(b). See Laurel Bank & Tr. Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41, 45 (Me. 1979)
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(stating that a party seeking relief from judgment bears the burden of
presenting competent evidence demonstrating his entitlement to relief
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)). Acting as the appellate tribunal here, the
Superior Court was not at liberty to independently make the factual findings
that formed the basis of its decision to grant Walker’s motion. Cf. Suzman v.
Comm’r, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2005 ME 80, ¶ 24, 876 A.2d 29
(“Neither this Court nor the Superior Court, acting in an appellate capacity, is
free to make factual findings independent of those made by [an] agency . . . .”);
see also Sheepscot Land Corp. v. Gregory, 383 A.2d 16, 24 (Me. 1978) (“Whether
the default entry or default judgment resulted from factual circumstances
justifying relief is a question of fact and must be proven by evidence . . . .”).
[¶11] Thus, assuming that, as an appellate court, the Superior Court
identified an important factual allegation in the record before it that would
necessitate fact-finding, it should have exercised its appellate authority to
remand the matter to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to set aside the default.
[¶12] We therefore remand to the Superior Court with instructions to
determine whether the allegations set forth in Walker’s motion to set aside the
default necessitated an evidentiary hearing on the motion. If the Superior Court
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determines that the District Court abused its discretion in deciding the motion
without a hearing, it will remand the matter to the District Court for a hearing
on Walker’s motion. If the Superior Court determines that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the motion to set aside the default
without a hearing, the Superior Court must affirm the District Court’s denial of
the motion to set aside the default and affirm the judgment in favor of the
Taylors.
The entry is:
Order of the Superior Court vacated. The matter
is remanded to the Superior Court with
instructions to determine whether to remand
the case to the District Court for an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to set aside the default or
to affirm the District Court’s judgment.
ALEXANDER, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part.
[¶13] I concur with the Court that we should reach the merits of this
interlocutory appeal, and I concur with the Court that the Superior Court’s
judgment on appeal from the District Court must be vacated. However, because
the record of information available to the District Court demonstrates that the
District Court acted within its discretion, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s
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remanding for any further review of facts by the Superior Court or by the
District Court. Because error in the District Court’s order has not been
demonstrated on this appeal, the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
[¶14] Review of the record discloses the following facts, available to the
District Court when it reached its decision, that support the District Court’s
action after receiving Mark Walker’s letter. Fred and Eleanor Taylor initiated
the small claims action in the Lewiston District Court seeking damages of
$4,256 plus costs. A hearing on the Taylors’ statement of claim was scheduled
for July 5, 2016, at 8:30 a.m.
[¶15] On June 13, 2016, three weeks before the hearing date, a notice of
the hearing was sent to Walker at his Windham address. The notice specifically
stated that the hearing would be held at the Lewiston District Court, with the
court’s address prominently displayed in the middle of the page, set-off from
the rest of the text. The notice stated that the hearing was set for 8:30 a.m. and
warned Walker that failure to appear may result in a default judgment against
him. On July 5, Walker failed to appear, and the court (Ende, J.) entered a default
judgment in favor of the Taylors.
[¶16] Later on July 5, Walker submitted a letter to the Lewiston District
Court. In the letter, Walker alleged that he had (i) appeared at the Portland
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District Court; (ii) called the Lewiston District Court at 9:08 a.m. “and was told
I could yet come to Lewiston”; (iii) found he had mislaid his car keys;
(iv) discovered that his car keys had been left at entry screening; (v) called the
“clerk” again, left Portland after 10:00 a.m., and arrived at Lewiston District
Court around 11:00 a.m. The letter provided no justification for Walker going
to Portland rather than Lewiston, as the notice had specifically directed him to
do, nor did the letter provide any justification for the apparent late arrival at
Portland.
[¶17] By letter to the District Court dated July 15, 2016, the Taylors
opposed reopening the hearing. The District Court treated Walker’s July 5
letter as a motion to set aside the default judgment.3 In an order dated July 26,
the court (Oram, J.) denied the motion. The court’s order states, in pertinent
part, “After considering the filings, [Walker’s] motion to set aside default is
denied.” In evaluating the motion, the court could have reasonably concluded,
based on its review of the letter and the court file, that even if the claims in
Walker’s letter were true, he was not entitled to relief.
3 M.R.S.C.P. 9, the rule governing motions to set aside small claims judgments, incorporates the
provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 60.
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[¶18] There are many defaults and failures to appear in properly noticed
small claims proceedings and other minor civil actions. Acting without hearing
on post-judgment letters or motions seeking to excuse defaults in such minor
civil matters is frequent practice.4 Were the practice otherwise, final resolution
of such matters could be unduly delayed, and parties who did appear to
prosecute or defend such matters could be unduly burdened because of a
nonappearing party’s dilatory behavior or carelessness.
[¶19] As the Court’s opinion correctly notes: “The District Court was
authorized to deny the motion without a hearing upon concluding that the facts
alleged in Walker’s motion, even if proved, did not constitute excusable neglect
for the purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Court’s Opinion ¶ 10.
[¶20] In his July 5 letter to the District Court, Walker did not explain why
he went to Portland when the notice he received, in explicit terms, directed him
to the Lewiston District Court; and he did not explain why he arrived at the
Portland District Court clerk’s office after 9:00 a.m., when the noticed hearing
time was 8:30 a.m. The District Court was authorized to deny the motion
4 See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7) (“Except as otherwise provided by law or these rules, after the opposition
is filed the court may in its discretion rule on the motion without hearing.”); M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5) (“The
court may in its discretion deny a motion for reconsideration without hearing and before opposition
is filed.”).
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without a hearing upon concluding that the limited facts alleged in Walker’s
July 5 letter, even if they could have been proved at a hearing, did not constitute
excusable neglect for the purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Too much was left
unexplained in Walker’s letter. See Laurel Bank & Tr. Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41,
45 (Me. 1979) (stating that a party seeking relief from judgment bears the
burden of presenting competent evidence demonstrating his entitlement to
relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
[¶21] The trial court’s action, whether taken with or without a hearing,
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. On appeal from the District Court to the
Superior Court, Walker, the party seeking to change the decision on appeal, had
the burden of persuasion to demonstrate error or, in this case, abuse of
discretion. See Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs, 2017 ME 6, ¶ 13, 153 A.3d 768;
Rossignol v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 2016 ME 115, ¶ 6, 144 A.3d 1175.
Walker had the burden to demonstrate that the District Court abused its
discretion in (i) not holding a hearing and (ii) denying Walker’s request to
reconsider and reopen the hearing.
[¶22] An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated when the record
indicates that a court, in discretionary decision-making: “(1) considers a factor
prohibited by law; (2) declines to consider a legally proper factor under a
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mistaken belief that the factor cannot be considered; (3) acts or declines to act
based on a mistaken view of the law; or (4) expressly or implicitly finds facts
not supported by the record according to the clear error standard of review.”
Smith v. Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶ 13, 1 A.3d 441; Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121,
¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074.
[¶23] The limited record that Walker presented to the District Court
lacked explanation of critical facts relating to his disregard of the explicit notice
Walker received directing him when and where to appear. That record does
not demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in denying,
without hearing, Walker’s motion to strike the default conveyed by his letter of
July 5, 2016. Because no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated, the
District Court’s decision must be affirmed.
Adam R. Lee, Esq., Trafton, Matzen, Belleau & Frenette, LLP, Auburn, for
appellants Fred and Eleanor Taylor
Mark W. Walker, appellee pro se
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-11
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY