16-3975
Crowell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
2 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
3 the 1st day of December, two thousand seventeen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Nathaniel H. Crowell,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 16-3975
17
18
19 Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
20
21 Defendant-Appellee.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 Appearing for Appellant: Nathaniel H. Crowell, pro se, New York, N.Y.
25
26 Appearing for Appellee: Allison M. Rovner, Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher
27 Connolly, Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant United States
28 Attorneys, on the brief), for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States
29 Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.
30
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
2 New York (Engelmayer, J.; Pitman, M.J.).
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
5 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
6
7 Appellant Nathaniel Crowell, pro se, sought review of a final decision of the
8 Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for disability
9 insurance benefits, following an adverse decision by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). He
10 appeals from the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commissioner.
11 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and
12 the issues on appeal.
13
14 We review de novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d
15 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). When the judgment upholds a benefits determination by the
16 Commissioner, we conduct a de novo review of the administrative record “to determine whether
17 there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the
18 Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (quoting Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103,
19 108 (2d Cir. 2002)). The substantial evidence standard means that “once an ALJ finds facts, we can
20 reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc.
21 Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
22 omitted).
23
24 Upon such review, we conclude that the district court properly ruled that the ALJ applied
25 the correct legal standards, and that both its factual determinations and legal conclusions were
26 supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ correctly determined that Crowell’s chronic diarrhea
27 did not meet 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 – Part A2, Listing 14.08I (“Listing
28 14.08I”), Crowell’s condition did not otherwise render him unable to work, and he had medically
29 improved in 2004 so that he could perform sedentary work. Further, the ALJ substantively applied
30 the treating physician rule, as required. The ALJ supported his decision with substantial evidence
31 from the medical records and testimony. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons
32 stated by the magistrate judge in his August 2016 report and recommendation, adopted in full by
33 the district court.
34
35 The Commissioner is correct that Crowell did not meet the criteria of Listing 14.08I. “For a
36 claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical
37 criteria.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). Listing 14.08I,
38 subsequently reserved as of January 2017, required: “Diarrhea, lasting for 1 month or longer,
39 resistant to treatment, and requiring intravenous hydration, intravenous alimentation, or tube
40 feeding.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 14.08I (Eff. December 8, 2014). The regulation
41 defines “resistant to treatment” as “a condition that did not respond adequately to an appropriate
42 course of treatment.” Id. at 14.00(C)(11). As noted by the magistrate judge in her analysis of the
43 treating physician rule, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Crowell’s diarrhea
44 was not resistant to treatment.
2
1
2 We also agree with the magistrate judge that the ALJ substantively applied the treating
3 physician rule in discounting a treating physician’s opinion, despite declining to explicitly discuss
4 the applicable regulatory framework. The opinion of a treating physician is afforded “controlling
5 weight so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
6 techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Burgess
7 v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)) (internal
8 punctuation omitted). However, a treating physician’s opinion will not control in all instances. The
9 regulations require the ALJ to consider several factors, listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) for
10 claims filed before March 27, 2017, in determining how much weight to give a treating physician’s
11 opinion. Id. at 129. Ultimately, an ALJ must “comprehensively set forth [her] reasons for the
12 weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28,
13 33 (2d Cir. 2004)). An application of the treating physician rule is sufficient when the ALJ
14 provides “good reasons” for discounting a treating physician’s opinion that reflect in substance the
15 factors as set forth in § 404.1527(d)(2), even though the ALJ declines to examine the factors with
16 explicit reference to the regulation. See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32-33.
17
18 While the ALJ did not explicitly discuss the treating physician rule, he nonetheless stated
19 that Dr. Schwartz’s opinion—to the effect that Crowell satisfied the listing—was contradictory to
20 the rest of the record evidence. Substantial evidence showed that Crowell reported having only
21 “episodic” diarrhea after his November 2002 hospitalization and Dr. Schwartz’s own medical
22 notes did not state that Crowell suffered from diarrhea at the time of her opinion stating that he met
23 Listing 14.08I. Thus, the ALJ provided “good reasons” for discounting Dr. Schwartz’s opinion.
24 See Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129-30.
25
26 We have considered all of Crowell’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
27 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
28
29 FOR THE COURT:
30 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
3