NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ATRINE LALENOH, No. 13-73491
Petitioner, Agency No. A088-089-852
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 14, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and EATON,** Judge.
Atrine Lalenoh, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of an
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen
removal proceedings. Lalenoh applied for asylum in 2006, claiming a fear of
persecution because of her Christian faith if returned to Indonesia. In September
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.
2008, an Immigration Judge denied the application, finding that Lalenoh had neither
shown past persecution nor established a well-founded fear of future persecution.
The BIA dismissed Lalenoh’s appeal, and this Court denied Lalenoh’s petition for
review. See Lalenoh v. Holder, 490 Fed. App’x. 928, 929 (9th Cir. 2012).
Lalenoh filed a motion to reopen with the BIA in July 2013, asserting that
changed country conditions in Indonesia made her return more dangerous than it
would have been in 2008. The BIA denied Lalenoh’s motion as untimely, and
Lalenoh timely petitioned for review.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We grant the petition for
review and remand to the BIA for reconsideration of Lalenoh’s petition in light of
our intervening opinion in Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2016).
1. A motion to reopen is untimely if not filed within ninety days of an
administrative decision, unless “based on changed circumstances arising in the
country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA concluded that Lalenoh had not demonstrated the
changed circumstances necessary to avoid the ninety-day bar. In Salim, we held that
a motion to reopen materially indistinguishable from Lalenoh’s provided
“substantial evidence” of a material change in country conditions between 2006 and
2013 in Indonesia with respect to the persecution of Christians. 831 F.3d at 1138.
2
Because the BIA did not have the benefit of Salim when rendering its decision in
this case, we remand to allow the agency to address the application of Salim to
Lalenoh’s motion to reopen in in the first instance.
2. As the government conceded at oral argument, the evidence in Lalenoh’s
motion to reopen concerning her individualized risk of persecution if returned to
Indonesia is indistinguishable from the evidence presented in Salim on that topic,
which the Salim panel found sufficient to justify granting the petition for review. See
831 F.3d at 1138–41. Accordingly, we remand for the BIA to reconsider Lalenoh’s
showing of individualized risk of persecution in light of Salim.
GRANTED and REMANDED.
3