Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #059
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of December, 2017, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2017-KK-0705 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. REGGIE PATRICK THIBODEAUX (Parish of
Terrebonne)
We find the procedure crafted by the court of appeal in Alexander
best safeguards a defendant’s rights to due process, access to
the courts, and to the assistance of counsel, while also
affording the trial court the opportunity to prevent confusion or
disruption of the trial process that is risked by the filing of
pro-se motions by a represented defendant. That is not to say,
however, that a hearing like that envisioned in Alexander will be
necessary every time a represented defendant files a pro-se
motion and defendant must in each instance necessarily be asked
to choose between continued representation of counsel or having
his pro-se motion considered. In many instances, counsel may
simply wish to adopt the pro-se filing or the trial court can
review the motion and assess its potential for confusion,
disruption, or reversible error. Regardless, however, the trial
court’s use of a stamp to reflexively deny all pro-se filings by
a represented defendant is inadequate to safeguard the
defendant’s rights while ensuring the efficient and orderly
administration of criminal justice. Therefore, we reverse the
court of appeal’s ruling and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
The trial court is directed to determine whether defense counsel
wishes to adopt defendant’s pro-se motion to suppress and, if
counsel does not, evaluate its disruptive potential in light of
Melon before determining whether to conduct a hearing consistent
with Alexander.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Retired Judge Burrell Carter assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting
for Weimer, J., recused.
WEIMER, J., recused.
HUGHES, J., concurs with reasons.
12/06/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-KK-0705
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
REGGIE PATRICK THIBODEAUX
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
PER CURIAM∗
Defendant, who was charged with several felony and misdemeanor drug
offenses as well as with arresting arrest, and who was represented by a public
defender, filed a pro-se motion to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the
motion, stamping it, “Motion denied: Defendant herein is represented by counsel.”
Thereafter, defendant filed additional pro-se motions (i.e., a motion for production
of discovery documents and motion for hardship release or for bail reduction), each
of which received the same stamped denial by the trial court. Defendant pro-se
then applied to the court of appeal seeking review, inter alia, of the denial of his
motion to suppress. The court of appeal granted the application in part and directed
the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford defense counsel an opportunity to
adopt the motion. Citing State v. Melon, 95-2209 (La. 9/22/95), 660 So.2d 466, the
court of appeal found that “[l]ower courts are required to accept and consider pro
se filings from represented defendants in a preverdict context whenever doing so
will not lead to confusion at trial.” State v. Thibodeaux, 17-0232 (La. App. 1 Cir.
3/31/17) (unpub’d).
∗ Retired Judge Burrell Carter assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Weimer, J., recused.
In State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584, 593 (La. 1981), this Court found that a
defendant has no constitutional right to be both represented and representative:
While an indigent defendant has a right to counsel as well as the
opposite right to represent himself, he has no constitutional right to be
both represented and representative. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); United States v. Daniels,
572 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904
(6th Cir. 1970), U.S. cert. den. 400 U.S. 958, 91 S.Ct. 357, 27 L.Ed.2d
267; United States v. O’Looney, 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1976), U.S.
cert. den. 429 U.S. 1023, 97 S.Ct. 642, 50 L.Ed.2d 625. With regard
to trial tactics, the federal courts have clearly stated that once a person
is represented by counsel, he is bound by his attorney’s decisions at
trial unless the attorney’s actions effectively deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. United States v.
Daniels, supra; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct.
1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). While this rule is an interpretation of a
federal statute, it sets up the constitutional boundaries of a trial court’s
discretion. Using the rule, federal courts have stated that a defendant
has no right to enter his own personal objections to testimony after he
has accepted the pre-trial assistance of counsel, Conder, supra; no
fundamental right to require that a particular witness be called at trial,
Daniels, supra; nor a right to object to his attorney’s decision to
request a special verdict in a criminal case, O’Looney, supra.
Thereafter, although the court in Bodley largely focused on the importance of
avoiding confusion at trial, several circuit courts began to refuse to consider the
appellate pro-se filings of represented defendants on direct review. Therefore, this
court clarified in State v. Melon, 95-2209 (La. 9/22/95), 660 So.2d 466 (per
curiam), that “State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584 (La.1982), provides a rule designed
to preserve order and consistency at trial and does not purport to apply in a post-
verdict context.” The Melon court, however, exceeded the scope of the certified
question presented and also held that “the lower courts must also accept and
consider filings from represented defendants in a preverdict context whenever
doing so will not lead to confusion at trial.” This terse reference in Melon to
“confusion at trial” was not, however, intended to draw a bright line at trial or
require trial courts to consider all pro-se pretrial filings by represented defendants.
Instead, it was intended to curtail confusing or contradictory motions with the
2
potential to disrupt the trial process or result later in reversible error.
While Melon can be misconstrued and applied too broadly, the trial court
here erred in contrast by reflexively rejecting all pro-se filings by represented
defendants without reference to their disruptive potential. We find that State v.
Alexander, 07-1236 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/9/08), 980 So.2d 877, strikes a delicate
balance. The represented defendant in Alexander filed a pro-se speedy trial motion,
which motion can present serious legal ramifications and complex considerations
few pro-se litigants are equipped to weigh carefully. 1 To balance Melon, its
underlying considerations, Bodley, and its holding, the court of appeal crafted the
following procedure:
In order to address and alleviate the problem in this case, Defendant’s
writ must be granted, made peremptory, and the trial court must first
advise Defendant of his constitutional right to counsel, and then the
trial court must conduct a contradictory hearing to determine: (1) if
Defendant is capable of representing himself; and (2) if so, does
Defendant desire to represent himself and forego representation by
defense counsel. If the trial court finds that Defendant is not
competent or does not have the capacity to represent himself, then he
is not allowed to represent himself. If the trial court determines that
1
The court of appeal framed the problem as follows:
Though we acknowledge the trial court’s rationale that allowing pre-trial
conflicting motions between defense counsel and Defendant pro se would lead to
confusion, Defendant has a constitutional right to have a speedy trial. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; La. Const. art. 1, § 16. At present, Defendant is in limbo.
This court is well aware of the numerous cases wherein defendants have filed pro
se motions which have been denied by the trial court due to said defendants
already being represented by court-appointed or retained counsel. When a writ is
taken from these cases, the appellate court customarily grants the writ, makes it
peremptory, and remands the case to the trial court for consideration and ruling in
accordance with Melon, 660 So.2d 466, as was done in this case. However, that
does not solve the problem.
In Melon, our supreme court specifically relied on State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584
(La.1981). In Bodley, our supreme court held: “While an indigent defendant has a
right to counsel as well as the opposite right to represent himself, he has no
constitutional right to be both represented and representative.” Id. at 593. In the
case at bar, Defendant seeks to do just that. Defendant seeks to be both
represented and representative. He has in place legal representation by defense
counsel, yet he wants to represent himself, in part, as evidenced by the filing of
his pro se motions.
Alexander, 07-1236, pp. 3–4, 980 So.2d at 880.
3
Defendant knowingly, willingly, and intelligently chooses to represent
himself, in effect waiving counsel, then he may do so and will not
have the benefit of counsel. At that point, the trial court must advise
Defendant of the consequences of foregoing legal representation and
the dangers and disadvantages as a result thereby. See State v.
Frisella, 03-1213 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/04), 868 So.2d 871. Thereafter,
the trial court must relieve counsel of any further representation of
Defendant’s interest in this matter and then entertain Defendant’s pro
se motions. This does not in any way restrict Defendant’s access to
the court to address any conflict or problems with counsel in pre-trial
and trial matters.
Alexander, 07-1236, pp. 4–5, 980 So.2d at 880.
We find the procedure crafted by the court of appeal in Alexander best
safeguards a defendant’s rights to due process, access to the courts, and to the
assistance of counsel, while also affording the trial court the opportunity to prevent
confusion or disruption of the trial process that is risked by the filing of pro-se
motions by a represented defendant. That is not to say, however, that a hearing like
that envisioned in Alexander will be necessary every time a represented defendant
files a pro-se motion and defendant must in each instance necessarily be asked to
choose between continued representation of counsel or having his pro-se motion
considered. In many instances, counsel may simply wish to adopt the pro-se filing
or the trial court can review the motion and assess its potential for confusion,
disruption, or reversible error. Regardless, however, the trial court’s use of a stamp
to reflexively deny all pro-se filings by a represented defendant is inadequate to
safeguard the defendant’s rights while ensuring the efficient and orderly
administration of criminal justice.
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeal’s ruling and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. The trial
court is directed to determine whether defense counsel wishes to adopt defendant’s
pro-se motion to suppress and, if counsel does not, evaluate its disruptive potential
in light of Melon before determining whether to conduct a hearing consistent with
4
Alexander.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
5
12/06/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-KK-0705
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
REGGIE PATRICK THIBODEAUX
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
Hughes, J. concurring.
I write to emphasize this court's guidance that an Alexander hearing is not
required in response to every pro se filing. I believe that Bodley and Melon rightly
focus on confusion at trial. Forcing a defendant to give up the right to counsel
prematurely will not lead to an efficient administration of justice. Any good defense
lawyer worth his or her salt will file a motion for bond reduction, motion for
preliminary exam, and motion to suppress at the earliest opportunity. 60 days,
mentioned at oral argument, is too long. Motions to quash or for a speedy trial may
require a little more thought.
When a defendant is forced to file motions because defense counsel has failed
to do so promptly, a little common sense and advocacy can go a long way. Read the
motion. Talk to the client. Give advice. If the client insists on doing it his or her own
way, so be it. The consequences are then on the client. A stamped denial and a public
defender litigating against his own client present embarrassing optics, and are not
worthy of the duty of court and counsel.
State of Louisiana v. Reggie Patrick Thibodeaux
Combined Opinion