#28085-r-GAS
2017 S.D. 81
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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RAYMOND C. OYEN, Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE COUNTY
COMMISSION, Respondent and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER
Judge
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LONNIE R. BRAUN of
Thomas, Braun, Bernard
& Burke, LLP
Rapid City, South Dakota
RICHARD P. TIESZEN of
Tieszen Law Office
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for petitioner and
appellee.
BRUCE L. OUTKA
Lawrence County Deputy
State’s Attorney
Deadwood, South Dakota
JOHN R. FREDERICKSON
Deadwood, South Dakota Attorneys for respondent and
appellant.
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ARGUED AUGUST 29, 2017
OPINION FILED 12/06/17
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SEVERSON, Justice
[¶1.] Various landowners petitioned the Lawrence County Commission
requesting that the County maintain a road providing access to their homes. The
County denied the Landowners request. Petitioner Raymond Oyen appealed the
County’s action to the circuit court. The County filed a motion to join the United
States of America as an indispensable party. The court denied the motion, finding
the County responsible for the road and directing the County to provide
maintenance. The County appeals. We reverse, and remand for the circuit court to
join, if feasible, the United States of America as an indispensable party. If joinder
is not possible the circuit court must determine whether to proceed or dismiss the
case.
Background
[¶2.] In 1930, Miner’s and Merchant’s Savings Bank granted Lawrence
County an easement for the “free and uninterrupted use, liberty and privilege of a
right of way of the customary width, for highway purposes . . . to carry with it all of
the attendant burdens and easements of a public highway.” That right of way
covers South Rapid Creek Road (SRCR), which is at issue in this case. Since the
1970s, the County approved three platted subdivisions indicating that SRCR is a
county road or a county/forest service road. In 1992, the County granted the United
States of America:
exclusive easements for the existing road for use for all lawful
purposes by the United States . . . and the general public when
authorized by the Grantee, over and across the parcels of land
. . . described as follows: South Rapid Road No. 231.6 . . . South
Rapid Branch Road No. 231.6A . . . the said easements hereby
granted are for the reconstruction, maintenance, and full, free
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and quiet use and enjoyment of the existing roads as they are
presently located and in place over and across the above
described premises.
The minutes of the 1992 Commission reflect that the motion to transfer was made
in order to “follow the recommendation of the Highway Superintendent and
authorize the Chairman to sign a transfer of existing easements.”
[¶3.] On August 15, 2015, Lawrence County landowners owning real
property along SRCR, petitioned the Lawrence County Commission to provide snow
removal and maintenance of SRCR. The Commission reviewed the matter at its
meeting on October 13, 2015, and denied the request for service to the road.
Thereafter, Oyen appealed the determination to the circuit court. The United
States of America was not a party to the proceedings, and on June 7, 2016, the
County filed a motion to dismiss Oyen’s petition, or in the alternative, join the
United States as an indispensable party. The circuit court conducted a hearing on
the motion on June 20, 2016, and denied the motion on July 22, 2016. In its
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the motion, the circuit court stated:
“Because Lawrence County failed to transfer its duty to maintain SRCR to the
Forest Service, the Forest Service is not an indispensable Party to this action.”
[¶4.] The circuit court issued further findings of fact and conclusions of law
on November 21, 2016. The court found that SRCR has been open to and used by
the public as a public roadway since the 1930s. It also found that agreements
between the County and the Forest Service indicate that both the County and
Forest Service admit that SRCR is on the County and Forest Service road systems.
An agreement dated May 12, 1983, stated that the “county is vitally interested in
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providing and operating a road system to provide adequate vehicular access for
residents and commercial enterprises for both intra and inter-county travel[.]” The
circuit court found Lawrence County’s witness testimony that SRCR was a Forest
Service road inconsistent with documentary evidence (Commission minutes and
recorded easements) reflecting that the County had joint ownership and
responsibility for SRCR. It found such testimony to also be inconsistent with the
“attempt to transfer the road easements to the United States Forest Service[.]”
Finally, it found that the “County’s decision to deny the petition was based on false
information and lack of relevant and competent evidence and the County’s refusal
to review documentary evidence of ownership by the County was therefore arbitrary
and capricious.”
[¶5.] The circuit court ultimately determined that Lawrence County is
responsible for maintaining the road pursuant to SDCL 31-12-26. The court
concluded that the County, through its actions of accepting the right-of-way
easements and approving the plats, “agreed to hold the property in trust for the
benefit of the Petitioners and other members of the Public . . . which responsibility
cannot simply be transferred to the United States Forest Service without ensuring
such obligations and responsibilities are protected and assured pursuant to SDCL
11-3-12[.]” The court noted that pursuant to SDCL 31-1-3, “[a]ll public highways
. . . lawfully established shall continue as established until changed or vacated in
some manner provided by law.” The court concluded that the Commission did not
follow the specific procedure set forth in SDCL 31-3-6 through SDCL 31-3-9 for
vacating or changing a county secondary road.
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Standard of Review
[¶6.] In South Dakota Department of Game, Fish and Parks v. Troy
Township, Day County, we recently clarified the standard of review relating to
actions of a board of county commissioners. 2017 S.D. 50, 900 N.W.2d 840. If the
challenged county commission action is determined to be quasi-judicial, this court
may conduct a de novo review of that action. Troy Twp., 2017 S.D. 50, ¶ 20, 900
N.W.2d at 849. An administrative action is quasi-judicial if it “‘investigates,
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
laws supposed already to exist’ rather than ‘looking to the future and changing
existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power.’” Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S. Ct. 67, 69, 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908)). “Thus . . . quasi-judicial
acts are those that could have been ‘determined as an original action in the circuit
court.’” Id. (quoting Champion v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 5 Dakota 416, 430, 41 N.W.
739, 742 (1889)).
[¶7.] We review a circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Coffey v. Coffey, 2016 S.D. 96, ¶ 7, 888 N.W.2d 805, 808.
Whether a party is an indispensable party is a question of law that we review de
novo. Busselman v. Egge, 2015 S.D. 38, ¶ 6, 864 N.W.2d 786, 788.
Analysis
[¶8.] We find it necessary to clarify that in this appeal, we are not reviewing
Lawrence County’s obligation to maintain a road or Lawrence County’s grant of an
easement to the United States. Rather, we are reviewing the circuit court’s
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procedural decision to not join the United States as an indispensable party to this
action. Thus, our review is de novo and we proceed by determining whether the
United States Forest Service is an indispensable party.
[¶9.] Lawrence County contends that the United States of America is an
indispensable party to this case. SDCL 15-6-19(a) 1 and SDCL 15-6-19(b) 2 pertain to
1. SDCL 15-6-19(a) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a
party in the action if:
(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties; or
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant,
or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the
action.
2. SDCL 15-6-19(b) provides:
If a person as described in subdivisions 15-6-19(a)(1) and (2)
cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in
the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those
already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
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the joinder of indispensable parties. This court has previously interpreted SDCL
15-6-19(a), stating “[a]n indispensable party is one whose interest is such that a
final decree cannot be entered without affecting that interest or in whose absence
the controversy cannot be terminated.” Busselman, 2015 S.D. 38, ¶ 6, 864 N.W.2d
at 788 (quoting Thieman v. Bohman, 2002 S.D. 52, ¶ 13, 645 N.W.2d 260, 262).
[¶10.] The circuit court determined the County failed to follow the proper
procedure to grant an easement in the right-of-way to the United States. Such a
ruling clearly affects the federal government’s interest and determines its rights
under the 1992 easement. Thus, the determination in this action cannot be made in
the absence of the federal government, as it has “an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in [its] absence may
. . . impair or impede [its] ability to protect that interest.” SDCL 15-6-19(a)(2)(i). It
was clear error for the circuit court to rule on the easement without first
determining whether the United States of America was a party that should have
been joined if feasible under SDCL 15-6-19(a) and SDCL 15-6-19(b).
Conclusion
[¶11.] Because the circuit court made its decision without an indispensable
party, we reverse, and remand to determine whether the United States of America
can be added as a party. If joinder is not feasible, then the circuit court must
determine whether the case should be dismissed under SDCL 15-6-19(b).
[¶12.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and KERN, Justices, and
WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur.
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[¶13.] JENSEN, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time
this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.
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