[Cite as State v. English, 2017-Ohio-8870.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 105237
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CIERRA ENGLISH
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-575406-A
BEFORE: Jones, J., Keough, A.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 7, 2017
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Richard H. Drucker
820 West Superior Avenue, Suite 800
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brett Hammond
Katherine Mullin
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Cierra English (“English”) appeals from the trial court’s
November 7, 2016 judgment denying her motion for a new trial. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} In 2013, English was charged with three counts of felonious assault. The
case proceeded to a jury trial; the jury convicted her on all counts. In 2014, the trial
court sentenced English to an aggregate seven-year prison term. She appealed,
challenging her conviction based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, and challenging
her sentence based on failure to merge allied offenses and error in imposing consecutive
sentences. This court affirmed English’s conviction, but found merit to her allied
offense challenge and, therefore, remanded the case for merger of allied offenses. State
v. English, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101883, 2015-Ohio-3227 (“English I”). In October
2015, the trial court again sentenced English to an aggregate seven-year prison term.
{¶3} In June 2016, English sought leave to file a motion for a new trial; the trial
court granted her leave. Her request for a new trial, on which she sought a hearing, was
based on her allegation of newly discovered evidence. In November 2016, the trial court
denied English’s motion for a new trial without holding a hearing. English now appeals,
and in her sole assignment of error challenges the trial court’s judgment denying her
motion for a new trial without a hearing.
II.
{¶4} The following are the facts of the case, as summarized from this court’s
decision in English I.
{¶5} The incident giving rise to the case occurred on May 18, 2013, when English
struck the two victims, Mark Lavender (“Lavender”) and Raymond Fisher (“Fisher”),
with her car as they were walking through a parking lot on their way to Larry Flynt’s
Hustler Club, where English worked. Id. at ¶ 2. The incident was caught on
surveillance camera; the men were struck from behind, English’s car did not slow down
after it hit them, and Fisher was dragged beneath the car for a short distance. Id.
Fisher was seriously injured as a result of the incident. Id.
{¶6} The trial testimony established that English and Fisher had a romantic
relationship that ended in early May 2013. Id. at ¶ 3. According to English, Fisher had
been stalking her in the days leading up to the incident. Id. On May 16, all four tires
on her vehicle had been slashed, and on the night of the incident, a tire on her vehicle had
been slashed while she was at work and the car was parked in a parking lot across from
the club. Id.
{¶7} On the night of the incident, a coworker replaced the slashed tire with a spare
tire. English left the club at approximately 3:00 a.m.; she was crying and “acting a little
hysterical.” Id. Fisher and Lavender were walking in the parking lot at the same time
English was leaving; the parties did not interact. Id.
{¶8} English testified that as she was leaving in her car, she saw Fisher and
Lavender, and upset because of the tire slashing, she panicked upon seeing Fisher. Id.
According to English, the two “appeared out of nowhere in front of [her] vehicle,” and
she wanted to get away from Fisher. Id. She testified that it was never her intent to
hurt them; rather, she just wanted to get away from Fisher. Id.
{¶9} English drove away from the scene after hitting Fisher and Lavender, and she
did not seek help for them. Id. at ¶ 4. She initially testified that she was unaware that
she had struck the men, but later admitted that she knew she hit them and had told her
mother, who called the police and local hospitals in an attempt to learn about Fisher’s
condition. Id.
III.
{¶10} As mentioned, English presents one assignment of error for our review,
challenging the denial of her motion for a new trial.
{¶11} We initially address a procedural issue. On June 13, 2016, counsel for
English filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court. In
addition to seeking leave, the motion also addressed the substantive arguments as to why
a new trial should be granted. On that same day, counsel also filed “general pleading
exhibits in support of motion for leave to file motion for new trial,” which consisted of
counsel’s affidavit and the alleged new evidence upon which English based her request
for a new trial. The following day, June 14, the same motion for leave to file a motion
for a new trial, with the supporting exhibits, was filed.
{¶12} On September 8, 2016, the state opposed English’s motion, addressing the
substantive arguments she presented as to why she was entitled to a new trial. In a
judgment entry dated September 21, 2016, the trial court ruled, “defendant’s motion for
leave to file motion for new trial is granted. Motion deemed filed on June 14, 2016.”
In a November 4, 2016 judgment, the trial court ruled, “defendant’s motion for a new trial
is denied. The defendant has failed to prove that she has obtained newly discovered
evidence.”
{¶13} On this record, we find that English’s motion for a new trial was filed and
properly before the court. Although the motion was captioned as a request for leave, it
addressed the substantive ground upon which English sought a new trial, and the trial
court specifically ruled that it deemed the motion for a new trial as being filed on June 14,
2006. We therefore now address the substance of the motion.
{¶14} As mentioned, English’s motion for a new trial was based on her contention
that she had discovered new evidence. Crim.R. 33 governs motions for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence. Under Crim.R. 33(A)(6), a new trial may be granted
when “new evidence material to the defense is discovered, which the defendant could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.”
{¶15} The rule further provides that motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence “shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon
which the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been
waived.” Crim.R. 33(B). The rule continues stating,
[i]f it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant
was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which
he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from an order of
the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the
evidence within the one hundred twenty day period.
Id. Thus, both Crim.R. 33(A)(6) and Crim.R. 33(B) require that the newly discovered
evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence.
{¶16} Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that to warrant a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a
strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) has been
discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial even with the
exercise of due diligence; (4) is material to the issues; (5) is not merely cumulative to
former evidence; and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence.
State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St.505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus.
{¶17} A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is within its sound discretion,
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Matthews, 81
Ohio St.3d 375, 378, 691 N.E.2d 1041 (1998), citing State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71,
564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus. Further, a motion for a new trial
does not automatically require a hearing, Schiebel at 83, and the decision to conduct a
hearing on a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
State v. Price, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92096, 2009-Ohio-480, ¶ 15; State v. Tomlinson,
125 Ohio App.3d 13, 19, 707 N.E.2d 955 (11th Dist.1997).
{¶18} The alleged newly discovered evidence was a June 17, 2013 email sent from
James and Tina Kuntz (“the Kuntzs”) to the investigating detective, Detective Small.
The Kuntzs were parking lot attendants, and on the evening in question, were working the
parking lot for the Diamond’s Club, which was near the parking lot where English had
parked her car.
{¶19} In the email, the Kuntzs told the detective that James Kuntz saw a man, later
identified as Fisher, walking through the parking lot they were working, “starring at
[James] like he was trying to get away with something.” James saw him go onto the
parking lot by the Hustler’s Club. Shortly thereafter, he learned that the tires had been
slashed on a car parked on the lot where he saw Fisher go.
{¶20} According to English, this new evidence possibly would have led to an
aggravated assault conviction (in that she had provocation for the assault), rather than
felonious assault. We are not persuaded.
{¶21} A review of the trial transcript from English I demonstrates that English was
aware of the parking lot attendants from the Diamond parking lot. Specifically, she
testified that “[o]h, and also, there was a man who placed [Fisher] in the parking lot at
that time and we have that statement. It was a man that worked at the club next door,
Diamonds.”
{¶22} Further, English raised the issue of the Diamond’s parking lot attendant in
her direct appeal, contending that her trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to
subpoena a witness she claims saw Fisher in the parking lot earlier in the evening [of the
incident], the police officer who allegedly took the statement of the witness and a private
investigator hired by English’s family.” State v. English, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
101883, 2015-Ohio-3227, ¶ 6. This court rejected English’s claim, however. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶23} The evidence from the Kuntzs, therefore, is not new evidence. Moreover,
even if it had been introduced at trial, we do not find that there was a strong probability
that it would have resulted in a conviction of aggravated assault, rather than felonious
assault. The Kuntzs’ statement does not advance English’s contention that English
was “under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage” “brought on by
serious provocation.” R.C. 2903.12(A). According to their statement, they did not see
English that evening, nor did they see Fisher slash her tires. All they saw was Fisher
“acting suspiciously” as he walked through their parking lot to the Hustler’s parking lot,
and then they later learned that tires had been slashed.
{¶24} In light of the above, the trial court properly denied English’s motion for a
new trial, and her sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR