J-S64042-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
LEONARD O. RILEY, JR
Appellant No. 1972 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-22-CR-0005291-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2017
Appellant, Leonard O. Riley, Jr., appeals nunc pro tunc from the
judgment of sentence to serve an aggregate thirty-nine to seventy-eight
months’ imprisonment for delivery of a controlled substance1 and criminal use
of a communication facility.2 Appellant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction for criminal use of a communication
facility, that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence, and that
the sentence was manifestly excessive. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the evidence against Appellant as follows:
On May 6, 2014, Harrisburg City Police Detective Sean
Cornick served as the lead detective in a drug investigation
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).
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of a person known as “Mac”. In the investigation, Detective
Cornick utilized a confidential informant (“CI”) who
previously assisted in investigations which resulted in
convictions.
On the afternoon of May 6, 2014, the CI placed a call to Mac
in the presence of Detective Cornick. Detective Cornick
heard a male voice on the other end of the conversation.
The CI arranged to meet Mac at a customary meeting place,
Woodbine and Logan Streets in Harrisburg. The CI ordered
ten packs of heroin. After the phone call, Detective Cornick
searched the CI’s person and vehicle to ensure that the CI
did not possess drugs, drug paraphernalia or money. The
CI possessed only a cell phone. Detective Cornick provided
the CI with $70 in Dauphin County Drug Task Force buy
money.
Harrisburg City Police Detective Nicholas Licata assisted
with the investigation. Detective Licata and [Office of the
Attorney General] Agent Henry Giammarco set up
surveillance in an unmarked vehicle near Woodbine and
Logan Streets.
Driving his own vehicle, the CI followed Detective Cornick to
that location and parked south of Cornick’s vehicle. They
remained in communication. The CI informed Detective
Cornick that the target was en route to the location driving
a black 300 Chrysler. The black Chrysler arrived at the area
and parked north of Detective Cornick’s vehicle. An
individual exited the Chrysler and walked south toward
Woodbine Street. At trial, Detective Cornick identified the
individual as [Appellant].
Detective Licata testified regarding his surveillance.
Detective Licata saw a black male exit the front passenger
seat of the Chrysler and toward the detectives’ vehicle. At
trial, Detective Licata also identified that person as
[Appellant].
Both detectives testified that as [Appellant] walked south on
Woodbine Street, he observed Detective Cornick. Detective
Cornick drove away in order to avoid further eye contact
with [Appellant]. [Appellant] continuously watched as
Detective Cornick drove away. [Appellant] returned to the
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black Chrysler and also drove away. Up to this point, no
one had approached the CI’s vehicle and the CI did not exit
his vehicle.
Within minutes, the black Chrysler returned and parked
behind the CI’s vehicle. The CI left his vehicle and entered
the rear passenger seat of the Chrysler.[3] . . . After the CI
exited, [Appellant] reached for something in the back seat
where the CI had been seated.
Detective Licata maintained constant surveillance of the CI
after he returned to his vehicle.
Following the transaction, Detective Cornick instructed the
CI to follow him to a pre-established secure meeting place.
The CI followed. At the meeting place, Detective Cornick
repeated the search as conducted before the transaction.
The CI handed Detective Cornick ten green glassine bags.
The CI did not possess any additional drugs or paraphernalia
and did not have the $70 of Drug Task Force money.
Pennsylvania State Police Laboratory crime lab testing
determined that the bags contained a total of .28 grams of
heroin. (N.T. pp. 23-24).
Several weeks later, Detective Licata arrested [Appellant] in
connection with another investigation. In the course of that
arrest, Detective Licata recovered a phone from [Appellant]
which contained a series of text messages inquiring about
the other person’s location at Logan Street and the prices
for packages of heroin[]. The text message referred to
[Appellant]’s street names of “Mac” or “Omizz”. The number
of the phone seized from [Appellant] at that arrest
contained messages which indicated they were from
“Omizz” at his new number.
3 The trial court further stated that after the CI entered the car, “[Appellant]
joined the CI in the rear passenger seat. The CI and [Appellant] remained
there for 30-60 seconds.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/11/17 at 4. However, as discussed
below that finding is not supported in the record. See N.T., 1/12/16, at 37
(indicating that Appellant exited the vehicle from the front passenger seat
after the CI got out, and then went to the back seat and reached toward the
area where the CI had been).
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Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4 (record citations omitted).
On January 12, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial at which
the trial court found him guilty of delivery of a controlled substance and
criminal use of a communication facility. Appellant waived the preparation of
a presentence investigation report, and the court immediately sentenced
Appellant to consecutive sentences of twenty-seven to fifty-four months’
imprisonment for the delivery and twelve to twenty-four months’ for the use
of communication facility. The trial court directed that the sentences run
consecutive to a previously imposed sentence.4 On January 21, 2016,
Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representation indicating
that Appellant intended to proceed pro se, which the trial court granted on
January 25, 2016. Meanwhile, Appellant filed several pro se post-sentence
motions. The trial court denied the pro se post-sentence motions on February
3, 2016. That same day, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.
Appellant obtained new counsel, who subsequently discontinued
Appellant’s pro se appeal and filed a Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§
9541-9546, petition seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. On
September 27, 2016, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition.
4 On the day before trial in the instant case, Appellant was convicted and
sentenced in a separate case docketed in the trial court as “5649-2014.”
Appellant’s Brief at 9 n.2. According to Appellant, he was sentenced to one
and one-half to three years’ imprisonment, and he took a separate appeal at
294 MDA 2017. Id. The current record only contains passing reference to
5649-2014.
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On October 6, 2016, Appellant filed post-sentence motions nunc pro
tunc challenging the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of
the sentence. The trial court denied the post-sentence motions on November
10, 2016. Appellant timely appealed and complied with the trial court’s order
to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. This appeal followed.
Appellant presents the following questions for review:
I. Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction
for the offense defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512 (criminal use
of a communication facility)?
II. Did not the [trial] court abuse its discretion by failing to
grant [Appellant] a new trial on the basis that the guilty
verdicts were against the weight of the evidence?
III. Was the imposition of an aggregate sentence of three
years, three months, to six years, six months, clearly
unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an
abuse of discretion, and inconsistent with the protection of
the public, the gravity of the offenses, and [Appellant]’s
rehabilitative needs where the court imposed consecutive
jail sentences[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (capitalization omitted).
Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove he used
a communication facility to engage in a drug transaction. He notes that the
cellular phone seized from him at the time of the arrest bore a different
number than the one used by CI to contact “Mac” and arrange the transaction
on May 6, 2014. He emphasizes that the Commonwealth “offered no proof
that [he] was the owner of a cell phone account with the particular number .
. . that the CI called on May 6, 2014” or that any other person called him at
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that number. Appellant’s Brief at 24. Moreover, he notes that Corporal
Cornick only “gave a threadbare description of the actual telephone
communication between the CI and ‘Mac’ on May 6, 2014.” Id. No relief is
due.
Our review of Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
governed by the following precepts:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 A.3d 750, 757 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted).
Section 7512 of the Crimes Codes defines criminal use of communication
facility, in part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the
third degree if that person uses a communication facility to
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commit, cause or facilitate the commission or the attempt
thereof of any crime which constitutes a felony under this
title or under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),
known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act. . . . .
18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a) (footnote omitted). The offense requires the
Commonwealth to prove “(1) [the defendant] knowingly and intentionally
used a communication facility; (2) [the defendant] knowingly, intentionally,
or recklessly facilitated an underlying felony; and (3) the underlying felony
occurred.” Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004)
Instantly, the record, when read in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, contains adequate circumstantial evidence that Appellant
used a communication facility to facilitate a drug transaction. On May 6, 2014,
the CI indicated he was calling “Mac” to purchase heroin and dialed a number.
Corporal Cornick overheard what he believed was a male voice talking to the
CI. “Mac” was known to operate a black Chrysler 300 with temporary tags.
Corporal Cornick testified that he instructed the CI to keep his normal routine
when dealing with “Mac.” The CI informed the officer that the transaction was
to take place at the intersection of Logan and Woodbine Streets. Appellant
appeared at the designated meeting place as a passenger in a black Chrysler
300 with temporary tags. The CI, who had been searched for contraband
before meeting with Appellant, returned with ten packets of heroin after
meeting with Appellant.
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Less than a month later, at the time of his arrest on June 4, 2014,
Appellant was in possession of a cellphone. Although that phone’s number
was different than the number used by the CI to contact “Mac,” a search of
the phone indicated that Appellant changed phone numbers and using his
known nickname of “Omizz,” alerted his contacts of his new phone number on
May 24, 2014. The cellphone also contained outgoing text messages referring
to the sender as “Mac” and arranging meetings at the intersection of Logan
and Woodbine.
Thus, although there was no direct evidence that the CI was in contact
with Appellant to arrange the May 6, 2014 sale, the circumstantial evidence
established that Appellant was the individual identified by the CI as “Mac” on
May 6, 2014. Moreover, because the CI contacted “Mac” and Appellant
appeared at the designated meeting place, the Commonwealth adduced
sufficient circumstantial proof that the Appellant used a communication facility
to facilitate that transaction. See Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Accordingly,
Appellant’s first claim fails.
Appellant next claims that the verdicts were against the weight of the
evidence. In support, Appellant sets forth four overlapping arguments. First,
Appellant emphasizes that there was inconsistent testimony regarding the
delivery. Appellant’s Brief at 28. He notes Detective Licata testified that the
exchange occurred in Appellant’s vehicle, while Corporal Cornick believed the
exchange occurred in the CI’s vehicle, and there was no video recording of the
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exchange despite Corporal Cornick’s belief that video surveillance was
conducted. Id.
Second, Appellant notes there was no direct evidence of an exchange
between him and the CI. He observes that the CI did not testify, none of the
surveilling officers could see a hand-to-hand transaction through the tinted
windows of Appellant’s vehicle, and the CI was not equipped with audio
recording capabilities. Id. at 27-28.
Third, Appellant challenges the quality of the circumstantial evidence
supporting the allegation he personally delivered the subject heroin. He
emphasizes that the search of the CI’s clothing and vehicle before and after
the search was perfunctory and did not exclude the possibility that the CI hid
contraband before the transaction or kept the pre-recorded buy money after
the transaction. Id. at 27. He further notes that none of the pre-recorded
buy money was recovered when he was arrested nearly one month after the
controlled purchase. Id. Additionally, Appellant observes that a third
person, the driver of Appellant’s vehicle, was in the vehicle at the time of the
transaction. Id. at 13. He also observes there was no evidence introduced
to show he owned the cellular phone contacted by the CI. Id. at 28.
Fourth, Appellant contends that the text messages recovered from the
cellphone found in his possession at the time of his arrest were wholly
unreliable, because the Commonwealth did not establish he authored the text
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messages, and his counsel failed to object to the authenticity of the messages.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
The principles governing our review of a challenge to the weight of the
evidence are well settled.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be
granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or
because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at
a different conclusion. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is
to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to
give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’”
It has often been stated that “a new trial should be awarded
when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity
to prevail.”
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with
a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard
of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the
trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial
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based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court's
discretion, we have explained:
The term “discretion” imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a
dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the
law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be
exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to
prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused where the course
pursued represents not merely an error of judgment,
but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (citations
omitted).
The trial court here opined that the evidence against Appellant was
overwhelming: to /and during ;
We found that [Appellant] delivered a controlled substance
based upon the following credible evidence: police gave the
CI Task Force funds; the CI called [Appellant] to . . .
arrange the purchase of ten bags of heroin at Woodbine and
Logan Streets; [Appellant] arrived and appeared concerned
by the presence of the detective’s vehicle and drove away;
[Appellant] returned to complete the transaction with the CI
in the back seat of [Appellant]’s vehicle; detectives
maintained constant surveillance of the CI; no one other
than [Appellant] interacted with the CI during that time
after the transaction[;] the CI had no funds and possessed
ten bags of heroin.
***
[Appellant] challenges this conclusion solely upon the lack
of observation of a hand-to hand exchange. The veracity of
our finding is undiminished by the lack of such evidence in
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that the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
[the delivery] by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Trial Ct. Op. at 6.
Appellant’s first two arguments, which focus on the inconsistencies
between Detective Licata’s and Corporal Cornick’s testimony and the absence
of direct evidence that Appellant delivered heroin to the CI, do not establish
an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of his motion for a new trial.
Corporal Cornick did not have a direct view of the transaction, but Detective
Licata did. Thus, the trial court, as finder of fact, was well within its authority
to credit Detective Licata’s testimony that the exchange occurred in
Appellant’s vehicle. Moreover, the trial court correctly observed that
Appellant’s convictions could be sustained by circumstantial evidence. Cf.
Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Therefore, Appellant’s first and second weight of
the evidence arguments fail.
As to Appellant’s third argument, which challenges the quality of the
circumstantial evidence, the perceived inadequacy of the search of the CI and
the CI’s vehicle for contraband before the alleged exchange does not warrant
relief. Instantly, Corporal Cornick testified that he followed protocols when
searching the CI, possibly having the CI shake out their undergarments, and
examining the interior of the CI’s car. Although the Corporal did not conduct
a cavity search or exhaust all possible hiding spots in the CI’s vehicle,
Appellant’s arguments rests on speculation that the CI secreted the heroin
before the sale or the recorded buy money after the sale. However, any doubt
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as to Appellant’s conviction must be reasonable, and reasonable doubt does
not require the Commonwealth to prove Appellant’s guilt to a mathematical
certainty. Cf. Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Thus, we discern no basis to disturb
the trial court’s conclusion that there was ample evidence that the CI obtained
the subject heroin during the meeting inside Appellant’s car, and its finding in
this regard did not shock one’s sense of justice. See Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,
1054-55.
As noted earlier, however, the record does not support the court’s
suggestion that Appellant was observed getting into the backseat of his vehicle
with the CI. See supra, note 3. Rather, the delivery that occurred inside
Appellant’s vehicle took place between the CI and either Appellant, who was
in the front passenger seat at the time of the alleged transaction, or the driver
of the vehicle. See N.T., 1/12/16, at 37. Nevertheless, the absence of
evidence regarding which party delivered the heroin to the CI does not warrant
relief.
The term “‘[d]eliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive, or
attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance,
other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.”
35 P.S. § 780-102(b). This Court has noted that an actual delivery “means
‘[t]o convey or remove from one . . . person to another; pass or hand over
from one to another.’” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1030
(Pa. Super. 2002). A “constructive transfer”
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requires that a person making a constructive transfer of a
controlled substance, the transferor, must have ownership
of the controlled substance; i.e., the controlled substance
must belong to the person, or the person must have
dominion and control over it. The constructive transfer of
the controlled substance occurs, then, whenever it is given
to another by a third person who is acting at the transferor’s
direction or command.
Id. at 1031-32.
Instantly, as set forth above, there was ample evidence that the CI
contacted “Mac” to purchase heroin, and that Appellant appeared at the
prearranged location in his own vehicle. Appellant, moreover, appeared to
conduct “counter surveillance” before the meeting and had his driver take him
around the block before engaging with the CI. Later, after the CI exited
Appellant’s vehicle, Appellant exited the car, rummaged in the area where the
CI had been seated, returned to the front passenger seat, and left the scene.
Under these circumstances, we find adequate support that Appellant either
directly, or through a third person under his command, transferred the heroin
to the CI. Therefore, no relief is due.
Fourth, although Appellant asserts that the text messages from the
cellular phone recovered at time of his arrest were insufficiently authenticated,
the record belies Appellant’s argument. Rather, the record reveals that
Appellant was known as “Mac” or “Omizz,” that the outgoing messages used
those nicknames, and that these messages also referred to purported
transactions at the same location as Appellant’s sale to the CI. See In re
F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. 2005) (circumstantial evidence which “will
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support a finding that the writing is genuine will suffice to authenticate the
writing” (citations omitted)). Therefore, we find no merit to Appellant’s
assertions that the messages were not entitled to any weight for the limited
purposes of identifying him as the individual known as “Mac” called by the CI.
Moreover, because none of Appellant’s arguments in support of his weight of
the evidence claim show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
his motion for a new trial. See Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55
Appellant, in his final claim, asserts that the trial court’s sentence was
manifestly excessive. Appellant acknowledges that he was sentenced in the
standard range for each offense but argues that the application of the
guidelines was clearly unreasonable in light of his history and background.
Appellant’s Brief at 19, 34 He further challenges the decision of the court to
run the two sentences in this case consecutively and consecutive to his
previously imposed sentence. Id. at 19, 33. We conclude Appellant has failed
to raise a substantial question warranting review.
This Court has stated that the
discretionary aspects of [an appellant’s] sentence [ ] are not
appealable as of right. Rather, an appellant challenging the
sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test.
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
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substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some
citations omitted).
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc requesting that
the sentences in this case run concurrently to each other and the previously
imposed sentence, and that the sentence was too severe in light of his
rehabilitative needs. Appellant perfected this appeal by filing an appeal nunc
pro tunc, and he preserved his sentencing claim in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Appellant has included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement.
Therefore, we proceed to consider whether Appellant raised a substantial
question.
It is well settled that
[t]he determination of what constitutes a substantial
question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. “A
substantial question exi[s]ts only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision
of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court
discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same
time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the
exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a
substantial question.” In fact, this Court has recognized
“the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most
extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate
sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the
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crimes and the length of imprisonment.” That is “in our
view, the key to resolving the preliminary substantial
question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence
consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what
appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the
criminal conduct at issue in the case.”
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808-09 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
Appellant presents boilerplate assertions that the trial court failed to
consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors and focused solely on
the gravity of the offense.5 However, considering the nature of the crimes we
do not find the individual sentences or the aggregate sentence of thirty-nine
to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment to be so severe a punishment
constituting an extreme circumstance under which the aggregate sentence is
unduly harsh. Similarly, Appellant presents no further facts to conclude that
the decision to run the sentences in this case consecutive to the sentence of
sixteen to thirty-six months’ imprisonment in his prior case was excessive in
light of the criminal conduct at issue. See Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665
A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (reiterating principle that defendants are
not entitled to “volume discounts” for multiple criminal acts). Therefore, we
find no substantial question and decline to proceed to review of Appellant’s
sentencing claim.
5 We note that Appellant does not specify any mitigating circumstances. We
further note that during allocution, Appellant merely invoked his constitutional
rights to confront and cross-examine his accusers. N.T. at 57.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2017
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Com. v. Riley, L., Jr.
Combined Opinion