Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 19, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48384-0-II
Petitioner,
v.
PUBLISHED OPINION
DARCUS DEWAYNE ALLEN,
Respondent.
MELNICK, J. — At issue in this case is whether the trial court properly dismissed the State’s
allegations of aggravating circumstances under chapter 10.95 RCW on double jeopardy grounds.
The State charged Darcus DeWayne Allen with four counts of premeditated murder in the first
degree and alleged two statutory aggravating circumstances under RCW 10.95.020 (aggravating
circumstances).1 The jury unanimously found that the State had not proved the aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, but found Allen guilty of the murder charges.
1
The State also filed aggravating circumstances under former RCW 9.94A.535 (2010), which, if
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, would allow the trial court to impose an exceptional
sentence. Those aggravating circumstances are not at issue in this discretionary review.
48384-0-II
After the Supreme Court reversed Allen’s convictions, State v. Allen, 182 Wn.2d 364, 341
P.3d 268 (2015), the State filed the same aggravating circumstances it had previously filed and
which the jury found had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The trial court granted Allen’s motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstances and
subsequently denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. We granted the State’s motion for
discretionary review and affirm the trial court.
FACTS
The State charged Allen with four counts of premeditated murder in the first degree with
aggravating circumstances. A jury found Allen guilty of the murder charges, but found that the
State had not proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court individually polled each juror. It asked each juror, “Is this your verdict?”
and “Is it the verdict of the jury?” Clerk’s Papers at 148. Every juror answered in the affirmative.
The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence above the standard range for the crime of
premeditated murder in the first degree. Allen appealed. His convictions were reversed based on
prosecutorial misconduct. Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 387.
On remand, the State did not seek the death penalty, but it did reallege the same aggravating
circumstances that the jury had previously found had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
2
If a jury found that the State had proved either of the aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant would be sentenced “to life imprisonment without possibility of
release or parole.” RCW 10.95.030. This sentence exceeds the statutory punishment for
premeditated murder in the first degree. RCW 9A.32.030, .040.
2
48384-0-II
Allen filed a motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstances based on double jeopardy.
The trial court, relying primarily on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L.
Ed. 2d 314 (2013) (partial plurality opinion), concluded that the aggravating circumstances
constituted elements of the crime and that Alleyne altered the prior line of cases in Washington as
to aggravating circumstances. The court concluded that because the prior jury found that the State
had not proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, double jeopardy barred
the State from retrying them. The court entered an order granting Allen’s motion to dismiss the
aggravating factors. The trial court then denied the State’s motion for reconsideration.
We granted the State’s motion for discretionary review as to whether or not the prohibition
against double jeopardy barred the State from retrying Allen on the aggravating circumstances.
Because the jury’s unanimous finding on the aggravating circumstances is an acquittal on them,
we conclude the State cannot retry Allen on them. We affirm the trial court.
ANALYSIS3
A number of separate issues are presented in this case. Although they are intertwined, each
must be analyzed separately. The ultimate issue we must decide is whether the jury’s affirmative
finding that the State had not proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt is
an acquittal and double jeopardy bars a retrial on them. We conclude it was an acquittal on the
aggravating circumstances and double jeopardy bars a retrial on them.
3
Allen additionally argues that collateral estoppel applies to bar the State from relitigating the
aggravating factors under RCW 10.95.020. However, this argument was not raised below and we
did not accept review of it; therefore, we will not address it.
3
48384-0-II
I. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT ELEMENTS
The State argues that the trial court erred by treating the aggravating circumstances in RCW
10.95.020 as elements of the charged crime because it is well-settled Washington law that
aggravating circumstances relate to sentencing and are not elements of the offense. We agree with
the State that the aggravating circumstances are not elements of the crime of premeditated murder
in the first degree with aggravating circumstances. However, because they are the functional
equivalent of elements, we disagree with the State that the trial court erred by treating them as
such.
Chapter 10.95 RCW sets forth the procedures and penalties for premeditated murder in the
first degree with aggravating circumstances. If the State charges a defendant with premeditated
murder in the first degree, it can also file one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. State
v. Thomas, 166 Wn.2d 380, 387, 208 P.3d 1107 (2009). If aggravating factors are filed, a jury4
determines whether the State has proved both the substantive crime and the aggravating
circumstance(s). RCW 10.95.050. Only if the jury finds that the State has proved both the
substantive crime and the aggravating circumstance(s) beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase
will a special sentencing hearing occur. RCW 10.95.050. At the sentencing hearing, the jury will
determine whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Depending on
the answer, a defendant is sentenced either to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility
of release or parole. RCW 10.95.030, .080. If the jury does not find aggravating factors, the
defendant is sentenced for the crime of premeditated murder in the first degree.
4
We are aware that under RCW 10.95.050(2), a jury may be waived at the court’s discretion with
the consent of the defendant and the State. We use the term jury and not fact finder for simplicity.
4
48384-0-II
Premeditated murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances is not a crime in
and of itself. The crime is premeditated murder in the first degree, which is accompanied by
statutory aggravators.5 State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 501, 14 P.3d 713 (2000).
Aggravating circumstances are “not elements of the crime, but they are ‘aggravation of
penalty’ factors.” State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 154, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Kincaid, 103 Wn.2d 304, 307, 692 P.2d 823 (1985)). They are sentence
enhancers used to “‘increase the statutory maximum sentence from life with the possibility of
parole to life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.’” Thomas, 166 Wn.2d at 387-
88 (quoting State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 758, 168 P.3d 359 (2007)). In Yates, the court rejected
the argument that murder in the first degree was a lesser included offense of murder in the first
degree with aggravating circumstances. 161 Wn.2d at 761.
II. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF ELEMENTS
Our courts have consistently ruled that aggravating circumstances enhancing premeditated
murder in the first degree are not elements. Kincaid, 103 Wn.2d at 307-10. But the United States
Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that factors that raise the penalty for a crime, other than
a fact of conviction, are the functional equivalent of elements. In other words, they are akin to
elements, must be submitted to a jury, and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). None of these cases
changed the statutory process utilized in chapter 10.95 RCW. None of these cases involved double
jeopardy challenges. But they are necessary to the analysis of why the jury’s factual finding on
the aggravating circumstances bars a retrial on them.
5
Some of the confusion about this issue may arise because the crime is statutorily called
“aggravated first degree murder.” RCW 10.95.020.
5
48384-0-II
In Apprendi, the Court held that any fact that increases the statutory maximum penalty for
the charged crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. The
Court recognized that this type of sentence enhancement “is the functional equivalent of an
element” because it increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
494 n.19.
Apprendi is based on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. Apprendi acknowledged the
“constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between ‘elements’ and ‘sentencing factors.’” 530
U.S. at 494. It recognized that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 494. Alleyne reaffirmed these rules. 133 S. Ct. at 2156 (plurality).
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002), the Court
held that aggravating factors necessary to impose the death penalty must be submitted to a jury.
In quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, the Court held that because Arizona’s enumerated
aggravating factors operate as “‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’” a
jury must decide them. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
The Court has also applied the general rule that a jury must hear facts that increase the
sentence, other than prior convictions, in various situations, including
plea bargains, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d
403 (2004), sentencing guidelines, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct.
738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), criminal fines, Southern Union Co. v. United States,
567 U.S. [343], 132 S.Ct. 2344, 183 L.Ed.2d 318 (2012), mandatory minimums,
Alleyne, [133 S. Ct. at 2166] and, in Ring, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153
L.Ed.2d 556, capital punishment.
Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016).
6
48384-0-II
Washington courts have recognized these changes in a variety of contexts, but in particular
in a capital case. In State v. McEnroe, the court held that an aggravating circumstance in a death
penalty case becomes the functional equivalent of an element of the crime. 181 Wn.2d 375, 382,
333 P.3d 402 (2014).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Washington’s statutory sentencing scheme under
chapter 10.95 RCW remains unchanged. The United States Supreme Court was cognizant of the
fact that different sentencing schemes exist in different jurisdictions. None of these cases has
overruled or altered our prior jurisprudence in this area. Premeditated murder in the first degree
remains a separate crime from premeditated murder in the first degree with aggravating
circumstances. The aggravating circumstances are the functional equivalent of elements that must
be submitted to the jury and must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The State additionally argues that Washington courts have held that double jeopardy
protections are not applicable to noncapital sentencing proceedings. Because those cases are
factually distinguished from this case, we disagree with this broad assertion. Instead, we conclude
that double jeopardy prohibits retrial on the aggravating circumstances that the jury determined
the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
“The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]
and [article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution] protect a defendant against multiple
punishments for the same offense.” State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769, 772, 888 P.2d 155 (1995).
Double jeopardy involves questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d
643, 649, 160 P.3d 40 (2007). “‘The double jeopardy doctrine protects a criminal defendant from
being (1) prosecuted a second time for the same offense after acquittal, (2) prosecuted a second
7
48384-0-II
time for the same offense after conviction, and (3) punished multiple times for the same offense.’”
State v. Fuller, 185 Wn.2d 30, 33-34, 367 P.3d 1057 (2016) (quoting State v. Linton, 156 Wn.2d
777, 783, 132 P.3d 127 (2006) (plurality opinion)). Here, we are dealing with the first prong and
deciding whether a unanimous jury verdict finding that the State had not proved aggravated
circumstances, the functional equivalent of elements, beyond a reasonable doubt is an acquittal of
those aggravating circumstances. A brief survey of case law sheds light on the answer.
In Bullington v. Missouri, a jury found Bullington guilty of capital murder in the guilt
phase, but returned a sentence of less than death in the penalty phase. 451 U.S. 430, 101 S. Ct.
1852, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1981). After a reversal of the conviction, the State once again sought the
death penalty. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436. The Court held that double jeopardy barred a retrial
on the death penalty because the jury’s sentence in the first case meant it had acquitted the
defendant of the factors necessary to impose death. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445-46. The Court
based its holding on the fact that the penalty phase required trial-like procedures. Bullington, 451
U.S. at 445-46. Here the jury’s finding meant that it had acquitted Allen of the circumstances
necessary to impose a sentence of either death or life without the possibility of parole or early
release.
In Monge v. California, the Court explained its earlier decision in Bullington:
When the State announced its intention to seek the death penalty again, the
defendant alleged a double jeopardy violation. We determined that the first jury’s
deliberations bore the “hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence,” because the
jury was presented with a choice between two alternatives together with standards
to guide their decision, the prosecution undertook the burden of establishing facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence was introduced in a separate
proceeding that formally resembled a trial. In light of the jury’s binary
determination and the heightened procedural protections, we found the proceeding
distinct from traditional sentencing, in which “it is impossible to conclude that a
sentence less than the statutory maximum constitute[s] a decision to the effect that
the government has failed to prove its case.”
8
48384-0-II
524 U.S. 721, 730-31, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 141 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1998) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439, 443) (internal
case citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
We are mindful that in Bullington, the jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder,
but here, the jury did not find Allen guilty of capital murder. It found him guilty of premeditated
murder in the first degree. As a result, Allen was not eligible for a sentence of life without parole
or early release. The jury’s finding had all the hallmarks of a trial.
In Arizona v. Rumsey, the jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and murder in the
first degree. 467 U.S. 203, 205, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1984). The trial judge found
no presence of aggravating circumstances and sentenced the defendant to life in prison for a
minimum of 25 years. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 205-06. The Arizona Supreme Court set aside the
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 207. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court held that the trial court’s findings of no aggravating circumstances
constituted an acquittal. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212. The defendant could not be sentenced to death.
Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212. The facts in Rumsey are similar to the ones we are presented with here.
Additionally, in Monge, the Court refused to find a double jeopardy violation where the
state court on appeal held that insufficient evidence supported the prior conviction upon which the
trial court relied in sentencing the defendant under California’s three strikes law. 524 U.S. at 731.
In holding that the case could be remanded for a new sentencing hearing where the State could
offer evidence on the prior conviction, the Court distinguished this case from one involving the
death penalty:
The penalty phase of a capital trial is undertaken to assess the gravity of a particular
offense and to determine whether it warrants the ultimate punishment; it is in many
respects a continuation of the trial on guilt or innocence of capital murder. “It is of
9
48384-0-II
vital importance” that the decisions made in that context “be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”
Monge, 524 U.S. at 731-32 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L.
Ed. 2d 393 (1977)).
Monge’s case involved California’s three strikes law and proof of the defendant’s criminal
history. Monge, 524 U.S. 721.6 As pointed out previously, proof of a prior conviction does not
involve proving the functional equivalent of an element. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In fact, after
appellate review in Washington, “the parties shall have the opportunity [at resentencing] to present
and the court to consider all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal
history not previously presented.” RCW 9.94A.530(2). In contrast, Allen’s jury determined that
the State had not proved the aggravating circumstances, the functional equivalent of elements of
the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt Because of Washington’s statutory scheme under chapter
10.95 RCW, the enhanced penalty only comes into play if the jury finds the defendant guilty of
premeditated murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances. It mandates that a jury
first must determine whether the State has proved the functional equivalent of the elements beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the guilt
phase of the trial. 537 U.S. 101, 103, 123 S. Ct. 732, 154 L. Ed. 2d 588 (2003). The case then
proceeded to the penalty phase where the state alleged one aggravating factor and the defendant
presented mitigating evidence. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103-04. After the jury was hopelessly
deadlocked, the trial court dismissed the jury and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment per
the existing law. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05. The defendant appealed and the state appellate
6
We note that in Monge, the parties and the courts did not address whether the recidivism
enhancement constituted an element of the offense. 524 U.S. at 728.
10
48384-0-II
court reversed his murder conviction. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105. On remand, the State again
filed a death penalty notice. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105. It alleged two aggravating factors.
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to disallow the State
from filing the aggravating factors. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105. The Court held that no double
jeopardy violation occurred because
the touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is
whether there has been an “acquittal.” Petitioner here cannot establish that the jury
or the court “acquitted” him during his first capital-sentencing proceeding. As to
the jury: The verdict form returned by the foreman stated that the jury deadlocked
9-to-3 on whether to impose the death penalty; it made no findings with respect to
the alleged aggravating circumstance. That result—or more appropriately, that
non-result—cannot fairly be called an acquittal “based on findings sufficient to
establish legal entitlement to the life sentence.”
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211).
Sattazahn is factually distinguishable from our case. There, the jury did not unanimously
make a finding as to the aggravating circumstance. In our case, Allen’s jury made that finding.
We also note that based on the jury’s “finding” in Sattazahn, the matter proceeded to the penalty
or sentencing phase. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105. In our case, Allen’s jury never entered the
sentencing phase; it found that the State had not proved the aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, under Washington’s scheme, no sentencing phase occurred because
Allen’s jury acquitted him of the aggravating factors; rather, Allen was sentenced for the crime of
premeditated murder in the first degree.
The Sattazahn Court reasoned in dicta that,
[i]n the post-Ring world, the Double Jeopardy Clause can, and must, apply to some
capital-sentencing proceedings consistent with the text of the Fifth Amendment. If
a jury unanimously concludes that a State has failed to meet its burden of proving
the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, double-jeopardy
11
48384-0-II
protections attach to that “acquittal” on the offense of “murder plus aggravating
circumstance(s).”[7]
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112. In Allen’s case, the jury did “acquit” him of the aggravating factors.
These cases lead us to the conclusion that once a jury made the finding in Allen’s death
penalty case that the State had not proved aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt,
it acquitted him of those aggravating circumstances.
Our decision today does not conflict with State v. Benn, where a retrial occurred based on
an aggravated circumstance for which the jury had not returned a verdict. 161 Wn.2d 256, 165
P.3d 1232 (2007). In the first trial, the jury left the answer blank. The jury made no finding as to
the aggravating circumstance. Benn, 161 Wn.2d at 264. It was not an implied acquittal. Benn,
161 Wn.2d at 264. “A jury’s failure to find the existence of an aggravating factor does not
constitute an ‘acquittal’ of that factor for double jeopardy purposes.” Benn, 161 Wn.2d at 264.
Here Allen’s jury did not fail to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance. It found no
existence of an aggravated circumstance. Therefore, double jeopardy prohibits the retrial of the
aggravating factors for which the jury found the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although no Washington case is directly on point, Oregon has addressed the issue
indirectly. It observed that, “under Apprendi, a jury determination of a sentencing enhancement
factor is now part and parcel of a jury trial and we now must view that determination similarly to
a jury’s decision to acquit or convict.” State v. Sawatzky, 339 Or. 689, 696, 125 P.3d 722 (2005)
(resentencing hearing on “enhanced” sentence before jury after judge initially made
determination). We agree with the court in Sawatzky.
7
The fact that the Court also opined that this situation would arise when the crime of murder
differed from the crime of aggravated murder is not relevant to this discussion.
12
48384-0-II
CONCLUSION
In the capital case against Allen, the jury affirmatively and unanimously found that the
State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt any aggravating circumstances. These
aggravating circumstances are the functional equivalent of elements of the crime. The jury’s
finding is an acquittal of the aggravating circumstances for double jeopardy purposes. The State
cannot retry Allen on the aggravating circumstances for which a jury found a lack of proof. We
affirm the trial court.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Johanson, P.J.
Sutton, J.
13
State Of Washington v. Darcus D. Allen
Combined Opinion