Amir Shabazz v. Jimmy Cruzen

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMIR SHABAZZ, No. 17-16037 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:15-cv-02041-LHK v. MEMORANDUM* JIMMY CRUZEN, Sgt; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 18, 2017** Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. California state prisoner Amir Shabazz appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action related to congregational prayer. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shabazz failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether there was “something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (requiring proper exhaustion, which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Shabazz contends that he exhausted under a “continuing violation” theory, but even if this court were to adopt such a theory, it would not apply in this case. AFFIRMED. 2 17-16037