NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA AGRAZ, an individual, No. 17-55037
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07088-PA-AS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GOLDEN EMPIRE MORTGAGE, INC.; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Sandra Agraz appeals from the district court’s order dismissing her federal
claims alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of the statute of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
limitations and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,
382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Agraz’s RESPA claim and TILA
damages claim because these claims are barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation and Agraz failed to allege facts demonstrating that equitable tolling
should apply. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (RESPA claims are subject to one- and three-
year statutes of limitation); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (TILA damages claims are subject
to a one-year statute of limitations); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (federal standard for equitable tolling).
The district court properly dismissed Agraz’s TILA rescission claim because
Agraz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she exercised the right to rescind
within three years of the consummation of her loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)
(borrower’s right to rescind “shall expire three years after the date of
consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property”); see also
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015)
(“[R]escission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his intention to
rescind.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agraz’s federal
claims without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a
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district court may dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be
futile).
AFFIRMED.
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