NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK, No. 17-15558
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00684-SPL-BSB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director of
the Arizona Department of Corrections; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Anthony James Merrick, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Merrick’s request for oral
argument, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Hamilton v. Brown, 630
F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Merrick’s
deliberate indifference claim against defendant Dr. Barcklay-Dodson and
defendant Ryan in his individual capacity because Merrick failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent
in treating Merrick’s spinal and back problems. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60
(a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; a mere difference in medical
opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Merrick’s
deliberate indifference claim against Ryan in his official capacity because Ryan is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816,
824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state
officials in their official capacity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Merrick’s claim
for prospective relief because Merrick failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether any official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.
See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting
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forth the elements of a §1983 claim against a private entity performing a
government function).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) claims because Merrick failed to allege facts showing that
defendants discriminated against him because of a disability. See Simmons v.
Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth
elements of ADA claim and explaining that “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination
because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability”).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s retaliation claim because
Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show causation or that his speech was
protected. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting
forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merrick’s motion to
supplement the pleadings under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because supplementing the operative second amended complaint would have
prejudiced defendants. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473-75 (9th Cir. 1988)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that prejudice can justify the denial
of a Rule 15(d) motion).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merrick’s motion to
appoint counsel because Merrick did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
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See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (standard of review and
requirements for appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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