MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 27 2017, 8:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael R. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Kelly A. Loy
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin Lynn Tedford, December 27, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1708-CR-1735
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marshelle D.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Broadwell, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1604-F6-12820
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-CR-1735 | December 27, 2017 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case
[1] Kevin Lynn Tedford appeals his conviction for domestic battery, as a Level 6
felony, following a bench trial. Tedford presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
conviction.1 We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 29, 2016, Tedford was exercising visitation with his daughter K.T.
(age 10) and his son Ke.T. (age 7). The children’s mother, D.T., was supposed
to pick up the children at 6:00 p.m., but Tedford called her and asked her
whether she could pick them up at 3:00 p.m. D.T. responded that she could not
get the children earlier than 6:00. Tedford became angry and called D.T.
names. D.T. told Tedford that she would see him at 6:00, and she hung up the
phone.
[3] Tedford then sent text messages to D.T. threatening to harm her with a gun.
And a short time later, Tedford drove to D.T.’s mother’s house, where D.T.
was visiting. Tedford’s friend Cruz Wright was in the front passenger seat of
the car, which belonged to Wright, and Tedford’s children were sitting in the
back seat. When they arrived, Tedford got out of the car and approached D.T.,
1
Tedford purports to also challenge his conviction on a second battery conviction, as a Level 6 felony
(Count II), but the trial court did not enter judgment of conviction on that count.
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who was standing outside of the house with a man named Dejuan.2 Tedford
said to Dejuan, “Are you the b**** a** n**** that was talking s*** on the
phone?” Tr. at 10. D.T. intervened and said to Tedford, “Don’t come over
here for this.” Id. Tedford then pushed D.T., and she pushed him back.
Tedford called D.T. a “b****,” and D.T. threatened to tell her uncle about
Tedford’s actions. Id. at 11. Tedford threatened D.T. with a fist. Finally, D.T.
told Tedford to “just leave.” Id.
[4] At that point, K.T. got out of the car. And D.T.’s mother and her mother’s
fiancé, Frederick, came outside. Tedford pushed D.T. again, and D.T. fell into
Frederick, who was standing behind her. Tedford then punched Frederick and
knocked him to the ground. Tedford then walked towards Wright’s car, and
D.T. followed him. Ke.T. got out of the car. Tedford reached into his car, got
a gun, and pointed the gun at D.T. at close range. Ke.T. was standing in close
proximity to D.T. at that time. D.T. said something to Tedford, and Tedford
eventually got back in the car and drove away. D.T.’s mother called the police.
[5] The State charged Tedford with domestic battery, as a Level 6 felony; battery,
as a Level 6 felony; intimidation, as a Level 6 felony; domestic battery, as a
Class A misdemeanor; three counts of battery, as Class A misdemeanors; and
pointing a firearm at another person, as a Class A misdemeanor. The State
dismissed the intimidation charge prior to trial. Following a bench trial, the
2
In her testimony, D.T. does not explain her relationship to Dejuan or give his last name.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-CR-1735 | December 27, 2017 Page 3 of 6
trial court entered judgment of conviction on three counts: domestic battery, as
a Level 6 felony; pointing a firearm at another person, as a Class A
misdemeanor; and battery, as a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court
sentenced Tedford to concurrent sentences of 365 days in Community
Corrections, with 185 days suspended. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Tedford contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for battery, as a Level 6 felony. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most
favorable to the conviction, neither reweighing the evidence nor reassessing
witness credibility. Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). We will
affirm the judgment unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the defendant
guilty. Id.
[7] To prove battery, as a Level 6 felony, the State was required to show that
Tedford knowingly or intentionally touched D.T., who has a child in common
with Tedford, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner which resulted in bodily
injury to D.T. and which was committed in the physical presence of K.T., who
was less than sixteen years old, knowing that K.T. was present and might be
able to see or hear the battery. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b) (2015). Tedford
maintains that the State failed to prove either that he caused D.T. bodily injury
or that he knew that K.T. was present and might be able to see or hear the
battery. We address each contention in turn.
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Bodily Injury
[8] Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-29 defines “bodily injury” as any impairment
of physical condition, including physical pain. And our Supreme Court has
held that “any degree of physical pain may constitute a bodily injury.” Bailey v.
State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind. 2012). Tedford contends that “the record in
this case provides no evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that
[D.T.] suffered ‘any degree of physical pain.’” Appellant’s Br. at 10 (quoting
Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 142). But D.T. testified in relevant part that she felt pain
when Tedford pushed her “hard” and she fell into Frederick, who was standing
behind her. Tr. at 13. Tedford’s contention amounts to a request that we
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented sufficient
evidence that D.T. suffered bodily injury.
In the Presence of K.T.
[9] Finally, Tedford contends that “there is no certainty as to where the children
were or what they could have seen or heard” when the battery occurred.
Appellant’s Br. at 14. But the evidence shows that the children were sitting in
the back seat of the car when Tedford drove to D.T.’s mother’s house. Thus,
Tedford knew that the children were sitting in the car when Tedford first
confronted D.T. outside of her mother’s house and pushed her the first time.
And D.T. testified that K.T. was outside of the car when Tedford pushed D.T.
the second time. Finally, the car was parked in the street in front of the house,
and the battery occurred in the front yard. Thus, the evidence supports a
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reasonable inference that the children could have seen the incident from their
vantage point.
[10] This court has held that “the critical question in determining whether a child is
‘present’ for purposes of [Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3] is whether a
reasonable person would conclude that the child might see or hear the offense;
not whether the child is in the same room as where the offense is taking place.”
Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added).
Here, we hold that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Tedford
knew that the children might see or hear the battery. Indeed, K.T. was outside
of the car when Tedford pushed D.T. the second time. Again, Tedford asks
that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented
sufficient evidence to support Tedford’s conviction for battery, as a Level 6
felony.
[11] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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