City of Lakewood v. Armstrong

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
December 28, 2017

2017COA159

No. 16CA1494, Lakewood v. Armstrong — Real Property —
Easements Appurtenant — Easement Deeds — Dominant Estate

This case addresses several issues concerning easements

appurtenant. A division of the court of appeals concludes: (1) an

easement deed is valid even though the deed does not describe a

dominant estate and contains only one legal description that

encompasses both the servient estate and the easement; (2) a court

may review undisputed extrinsic evidence to determine whether the

easement’s location and the dominant estate are described with

reasonable certainty such that the deed is valid and enforceable;

and (3) a county may acquire an easement for a city’s and the

public’s use. The division also rejects the appellants’ arguments

that they did not have notice of the easement and that a reverter
clause in the deed had been triggered by the dominant estate’s

zoning.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA159

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1494
Jefferson County District Court No. 15CV31593
Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge

City of Lakewood, Colorado, a Colorado home rule municipality,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joyce B. Armstrong and Mary E.J. Armstrong Trust,

Defendants-Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE
Dailey and Welling, JJ., concur

Announced December 28, 2017

Hoffmann, Parker, Wilson & Carberry, P.C., M. Patrick Wilson, Kathryn M.
Sellars, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Timmins LLC, Jo Deziel Timmins, Edward P. Timmins, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants-Appellants
¶1 Defendants, Joyce B. Armstrong and the Mary E.J. Armstrong

Trust (the Armstrongs), appeal the district court’s summary

judgment for plaintiff, City of Lakewood (Lakewood), declaring that

a deed conveying an express easement over the Armstrongs’

property was a valid and enforceable easement appurtenant. We

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 The undisputed facts establish that on June 18, 1984, Lois

Jones Mackey executed a deed (Mackey deed) purporting to convey

a “permanent public easement for ingress and egress” over a

portion of the southeast corner of her property to Jefferson County.

The deed was recorded in the Jefferson County Clerk and

Recorder’s Office that same day. Lakewood owned property directly

east and north of Mackey’s property, but Jefferson County did not

own any adjacent property. Lakewood’s adjacent property consisted

of the Bear Creek Greenbelt.

¶3 A month later, Jefferson County executed a deed to Lakewood

(Commissioners deed) conveying the Mackey deed easement using

the same legal description. The Commissioners deed contained a

reverter clause that required Lakewood to use the easement

1
 exclusively for public open space, park, and recreational purposes.

This deed was recorded in October 1984 in the Jefferson County

Clerk and Recorder’s records.

¶4 In 2011, the Armstrongs bought the property from Mackey’s

successor in interest and occupied it. At some point, the

Armstrongs attempted to obstruct the easement’s use by locking a

gate at one entrance to it. In 2015, Lakewood filed an action for

quiet title, declaratory judgment, prescriptive easement, trespass,

reformation of the Commissioners deed, and preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief. The Armstrongs answered and

counterclaimed for quiet title, asserting that the easement was

invalid. Lakewood requested partial summary judgment on its

claims for declaratory judgment, quiet title, and reformation of the

Commissioners deed. The Armstrongs filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment in their favor on all of Lakewood’s claims.

¶5 Before trial, the district court granted Lakewood’s summary

judgement motion for declaratory judgment, quiet title, and

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 reformation.1 The court found that the easement was a valid

express easement appurtenant over the Armstrongs’ property for

use by the public and Lakewood. The court denied the Armstrongs’

motion for summary judgment and entered a final order and decree.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 The court’s summary judgment noted that “[t]he parties agree

that . . . there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to

the question of whether an express easement exists and that this

issue is appropriate for resolution on summary judgment.”

Because all issues raised by the Armstrongs on appeal were decided

by summary judgment, the parties agree that a de novo review

standard applies. We agree.

¶7 We review an appeal of a summary judgment de novo.

Edwards v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2016 COA 121, ¶ 13. Summary

judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted only when the

pleadings and the supporting documents demonstrate that no

1 More precisely, the court granted Lakewood’s revised motion for
partial summary judgment. Also, the court subsequently amended
its summary judgment order, which clarified the extent of the
easement, corrected the Armstrongs’ chain of title, and corrected
the parties’ maintenance obligations under the easement.
3
 genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is

legally entitled to judgment. W. Elk Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States,

65 P.3d 479, 481 (Colo. 2002).

III. The Commissioners Deed Is Valid Because the Easement Is
Described with Reasonable Certainty

¶8 The Armstrongs assert that the district court erred in granting

Lakewood’s motion for summary judgment because the

Commissioners deed violates the statute of frauds and is void

“because it fails to legally describe the easement itself or the

dominant estate.” We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶9 An interest in real property, including an express easement,

must be created by act or operation of law or contained in a deed or

conveyance and subscribed by the party creating or assigning the

interest to satisfy the statute of frauds. § 38-10-106, C.R.S. 2017;

Strole v. Guymon, 37 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. App. 2001) (easements

are interests in real property).

¶ 10 Words that clearly show the intention to grant an easement

are adequate to demonstrate its creation, provided the language in

the instrument is sufficiently definite and certain. Hornsilver Circle,

4
 Ltd. v. Trope, 904 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Colo. App. 1995). As a

nonpossessory interest, an easement does not require the precise

description that a possessory interest does. Hutson v. Agric. Ditch &

Reservoir Co., 723 P.2d 736, 740 (Colo. 1986). The instrument

instead must identify with reasonable certainty the easement

created and the dominant and servient tenements. Hornsilver, 904

P.2d at 1356. No particular words are necessary to grant an

easement, and a lack of specificity in describing an easement’s

location will ordinarily not invalidate it. Stevens v. Mannix, 77 P.3d

931, 932 (Colo. App. 2003) (citing Isenberg v. Woitchek, 144 Colo.

394, 400, 356 P.2d 904, 907 (1960)).

¶ 11 The general rule is that vagueness in describing the easement

“does not go to the existence or validity of an easement,” but “an

extreme case of vagueness could result in a holding that no

easement was granted.” Isenberg, 144 Colo. at 399, 356 P.2d at

907; see Friends of the Black Forest Reg’l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs, 80 P.3d 871, 879-80 (Colo. App. 2003) (no easement was

created where a conveyance was “subject to” a right-of-way not

previously existing and possibly including land not owned by the

grantor, and concluding “[w]e cannot determine from the face of the

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 1921 deed that the lumber company intended to grant the road

easement”). “To determine whether an easement has been

expressly granted — and, if it has, the extent of such easement —

we look first to the deed or other conveyance instrument,

construing it to ascertain the parties’ intent.” Gold Hill Dev. Co.,

L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA 177, ¶ 48 (citing Lazy Dog

Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Colo. 1998)).

Ascertaining the parties’ intent is “[o]ur paramount concern.” Lazy

Dog Ranch, 965 P.2d at 1235.

B. The Easement’s Description in the Commissioners Deed

¶ 12 The Commissioners deed conveyed to Lakewood a “permanent

public easement for ingress and egress over the property described

in Exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto.” (Emphasis added.) The deed and

attached Exhibit A provide a detailed metes and bounds description

of a 0.362 acre parcel of land lying in the “NW 1/4 of section 34,

township 4 south, range 69 west of the 6th P.M., City of Lakewood”

in Jefferson County, Colorado. Thus, the Commissioners deed

contains “a description of the land that is to be subjected to the

easement with sufficient clarity to locate it with reasonable

certainty.” Hornsilver, 904 P.2d at 1356.

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¶ 13 But the Armstrongs contend that the easement is not

described because the parties agree that Exhibit A describes the

entire servient estate and the easement itself is not described within

the servient estate. Even assuming this is so, as noted, “a lack of

specificity in describing an easement’s location will ordinarily not

invalidate it.” Stevens, 77 P.3d at 932 (citing Isenberg, 144 Colo. at

400, 356 P.2d at 907). The parties agree that the burdened estate

is sufficiently identified. So, the easement is not invalid for

vagueness where the easement is not particularly identified. Id. at

933 (“Because these documents reasonably designate the land

burdened by the easements, we conclude that the easements were

not, as a matter of law, invalid because of vagueness.”). “If a valid

easement is granted without fixing in writing its location, the

location may be determined based on the conduct of the parties.”

Id.; see, e.g., Gjovig v. Spino, 701 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Colo. App. 1985)

(looking to historical use of the easement where there was no

precise description of the easement’s location of ingress and egress

over the servient estate); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes

§ 2.7 (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (“The great majority of cases require only

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 that the servient estate be described. They do not require that the

servitude’s location within the servient estate be described.”).

¶ 14 The Armstrongs also argue that if the easement and servient

estate share the same legal description, as the court found, then

the Commissioners deed does not describe a servient estate. The

Armstrongs rely on DRD Enterprises, LLC v. Flickema to support this

argument. 791 N.W.2d 180, 189 (S.D. 2010) (where a servient

estate is not identifiable the conveyance is invalid). But, the deed in

that case identified the servient estate only as “grantor’s land,” and

the court concluded that “[t]hese two words do not suggest any

point of reference by which one could identify the specific property

burdened.” Id. Further, the Armstrongs have not cited any

authority, and we are not aware of any, supporting the proposition

that an easement cannot encompass the entire servient estate with

its boundaries being coterminous with those of the servient estate.

On the contrary, an easement can encompass the entire servient

estate. See Bachman v. Hecht, 659 F. Supp. 308, 316 (D.V.I. 1986)

(an easement granted to subdivision purchasers to use beaches

designated on the plan as “Plots No. 103, No. 127 and No. 186”

implied that the easement covered the entire plots and was not

8
 limited to beach areas), aff’d, 849 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1988)

(unpublished table decision); Jankoski v. Lake Forest Acres

Homeowners, Inc., 968 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)

(an easement for recreational purposes covered the entire servient

estate and was not limited to lake access). So we reject this

argument.

¶ 15 We conclude that the Commissioners deed describes the

easement itself with reasonable certainty and is not rendered

invalid by any deficiency in the easement’s description.

C. The Dominant Estate

¶ 16 The parties agree that the Commissioners deed does not

expressly describe a dominant estate.

¶ 17 Requiring a sufficient description of a dominant estate is

important, in part, to give a bona fide purchaser notice of the

nature and extent of the easement. See Lewitz v. Porath Family Tr.,

36 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo. App. 2001). But in Hornsilver, another

division of this court held that an easement was reasonably certain

and valid when it provided, “in accurate detail, the size, dimensions,

type of use, and location of the easement on the servient tenement,

as well as the precise legal description of the servient property,”

9
 even though the deed provided an “inaccurate legal description of

the [dominant estate].” 904 P.2d at 1356. Even though the facts in

Hornsilver differ from those in this case, its legal conclusions are

equally applicable here.

¶ 18 The deed in question in Hornsilver described the dominant

estate by a lot number that did not exist in the town’s official

recorded plat. And the Commissioners deed does not expressly

describe a dominant estate. Because the deed in Hornsilver

described a non existent dominant estate and the Commissioners

deed does not describe a dominant estate at all, we perceive no

reasoned basis for not applying the legal principles announced in

Hornsilver to reach the same result in this case.

¶ 19 The parties agree that the servient estate is sufficiently

described, and as we concluded above, the easement is also

sufficiently described.2 So, we conclude that the lack of an

2We recognize that in Hornsilver, the servient estate was separately
described from the easement. But as we noted above, we are not
aware of any authority prohibiting an easement and the servient
estate from sharing the same legal description, and thus having
coterminous boundaries.
10
 expressly described dominant estate does not render the easement

invalid. Id.3

D. The Armstrongs Had Notice of the Recorded Easement

¶ 20 To the extent the Armstrongs argue that they did not have

constructive notice of the easement because the Commissioners

deed does not describe the dominant estate or easement itself, we

are not persuaded.

¶ 21 The easement was recorded in the Jefferson County Clerk and

Recorder’s Office pursuant to section 38-35-109(1), C.R.S. 2017,

over twenty-five years prior to the Armstrongs’ purchase of the

property. We have concluded above that the easement is described

with reasonable certainty and is valid. So, the Armstrongs had

constructive notice of the easement. Bolinger v. Neal, 259 P.3d

1259, 1270 (Colo. App. 2010) (“As a matter of law, a person who

3 We note that Hornsilver is consistent with the general rule that “it
is a sound conveyancing practice to identify the dominant estate in
a deed, but generally this is not essential to the creation of an
easement appurtenant.” Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, The Law of
Easements and Licenses in Land § 2:3, Westlaw (database updated
September 2017); see, e.g., Garza v. Grayson, 467 P.2d 960, 962
(Or. 1970); Lozier v. Blattland Invs., LLC, 100 P.3d 380, 385 (Wyo.
2004).
11
 acquires an interest in real property is on constructive notice of all

prior filings concerning that property.”).

IV. The Court Properly Reviewed Extrinsic Evidence to Determine
the Commissioners Deed’s Validity

¶ 22 The Armstrongs contend that the court impermissibly looked

to extrinsic evidence to interpret the Commissioners deed.

Specifically, the Armstrongs assert that because the deed failed to

describe the easement or dominant estate, extrinsic evidence,

including the parties’ intentions, was not admissible to alter or

control the deed’s plain terms, so the Commissioners deed is invalid

and unenforceable. Again, we are not persuaded.

¶ 23 Extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine whether

the description of an easement in a deed is reasonably certain or

instead is invalid for vagueness. See, e.g., Isenberg, 144 Colo. at

400, 356 P.2d at 907 (“[The] lack of specific description does not

affect the validity of the easements, particularly where the conduct

of parties has over a period of time located it.”); Stevens, 77 P.3d at

933 (“Because [the site plan] documents reasonably designate the

land burdened by the easements, we conclude that the easements

were not, as a matter of law, invalid because of vagueness.”).

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¶ 24 And again, lack of a description of the dominant estate is not

fatal to the Commissioners deed’s validity. See Hornsilver, 904 P.2d

at 1356 (“We find most persuasive those cases which hold that an

easement is valid provided the servient tenement is accurately

identified.”). So the court may properly review extrinsic evidence to

determine whether an easement is identified with reasonable

certainty and, therefore, valid.

¶ 25 The district court found that the parties agreed that the legal

description in Exhibit A to the Commissioners deed sufficiently

described the servient estate. It also concluded that “the failure to

describe the dominant estate is not a fatal flaw, as long as the size

and location of the easement can be ascertained.” And it noted that

a letter and accompanying drawing sent by a property manager for

Lakewood to the grantor in the Mackey deed, dated before the

Mackey deed’s execution, shows that Lakewood intended to use the

easement to build a road to carry equipment and material to

complete the development of the Bear Creek Greenbelt. Once the

work was completed, Lakewood intended the road to remain and to

provide permanent maintenance and emergency vehicle access to

the greenbelt. Based on this undisputed evidence, the court found

13
 that “[Lakewood] intended to use the easement to build a road

across the property and needed the entire space for the purposes of

building that road.” The court further summarized its findings:

(1) the parties intended to create an express
easement,

(2) the easement is not deficient because of the
vagueness of the instrument,

(3) the easement originally agreed on
encompassed the entire area described in the
Mackey deed and transferred to the
[Armstrongs] in the Commissioners deed.

¶ 26 The court did not err in considering this extrinsic evidence to

determine that the easement’s description encompassed the entire

servient estate, and, thus, for the purposes of determining the

easement’s validity, it was not deficient because of vagueness. See

Isenberg, 144 Colo. at 400, 356 P.2d at 907; Stevens, 77 P.3d at

933. And because a dominant estate is necessary for a valid

easement appurtenant, see Lewitz, 36 P.3d at 122, the court did

not err in considering this extrinsic evidence to determine what, if

any, dominant estate the easement served. See, e.g., Hornsilver,

904 P.2d at 1356 (an easement was not void where the deed

described a non-existent “Lot B” in the town’s recorded plat but the

14
 dominant estate was simply inaccurately described). The court

found that the easement served the Bear Creek Greenbelt as a

dominant estate. Another division of this court has concluded that

a trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence in a similar

context to determine that an easement was valid even though no

dominant estate was described. Bolinger, 259 P.3d at 1265

(rejecting the argument that an easement was not created because

under a common development plan, “the dominant estate need not

be specifically described”).

¶ 27 The Armstrongs also argue that the court erred in considering

extrinsic evidence to determine the location and extent of the

dominant estate because Jefferson County did not own any

adjacent property when the Mackey deed conveyed the easement to

it. We reject this argument because, as we explain in Part VI below,

Jefferson County had authority to purchase the Mackey easement

for Lakewood’s benefit.

¶ 28 Finally, we do not address the Armstrongs’ argument, raised

for the first time in their reply brief, that the court also improperly

considered the undisputed extrinsic evidence to resolve any

ambiguities in the deed. See Colo. Korean Ass’n v. Korean Senior

15
 Ass’n of Colo., 151 P.3d 626, 629 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[W]e do not

address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

V. The Commissioners Deed’s Reverter Clause Has Not Been
Triggered Because Its Purpose Still Applies

¶ 29 The Armstrongs contend that the court erred in enforcing the

Commissioners deed because the reverter clause in the deed had

been triggered, so the deed expired. We disagree.

¶ 30 Where a deed’s language provides that property is conveyed so

long as it is used for a specific purpose and no longer, the

conveyance creates a fee simple determinable with the possibility of

reverter. Sch. Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 81, 396 P.2d

929, 932 (1964). This property interest lasts an indefinite period

and terminates if a specified event occurs, and the subject property

then automatically reverts to the grantor of the interest. Id. at 80,

396 P.2d at 931.

¶ 31 The Commissioners deed contains a reverter clause stating

that the easement granted from Jefferson County to Lakewood lasts

“for so long as the following described property is used exclusively

for public open space, park and recreational purposes and no

longer . . . .”

16
¶ 32 Lakewood produced undisputed evidence showing that the

dominant estate served by the easement has been continuously

used exclusively for open space, park, and recreational purposes,

namely the Bear Creek Greenbelt, since Lakewood obtained the

easement.

¶ 33 The Armstrongs’ argument that the reverter clause was

triggered because the dominant estate is zoned for commercial use

does not create a material factual dispute as to the easement’s use,

and, therefore, is not relevant. The deed requires the easement be

“used exclusively for public open space, park and recreational

purposes.” The easement’s use is the determinative factor for

triggering the reverter clause, not the zoning of the land benefited

by it. See Barnes v. Winford, 833 P.2d 756, 757 (Colo. App. 1991)

(“[The grantor], therefore, retained a possibility of reverter interest

in the land occupied by the right-of-way which would vest

automatically when and if the [r]ailroad ceased to use the right-of-

way for ‘railway purposes.’”) (emphasis added).

¶ 34 The Armstrongs also assert that the Bear Creek Greenbelt is

almost a mile away from their property. But this evidence, even if

considered in a light most favorable to the Armstrongs, does not

17
 create a material factual dispute about the easement’s use. The

Armstrongs provided no evidence rebutting Lakewood’s evidence

that the dominant estate served by the easement has been

continuously used for open space, park, and recreational purposes.

And, as the Armstrongs concede on appeal, “[t]he facts relating to

this issue on appeal are undisputed.” But even if this assertion is

accurate, benefited and burdened lands are not required to be

adjacent to one another. Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481, 487,

379 P.2d 165, 169 (1963) (“For the general and modern rule, which

we approve, is that a right-of-way may be appurtenant to land even

when the servient tenement is not completely adjacent to the

dominant.”).

¶ 35 We conclude that a reversion was not triggered by the

dominant estate’s zoning classification and the easement has not

reverted to Jefferson County.4

4 The Mackey deed to Jefferson County does not contain a reverter
clause, so if the Commissioners deed’s reversion was triggered, the
easement would revert to Jefferson County.
18
 VI. Jefferson County Had Authority to Purchase the Mackey
Easement

¶ 36 The Armstrongs contend that the Commissioners deed is void

because Jefferson County did not have the authority to purchase

the easement for use by Lakewood. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 37 A county may purchase real estate for the “use of the county.”

§ 30-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 2017. But counties do “not have blanket

authority to deal in real estate.” Farnik v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 139

Colo. 481, 491, 341 P.2d 467, 473 (1959). While counties “possess

only such powers as are expressly conferred on them either by the

Constitution or statutes,” this includes “such implied powers as are

reasonably necessary to the proper execution of those expressly

conferred.” Id. Counties may not acquire real property for

speculation or investment, nor can they retain property lawfully

acquired for use by the county when the reason for the county’s use

no longer exists. Id. at 492, 341 P.2d at 473.

B. Analysis

¶ 38 In addition to the powers enumerated above, Jefferson County

has the authority “[t]o exercise such other and further powers as

19
 may be especially conferred by law.” § 30-11-101(1)(e). One such

power is to “acquire, sell, own, exchange, and operate public

recreation facilities, open space and parklands, [and] playgrounds

. . . ; acquire, equip, and maintain land, buildings, or other

recreational facilities either within or without the corporate limits of

. . . [the] county; and expend funds therefor and for all purposes

connected therewith.” § 29-7-101(1), C.R.S. 2017. Similarly,

Jefferson County may “acquire . . . any public project, which public

project may be located within or without or partly within and partly

without the territorial limits of [Jefferson County].” § 30-20-302,

C.R.S. 2017.

¶ 39 A public project includes “any lands . . . suitable for and

intended for use as public property for public purposes or suitable

for and intended for use in the promotion of . . . public welfare, or

the conservation of natural resources, including the planning of any

such lands . . . .” § 30-20-301(2), C.R.S. 2017; see also Garel v. Bd.

of Cty. Comm’rs, 167 Colo. 351, 357, 447 P.2d 209, 211 (1968)

(“[T]he sewer system as contemplated to be constructed by the

Board in Summit County is within the power conferred in the act

20
 and well within the definition of ‘public project . . . .’’’ (quoting

section 30-20-301’s predecessor, section 39-19-1, C.R.S. 1963)).

¶ 40 The Armstrongs have not cited any authority, and we are not

aware of any, that requires Jefferson County to own property

adjacent to property being acquired for recreational purposes or a

public project before such property is acquired. And generally, “the

creator of an easement need not own the dominant estate.” Lewitz,

36 P.3d at 123.

¶ 41 Lakewood presented undisputed evidence that Jefferson

County purchased the Mackey easement to further a plan to

operate parks and open space in Jefferson County. Specifically,

before Jefferson County acquired the easement, Lakewood resolved

to purchase the easement to provide access to the Bear Creek

Greenbelt, and to use its share of Jefferson County’s available

“Open Space Funds” to do so. The Mackey easement was then

acquired using these funds contributed by both Lakewood and

Jefferson County.

¶ 42 Jefferson County expended its funds for the purpose of

providing a public easement for ingress and egress to and from the

Bear Creek Greenbelt. The Commissioners deed requires Lakewood

21
 to use the easement exclusively for public open space, park, and

recreational purposes. The Bear Creek Greenbelt is used as a

public open space and parkland.

¶ 43 We conclude that Jefferson County had the authority to

purchase an easement for access to a public park or open space

owned by Lakewood under its implied powers to promote public

projects or public open space and parkland. See generally Adams

Cty. Golf, Inc. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 199 Colo. 423, 426, 610

P.2d 97, 99 (1980) (concluding that counties have implied power to

sell beer given the express power to own or operate public

recreational facilities).

VII. Conclusion

¶ 44 We affirm the district court’s order granting partial summary

judgment for Lakewood and denying the Armstrongs’ motion for

summary judgment.

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE WELLING concur.

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