Causey v. Cain

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 24, 2006
______________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 04-30618 Clerk
______________________

HARLAN CAUSEY

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,

Respondent - Appellee.

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
_____________________

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

This Court previously granted Petitioner Causey a Certificate

of Appealability (“COA”) to determine whether limitations should

bar his application for habeas corpus. Specifically, the COA

directs us to decide two questions: “whether the prison mailbox

rule should be used to determine the date on which Causey filed his

writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court and whether Causey

is entitled to equitable tolling under the circumstances.”1 We now

1
Causey v. Cain, No. 04-30618, at 1 (5th Cir. Nov. 5,
2004)(interim order). The grant of COA complied with Slack v.
McDaniel in finding that Causey asserted constitutional claims that
merit further consideration. 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
write solely to answer the first COA question in the affirmative.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand so

that the district court may determine when Causey’s application was

delivered to prison authorities.2

I. BACKGROUND

A Louisiana jury convicted Causey of possessing cocaine and

marijuana. Under the state’s three-strikes law, Causey was

sentenced to life in prison without parole. Causey timely appealed

to Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. On January 26,

2000, that intermediate appellate court affirmed Causey’s

convictions and sentences. See State v. Causey, 752 So. 2d 287

(La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).

Proceeding pro se, Causey then sought direct review in the

Louisiana Supreme Court. Louisiana law required Causey to apply

for a writ of certiorari within thirty days of the court of

appeal’s January 26th judgment. LA. SUP. CT. R. X. Within that

thirty-day window, no later than February 25, 2000,3 Causey signed

2
The district court dismissed Causey’s habeas petition solely
on the ground of limitations without deciding or discussing the
merits of Causey’s claims. See Causey v. Cain, No. 03-0968, slip
op. (E.D. La. May 20, 2004).
3
In computing time periods, Louisiana follows the general rule
that one terminal day is included and one is excluded. See Housing
Author. of Lake Arthur v. T. Miller & Sons, 120 So. 2d 494, 500
(La. 1960) (“[W]hen an act is to be performed within a specified
period from or after a day named, the rule is to exclude the first
day and to include the last day of the specified period.”); see
also Heirs of P.L. Jacobs, Inc. v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 691, 692 (La.
1952) (holding that a defendant denied rehearing in the

2
an application to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Causey also alleges

that he placed the application in the prison mail system on or

before February 25.4 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not

receive it until March 21, 2000. Causey’s application remained on

the Louisiana Supreme Court’s docket for about eleven months. On

February 16, 2001, the court rejected Causey’s certiorari

application in a one-word order: “Denied.” State v. Causey, 785

So. 2d 837 (La. 2001).

Next, Causey pursued state habeas corpus relief. His state

habeas petition, filed on August 13, 2001, was denied at all three

levels of the Louisiana courts. State v. Causey, No. 383-600

(Orleans Parish Crim. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2001); State v. Causey,

No. 2002-K-0081 (La. App. 4th Cir. Jan. 29, 2002); State ex rel.

Causey v. State, 836 So. 2d 127 (La. 2003). The Louisiana Supreme

intermediate court of appeals on November 30, 1951 could have filed
for certiorari “on December 31st 1951 the 30th being Sunday”).
Accordingly, February 25th was within the thirty-day window
because the date of the appellate court’s decision, January 26th,
cannot be included in calculating the period.
4
There is a discrepancy as to exactly when Causey delivered
his writ application. We granted a COA to address Causey’s claim
that he “timely filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme
Court on February 25, 2000.” Causey v. Cain, No. 04-30618, at 1
(5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2004) (interim order). Causey’s post-COA brief
to this Court asserts that he applied to the Louisiana Supreme
Court on February 18, 2000. For its part, the State does not
affirmatively concede that Causey delivered his application to
prison authorities on either date. In accordance with our grant of
COA, we assume for the purposes of this opinion that the relevant
date is February 25, 2000. However, we will remand so that the
district court can ultimately determine whether Causey gave his
application to prison officials no later than February 25.

3
Court again, in a one-word order, “Denied” review at the post-

conviction stage, this time on February 14, 2003.

On March 6, 2003, Causey filed for federal habeas corpus

relief. 18 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The district court held that

Causey had filed his section 2254 petition past the one-year

limitation period. It reasoned that Causey’s conviction had become

final in February of 2000 because his pro se application for direct

review in the Louisiana Supreme Court had been late under Louisiana

law. We granted a COA5 to decide, inter alia, “whether the prison

mailbox rule should be used to determine the date on which Causey

filed his writ application for direct review of the court of

appeal’s decision affirming his conviction.” Causey v. Cain, No.

04-30618, at 2 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2004) (interim order).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo an order dismissing a habeas petition as

time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”). See Giesberg v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir.

2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. CAUSEY’S FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION IS TIMELY IF THE PRISON MAILBOX RULE
DEEMS HIS WRIT FILED NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 25, 2000

Causey’s federal habeas petition is timely if the prison

5
Subsequent to its order of dismissal, the district court
denied Causey’s request for a COA. Causey v. Cain, No. 03-0968
(E.D. La. Jun. 15, 2004) (order denying COA).

4
mailbox rule sets the filing date for his application to the

Louisiana Supreme Court no later than February 25, 2000. “AEDPA

provides that a petitioner may file a habeas petition within one

year of ‘the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) [2000].” Foreman

v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004). “[T]he time during

which a properly filed application is pending in state court is not

counted toward the federal limitations period, 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) . . . .” In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 874 (5th Cir.

2006).

The question presented here is when Causey’s conviction became

final. If Causey’s state certiorari application was timely filed

on the date he presumably placed it in the prison mail system, then

AEDPA’s limitations period began running only after the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied direct review on February 18, 2001. In that

case, Causey filed for federal habeas well within AEDPA’s time

restrictions since the statute of limitations was tolled during the

year-and-a-half that Causey’s state habeas petition was pending.

However, if Causey’s state certiorari application is deemed filed

only when the Louisiana Supreme Court received it, then the time

expired for direct review in February of 2000 and his conviction

became final at that time. In that case, AEDPA’s time-bar forbids

Causey’s petition absent equitable tolling. Thus, we must decide

5
whether the prison mailbox rule should be applied to determine the

filing date of Causey’s application for direct review in the

Louisiana Supreme Court.

B. LOUISIANA LAW REQUIRES FEDERAL COURTS TO APPLY THE PRISON MAILBOX RULE
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES

1. HOUSTON V. LACK AND THE PRISON MAILBOX RULE

In Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court held that a pro se

petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed” at the moment it is

delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the district

court. 487 U.S. 266, 270–71. Construing a federal rule of

appellate procedure, the Court reasoned that pro se prisoners are

at the mercy of prison authorities and cannot “personally travel to

the courthouse” to ensure timely filing. Id. at 270–74.

Additionally, the Houston Court’s rule minimizes disputes and

uncertainty over when filing occurs: “Because reference to prison

mail logs will generally be a straightforward inquiry, making

filing turn on the date the pro se prisoner delivers the notice to

prison authorities for mailing is a bright-line rule, not an

uncertain one.” Id. at 275. In light of these concerns, the Court

held that Houston timely appealed in his federal habeas case even

though the clerk stamped “filed” on his appeal one day late:

Houston delivered his appeal to prison authorities within the

thirty-day deadline. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court has since

dubbed Houston’s holding the “prison mailbox rule.” Johnson v.

6
United States, 544 U.S. 295, 300 n.2, 125 S.Ct. 1571, 1576 n.2

(2005).

The Houston Court was interpreting federal procedural rules.

Many state courts, however, have incorporated the prison mailbox

rule as an incident of their state filing deadlines. See

Massaline v. Williams, 554 S.E.2d 720, 721–22 (Ga. 2001); Smith v.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 683 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa.

1996); In re Jordan, 840 P.2d 983, 993 (Cal. 1992). Other courts

have rejected Houston as a matter of state law. Grant v.

Senkowski, 744 N.E.2d 132, 134 (N.Y. 2001); Hamel v. State, 1

S.W.3d 434, 436 (Ark. 1999); State v. Parmar, 586 N.W.2d 279, 284

(Neb. 1998).

2. COLEMAN V. JOHNSON DOES NOT CONTROL

This Court has refused to extend the prison mailbox rule to

Texas state habeas filings. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398

(5th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Louisiana Supreme Court

has applied the prison mailbox rule with unfailing consistency as

a matter of state law. See State v. ex rel. Hensley v. State, 876

So. 2d 78 (La. 2004); State ex rel. Egana v. State, 771 So. 2d 638

(La. 2000); State ex rel. Ward v. State, 741 So. 2d 658 (La. 1999);

State ex rel. Gray v. State, 657 So. 2d 1005 (La. 1995); State ex

rel. v. Johnson v. Whitley, 648 So. 2d 909 (La. 1995); see also

State v. Froiland, 910 So. 2d 956, 959 n.4 (La. App. 5th Cir.

2005); State v. Girod, 892 So. 2d 646, 653 n.4 (La. App. 5th Cir.

7
2004); Davis v. Huey P. Long Regional Medical Center, 841 So. 2d 7,

9–10 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2003) (stating, “Louisiana has adopted the

‘mailbox rule’ . . ., holding that a document is considered ‘filed’

when it is delivered to prison officials”); Tatum v. Lynn, 637 So.

2d 796 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994) (“We find the reasoning in Houston

v. Lack supra to be persuasive on this issue. . . . Thus we hold

that Tatum’s [state] petition for judicial review . . . was filed

at the time it was delivered to the prison authorities for

forwarding to the district court”).

Coleman does not require that we ignore the abundance of

Louisiana case law following the prison mailbox rule. Although its

reasoning is less than clear, Coleman is best understood as an

interpretation of Texas law. See 184 F.3d at 402 (emphasizing that

the case involved “postconviction applications in state court”)

(emphasis in original); but see Torns v. Mississippi, 54 Fed.

App’x. 592 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2002) (unpublished) (stating both

that petitioner’s state applications were not “‘properly filed’

under Mississippi law” and not subject to the mailbox rule under

Coleman). “This circuit, like most, holds that a properly filed

[state] application [for collateral review] is one submitted

according to the state’s procedural requirements.” Lookingbill v.

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 260 (internal punctuation omitted).6 At

6
See Larry v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 890, 894–96 (5th Cir. 2004)
(considering thoroughly Texas procedural law to determine whether
a petitioner’s state post-conviction application was properly filed

8
the time this Court decided Coleman, Texas law was unclear on, and

arguably averse to, the prison mailbox rule. See Kinnard v.

Carnahan, 25 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.)

(rejecting the prison mailbox rule as a matter of state law).7

Implicit in Coleman’s decision not to “extend the mailbox rule

to . . . state habeas applications” is the principle that state

courts have the right to interpret “state rules of filing” and are

not bound by Houston’s construction of federal filing rules.

Coleman, 184 F.3d at 402. As one district court in our circuit

wrote in a Louisiana case:

[T]he Coleman decision is distinguishable. Here, the
Court need not ‘extend’ Houston by imposing its rule upon
a state . . . proceeding. Rather, this Court is called
upon to recognize that state courts are at liberty to
adopt their own filing requirements, and in the present
context, Louisiana has chosen to adopt the Houston rule.
See Johnson v. Whitley, 648 So.2d 909 (La.1/6/95);
Hensley v. Louisiana, 03-1691, (La.6/4/04), 876 So.2d 78;
Tatum v. Lynn, 93-1559 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637
So.2d 796. Ultimately, the Coleman decision was

under AEDPA); Grillette v. Warden, 372 F.3d 765, 774 (5th Cir.
2004) (predicting how the “Louisiana Supreme Court would read” a
Louisiana filing deadline to determine whether an application for
state post-conviction review remained pending for AEDPA purposes);
Edwards v. Dretke, 116 Fed. App’x. 470, 471 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2004)
(unpublished) (“The initial filing of Edwards’s state habeas corpus
application did not constitute a ‘properly filed’ application . . .
because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the
application failed to comply with TEX. R. APP. P. 73.2.”).
7
We do not resolve in this Louisiana case whether Coleman
remains good law after the Texas Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in
Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 684–86 & n.3 (Tex. 2004) (adopting
the “new rule” that “a pro se inmate’s claim under section 14.004
of the Inmate Litigation Act is deemed filed at the time the prison
authorities duly receive the document to be mailed”).

9
 concerned with the imposition of a federal filing rule
upon a sovereign state court. In the present case, to
ignore the [prison mailbox] rule would be to impose a
federal rule upon a state court proceeding, the outcome
sought to be avoided in Coleman.

Weaver v. Cain, 2005 WL 1400409, *4 (E.D. La. Jun. 3, 2005)

(unpublished).

Other courts have recognized our Coleman decision as an

application of Texas state law. See Fernandez v. Artuz, 402 F.3d

111, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2005). Indeed, it is difficult to

conceptualize Coleman in any other way. If Coleman were applying

federal procedural law, then the prison mailbox rule would have

controlled under Houston. See, e.g., Coleman, 184 F.3d at 401.

Coleman cannot control the different question presented here:

whether the time had expired for seeking direct review before

Causey applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Nor can Coleman’s

reasoning be persuasive in this Louisiana case, inasmuch as we

understand Coleman to be an application of Texas law.

3. IF CAUSEY DELIVERED HIS WRIT NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY
25TH, IT WAS TIMELY UNDER LOUISIANA LAW

AEDPA’s limitation period begins running when a prisoner’s

conviction becomes final. “AEDPA, not state law, determines when

a judgment is final for federal habeas purposes.” Foreman, 383

F.3d at 339. The Director incorrectly asserts that Louisiana law

governs finality for AEDPA purposes.8 We have held that a

8
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 922 (1997) (providing that an
appellate court’s judgment is final “within fourteen days of

10
conviction becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or when

the time for such review has expired, as specified by AEDPA,

regardless of when state law says finality occurs. See Roberts v.

Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003).

Nevertheless, we have frequently stated that “some

consideration of state law is inevitable when analyzing AEDPA

limitations.” E.g., Foreman, 383 F.3d at 339. Thus, we must “look

to state law for a determination of how long a prisoner has to file

a direct appeal.” Roberts, 319 F.3d at 693–94 (dicta).9

Accordingly, we apply Louisiana law to decide whether Causey’s

application for direct review was timely and postponed the start of

AEDPA’s time-bar. See Foreman, 383 F.3d at 341 (holding that a

rendition of the judgment [or] if an application for writ of review
is timely filed with the supreme court . . ., when the supreme
court denies the writ”).
9
See Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005)
(assessing state filing deadlines to determine when the time for
direct review in Texas state courts had expired under AEDPA); Dolan
v. Dretke, 2006 WL 305539, *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding that a two-month extension of Texas’s
direct-review filing deadline granted by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals postponed a conviction’s finality for AEDPA
limitations purposes); McGee v. Cain, 104 Fed App’x. 989, 990–91
(Jul. 28, 2004) (unpublished) (applying the Louisiana rule at issue
in the case at bar, LA. SUP. CT. R. X, to determine when the time
for direct review to the Louisiana Supreme Court had expired so as
to render petitioner’s conviction final); Salinas v. Dretke, 354
F.3d 425, 430 n.5 (holding that state law governs whether an out-
of-time petition for discretionary review constitutes direct review
under AEDPA); cf. Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that an application for collateral review was
properly filed for AEDPA purposes where a state-law exception to
Louisiana’s filing deadline applied).

11
“timely appeal in the state court system” constitutes direct

review, prevents a conviction from becoming final, and staves off

the start of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period).

Declining to apply Louisiana law on this issue would produce

bizarre results. We would have to concoct our own common-law

filing deadlines for Louisiana direct appeals, or we would have to

ignore Louisiana courts’ interpretations of their own statutes.

Either way, we could be forced to hold that the time for state

direct review had expired even where the Louisiana Supreme Court

has explicitly held that a defendant’s application for direct

review was timely filed as a matter of state law.

Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court likely treated Causey’s

application as timely in this very case. We have stated that “when

the denial of an application is based on untimeliness, Louisiana

courts routinely and unmistakably indicate so in their opinions.”

Grillette v. Warden, 372 F.3d 765, 775 (5th Cir. 2004). There was

no such indication here. Ignoring the Louisiana Supreme Court’s

adoption of the prison mailbox rule would be inconsistent with

basic principles of comity and with the respect due state court

decisions under AEDPA. See Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 405

n.3 (5th Cir. 2001).

Under Louisiana’s prison mailbox rule, Causey’s application

for direct review was filed when Causey placed it in the prison

mail system. If Causey delivered his application to prison

authorities no later than February 25, 2000, then this was within

12
Louisiana’s thirty-day window for certiorari applications. In that

case, Causey’s conviction did not become final, and AEDPA’s

limitations period did not begin to run, until the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied Causey’s application on February 16, 2001.

Since the limitations period would be tolled while Causey sought

state collateral relief, his federal habeas petition would be filed

within the one-year deadline.

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal. We

REMAND for the district court to determine the date on which Causey

delivered his application to prison authorities and, if necessary,

to consider the substance of Causey’s claims for relief.

13