MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 11 2019, 8:42 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Shane A. Toland
Indianapolis, Indiana Toland Law Firm
Indianapolis, Indiana
Roberta L. Ross
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dean Griffin d/b/a Mighty December 11, 2019
Motors, Inc., Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 19A-SC-1497
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable Andrew Roesener,
Edward Stephens, Judge
The Honorable Douglas B.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cummins, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-1901-SC-23
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-1497 | December 11, 2019 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] On January 4, 2019, Edward Stephens filed an action against Dean Griffin
d/b/a Might Motors, Inc. (“Griffin”) in small-claims court alleging breach of
contract. The small-claims court found in favor of Stephens and awarded him
$4160. Griffin raises various challenges to the small-claims court’s judgment on
appeal. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Griffin had completed auto-repair work for Stephens for a number of years
prior to the situation giving rise to the instant controversy. Stephens had also
purchased a number of vehicles from Griffin, which Griffin purchased as
salvage automobiles and repaired for Stephens. In these transactions, Griffin
assisted Stephens in purchasing a vehicle from an auction website to which
Griffin, but not Stephens, had access and completed any necessary repairs.
Once repairs were complete, the vehicles were inspected by police before the
vehicles and titles were transferred to Stephens. Upon completion of the work
and inspection, Stephens wrote a check for Griffin’s repair work and Griffin
transferred the vehicles to Stephens. The “typical” turnaround on the vehicles
was “[p]robably within four (4) to six (6) weeks,” although one vehicle took
“about eight (8) months.” Tr. p. 7.
[3] In 2011, Stephens entered into a verbal agreement with Griffin to purchase a
Dodge pickup truck (the “truck”). Stephens went to Griffin’s office wherein he
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and Griffin looked on Griffin’s computer at vehicles that were up for auction.
They found a “Dodge pickup truck and bid on it.” Tr. p. 8. They won the bid
and Stephens provided a cashier’s check for $3155 to pay for the truck. After it
was delivered to Griffin, Griffin and Stephens “discovered that the bed on [the
truck] could not be repaired.” Tr. p. 8. They subsequently bought a second
truck for parts. Stephens provided a cashier’s check for $1015 for the second
truck, which was purchased within six months of the first. Griffin informed
Stephens that he had two or three insurance jobs to complete before he could
work on the truck. Stephens indicated that “that should work.” Tr. p. 9. He
thought that meant the work would be completed “within a year or so.” Tr. p.
14. Griffin never completed the repairs.
[4] On January 4, 2019, Stephens filed a notice of claim in the small-claims court,
alleging breach of contract. In making this claim, Stephens alleged that Griffin
“has had [the] vehicles since 2011 [and] refuses to do [the repair] work.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 6. Stephens requested a judgment in the amount of
$5565 plus court costs. Following evidentiary hearings on April 22, 2019 and
May 21, 2019, the small-claims court issued an order awarding Stephens
$4160.1
1
In requesting $5565 in damages, Stephens requested both the $4160 that he paid for the trucks and
additional funds allegedly paid to Griffin for parts and repairs. The small-claims court granted Stephen’s
request for the $4160 paid for the trucks but denied Stephen’s request for the additional funds, finding “the
evidence insufficient to award any other monies requested.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 22. We will not
disturb this finding on appeal.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] On appeal, Griffin contends that the small-claims court abused its discretion in
finding that Stephen’s action was not barred by the applicable six-year statute of
limitation. Alternatively, he contests the small-claims court’s determination
that the parties had entered into a valid oral contract. Griffin also contends that
the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying the requests for
compensation raised in his counterclaim.
I. Statute of Limitations
[6] Griffin contends that the small-claims court abused its discretion by
determining that the breach-of-contract action was not barred by the applicable
six-year statute of limitation. A cause of action alleging a breach of an oral
contract “must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action
accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-7(a).
Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and
the statute of limitation begins to run, when the plaintiff knew or
in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered that
an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of
another. For a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that
the full extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable but
only that some ascertainable damage has occurred. The
discovery rule applies to both tort and contract claims.
Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal
citations omitted).
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[7] It is undisputed that the necessary repairs have not been completed. When
asked why the repairs had not been completed, Griffin responded that he is “a
very busy man.” Tr. p. 31. Griffin introduced the testimony of Jennifer Staten,
an employee of Griffin’s body shop, and Mark Sulzberger, another client of
Griffin’s, to establish that it was common practice for his body shop to take
long periods of time to complete non-priority repairs. Staten testified that
Griffin does not give customers a time frame for completing repairs of the
nature of the repairs at issue because such repairs are of the lowest priority and
are completed as time permits. For example, Staten testified that another
vehicle has been at the body shop “for probably over eight (8) years” without
the repairs being completed. Tr. p. 51. Sulzberger testified that Griffin has had
a vehicle that belongs to him in his shop “for three (3) years, four (4)” without
completing the requested repairs. Tr. p. 72.
[8] While Stephens testified that he does not believe that work has been done on
the truck since mid-2012, Griffin’s own evidence supports an inference that
Stephens could not have learned that the cause of action had accrued for quite
some time after the parties entered into the agreement for Griffin to repair the
truck. Griffin’s evidence supports an inference that it was not uncommon for
him to take long periods of time to complete repairs of this nature. This fact,
coupled with the fact that Griffin indicated that the two men spoke about the
truck “‘bout two (2) years ago,” tr. p. 35, supports the small-claims court’s
determination that the six-year statute of limitations had not expired.
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[9] Further, while Griffin presented evidence suggesting that he informed Stephens
at some point that he would no longer work on the truck and instructed
Stephens to remove it from his body shop, Stephens disputes that he was ever
instructed to remove the truck from Griffin’s body shop. Regardless, even if the
instruction was given, the record does not support an inference that it was given
more than six years prior to the initiation of the underlying lawsuit. The small-
claims court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the case was not barred
by the applicable six-year statute of limitations.
II. Evidence of an Oral Contract
[10] Alternatively, Griffin argues that the record is devoid of evidence establishing
that he and Stephens entered into an oral contract regarding the repairs to the
truck.
The existence of a contract is a question of law. The basic
requirements of a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration,
and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties. For an oral
contract to exist, parties have to agree to all terms of the contract.
If a party cannot demonstrate agreement on one essential term of
the contract, then there is no mutual assent and no contract is
formed.
Barrand v. Martin, 120 N.E.3d 565, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations
and quotation omitted), trans. denied.
[11] Griffin argues that there could be no contract because there was no
consideration.
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The concept of consideration is oftentimes encapsulated by the
phrase bargained for exchange. To constitute consideration,
there must be a benefit accruing to the promisor or a detriment to
the promisee. A benefit is a legal right given to the promisor to
which the promisor would not otherwise be entitled. A
detriment, on the other hand, is a legal right the promisee has
forborne.
DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1022–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). “The doing of an act by one at the request of
another which may be a detrimental inconvenience, however slight, to the party
doing it or may be a benefit, however slight, to the party at whose request it is
performed, is legal consideration for a promise by such requesting party.”
Harrison-Floyd Farm Bureau Co-op Ass’n v. Reed, 546 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989). “A mere promise is sufficient as consideration if it is the result of a
bargained for exchange.” Monarch Beverage Co. v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 589
N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992). “[W]hether consideration exists is
generally a question of law for the court.” Lily, Inc. v. Silco, LLC, 997 N.E.2d
1055, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[12] The small-claims court found that the parties had entered into an oral contract.
Because we conclude that all of the basic requirements for a contract were
encompassed in the parties’ agreement, we agree. The parties’ agreement
satisfies the consideration requirement as it sets forth a bargained-for-exchange.
Stephens and Griffin agreed on the essential terms of the contract, i.e., that
Griffin would help Stephens purchase the truck from a website available to
Griffin, Griffin would complete the necessary repairs, and, upon completion,
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Stephens would pay Griffin for the work completed. Stephens and Griffin
exchanged promises to complete repair work in exchange for payment and for
payment in exchange for the completed repairs. For some time, both parties
acted in a manner consistent with this agreement, which was consistent with
prior agreements entered into by Griffin and Stephens. Griffin himself also
acknowledges that Stephens provided the funds to acquire both trucks as well as
additional funds, which Griffin used to procure parts for the truck.
III. Denial of Compensation Requested in Griffin’s
Counterclaim
[13] Griffin also contends that the small-claims court abused its discretion in
denying the requests for compensation set forth in his counterclaim against
Stephens. In this counterclaim, Griffin sought $45 per day in storage fees for
the truck and the spare parts truck, which have remained in his shop since they
were purchased. While Griffin suggests that Stephens could have removed the
trucks from his body shop, he acknowledged that both the truck and the spare
parts truck are titled in his name. Given this fact, we are unpersuaded by
Griffin’s suggestion that Stephens simply could have removed the trucks at any
time. Griffin also sought $2774.41 for work that he claimed to have completed
on the truck, indicating that the repairs were “three-quarters” completed. Tr. p.
41. While Griffin acknowledges that he agreed to fix the truck, he also
indicated that he is “a busy man and [has not] had time in seven (7) years” to
complete the necessary work. Tr. p. 34. The small-claims court found that “As
[Griffin] failed to sign over the titles to the truck and thereby relinquish
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ownership to [Stephens], [Griffin] now owns both trucks and any repairs have
been made to vehicles he now owns.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. We cannot say
that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying Griffin’s
counterclaim requests.
[14] The judgment of the small-claims court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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