NO. 12-19-00295-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
JUSTIN LEWIS MCCREARY, § APPEAL FROM THE 369TH
APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Justin Lewis McCreary appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. In
one issue, Appellant argues that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is
grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was indicted for the first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a
child. In 2016, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to the offense, and the trial court placed Appellant on
deferred adjudication community supervision. In 2019, the State filed an application to adjudicate
Appellant’s guilt for various alleged violations of the terms of his community supervision,
including his commission of the offense of evading arrest or detention. Appellant pleaded “not
true” to the allegations in the State’s application. After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated
Appellant’s guilt, found the State’s allegations in its application to be “true,” found him “guilty”
of the underlying offense, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life. This appeal followed.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the life sentence of imprisonment imposed by the
trial court is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment. “To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly
disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”
Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Rhoades v.
State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waiver of complaint of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Texas Constitution because defendant presented his argument for first time
on appeal); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (defendant waived
complaint that statute violated his rights under the United States Constitution when raised for first
time on appeal); Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Preservation of
error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should ordinarily review on its own
motion[;] . . . it [is] incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error preservation as a threshold
issue.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. A review of the record shows that Appellant lodged no objection to
the constitutionality of his sentence at the trial court level, and has, therefore, failed to preserve
error for appellate review. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; see also Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 120;
Curry, 910 S.W.2d at 497; Mays, 285 S.W.3d at 889; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
However, despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we conclude his sentence does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision was made
applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v.
State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666–667, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420–21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)).
The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis
v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v. State,
944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that
punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or
unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. Appellant was convicted of
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aggravated sexual assault of a child, the punishment range for which is no less than five years but
no more than ninety-nine years or life imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32(a),
22.021(a)(1)(A)(ii), (2), (b) (West 2019). Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court falls within
the range set forth by the legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual,
or excessive per se. See Harris, 656 S.W.2d at 486; Jordan, 495 S.W.2d at 952; Davis, 905
S.W.2d at 664.
Nevertheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three-part test originally set forth in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the
proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and
(3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id., 463 U.S.
at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a threshold
determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the
remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v. State, 989
S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
We are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estelle in making the threshold determination
of whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime. 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct.
1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court considered the proportionality
claim of an appellant who received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas
habitual offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445
U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. In that case, the appellant received a life sentence because he had
two prior felony convictions—one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods
or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 265–
66, 100 S. Ct. at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as
felonies and, further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined
that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
445 U.S. at 284–85, 100 S. Ct. at 1144–45.
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In this case, the offense committed by Appellant—aggravated sexual assault of a child—
is far more serious than the combination of offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while
Appellant’s life sentence is the same as the sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in Rummel is not constitutionally
disproportionate, neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in this case. Furthermore, in
his brief, Appellant points to evidence of his psychological assessment showing that he suffered
from borderline intelligence, functional illiteracy, attention deficit disorder, a mild mood
disturbance, and a high anxiety level. Appellant appears to argue that his psychological assessment
was relevant in determining whether his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime he
committed, and further contends that the trial court failed to consider this evidence in assessing his
sentence. We need not address the former contention, because even if the results of his
psychological assessment are relevant to the grossly disproportionate analysis, we disagree with
his latter contention that the trial court failed to consider it. After the close of evidence and the
parties rested, the record shows that the trial court recessed the proceeding to consider all of the
evidence, including the results of Appellant’s psychological assessment, specifically mentioning
it by name.
Finally, Appellant makes a conclusory statement in his brief that his life sentence is grossly
disproportionate when compared to sentences in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. However,
he cites to no authority to support this contention. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to the
authorities and to the record.”). Because we do not conclude that Appellant’s sentence is
disproportionate to his crime, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test.
Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
Opinion delivered March 31, 2020.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
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COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
MARCH 31, 2020
NO. 12-19-00295-CR
JUSTIN LEWIS MCCREARY,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
Appeal from the 369th District Court
of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 369CR-15-32392)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below
for observance.
Brian Hoyle, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.