United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 16, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 05-10844 Clerk
CHRISTOPHER MACK,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ABILENE; JIMMY SEALS, Officer; OTHER UNKNOWN POLICE
OFFICERS OF THE ABILENE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Individually and
in their Official Capacities; ABILENE POLICE DEPARTMENT; SUE
BELVER, Officer; ROGER BERRY, Officer; D. W. HAVINS,
Officer; STEVE ROGERS, Officer; RODNEY SMITH, Officer,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
Before DEMOSS, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The focus of this case is whether Appellant Christopher Mack’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a series of warrantless
vehicle searches. As set out below, we have determined that one of
the vehicle searches was unconstitutional. Relatedly, we hold that
the police officers who conducted that search are not entitled to
the defense of qualified immunity. Additionally, we hold that the
arrest and apartment search warrant was valid and that Appellant’s
arrest therefore was lawful. Finally, we affirm the dismissal of
Appellant’s state law claims against the City of Abilene but vacate
the dismissal of Appellant’s section 1983 claims against the City
of Abilene.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The named police officers (“Appellees”), who were employed by
the City of Abilene (the “City”), applied for and received a
warrant to arrest Appellant and search his apartment based on
information obtained from a confidential informant. The
confidential informant stated that he had seen Appellant with
marijuana at Appellant’s apartment.
The next day, Appellant left his place of employment, a
restaurant, and walked across a parking lot toward his parked
Suburban. As he approached the vehicle, Appellant remotely
unlocked the doors and started the engine. Immediately thereafter,
he was intercepted by two officers, including Officer Jimmy Seals.
Appellant confirmed his identity. Officer Seals then placed him
under arrest. After searching Appellant and finding no weapons or
contraband, Appellees handcuffed Appellant and placed him in a
police vehicle. Appellees then advised Appellant that the officers
had an arrest and search warrant for him and his apartment. They
then searched the Suburban after placing him in a patrol car. A
search of the vehicle revealed no weapons or contraband.
Appellees subsequently transported Appellant to his apartment
complex in a police vehicle, with one officer driving Appellant’s
vehicle to the complex. Appellees obtained a key and executed a
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search of the apartment. Again, no contraband was found.
Appellees next searched Appellant’s Suburban a second time.
Appellees found one marijuana seed. Then, Appellees searched
Appellant’s Cadillac, which was parked in the apartment complex
lot. Appellees found nothing illegal. Consequently, Appellant was
released and no charges were filed against him.
Appellant filed suit against Appellees and the City alleging
that Appellees violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and that the unconstitutional conduct by the
police was the result of the City’s official policy, custom, or
practice. He additionally brought state law claims. Appellees
filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, claiming
that the warrant was valid, all of the searches were
constitutional, and, even if a search were unconstitutional,
Appellees are immune from liability. The district court granted
Appellees’ motions on all claims. Appellant appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
When ruling upon a qualified immunity issue, the Supreme Court
has instructed that the threshold question to be answered is:
“[T]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Thus, as a threshold matter, we must decide whether the alleged
3
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, show that
Appellant’s constitutional rights were violated. We first briefly
discuss the validity of the warrant. Second, we analyze the
constitutionality of his arrest and the searches of his two
vehicles. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Finding an unconstitutional
search of one of the vehicles, we then examine whether Appellees
are protected by the defense of qualified immunity. Finally, we
address whether Appellant’s constitutional and state law claims
against the City were properly dismissed by the district court.
A. The Warrant Was Valid
Appellant challenges the warrant on the basis of insufficient
probable cause. He claims the magistrate incorrectly determined
that probable cause existed and therefore issued an invalid
warrant. In reviewing the issuance of a warrant, we pay great
deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). The Fourth Amendment
merely requires a showing that “the magistrate had a substantial
basis for . . . [concluding] that a search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks
omitted). That said, courts must not “defer to a warrant based on
an affidavit that does not provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.”
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
4
The magistrate considered the affidavit of Officer Seals. In
his affidavit, Officer Seals states that an informant reported that
Appellant possessed marijuana at his residence. “An informant’s
‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his report.” Gates, 462 U.S.
at 230. Here, the informant’s report was based on a direct,
personal observation. Officer Seals stated that the informant
“knows what marijuana looks like in it’s [sic] various forms,
including the odor of burning marijuana . . . .” It was with that
knowledge that the informant reported that Appellant possessed
marijuana in his apartment within the prior forty-eight hours.
Thus, Officer Seals established the informant’s basis of knowledge.
Officer Seals also established the veracity and reliability of
the informant by stating that, although he only knew the informant
for less than a month, the informant had supplied Officer Seals
with truthful and correct information about criminal activity.
Additionally, the informant is described as lawfully employed
within the community and having no felony convictions. Officer
Seals, in his affidavit, presented facts tending to evince the
veracity and reliability of the informant. In sum, the magistrate
had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Therefore, the
warrant should be considered facially valid.
Appellant additionally argues that the warrant was facially
invalid because the affidavit “contains conclusory, vague and
5
ambiguous allegations regarding the credibility of the confidential
informant.” However, the affidavit was specific in its statement
regarding the knowledge obtained from the informant. Appellant has
not pointed to particular claims in the affidavit as false and
therefore does not seem to be making a Franks challenge. See
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Therefore, Appellant’s
facial attack fails.
We cannot conclude that Appellant’s arrest was
unconstitutional. “The Constitution does not guarantee that only
the guilty will be arrested.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145
(1979). An arrest pursuant to a properly issued warrant is not
unconstitutional, and “a complaint based on such an arrest is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Smith v.
Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982). Appellees arrested
Appellant pursuant to a valid warrant.1 Accordingly, we reject
1
Assuming, arguendo, that the warrant was not a valid arrest
warrant, the arrest still was constitutional. A warrantless
arrest can be made on the basis of probable cause. Probable
cause exists when the “totality of facts and circumstances within
a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect
had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v.
Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995). A court considers the
expertise and experience of the law enforcement officials when
considering what a “reasonable person” would have concluded.
United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1999).
Appellees had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless
arrest. Appellees had received specific information from a
reliable informant regarding Appellant’s alleged criminal
activity. As stated in the affidavit from the warrant
application, the informant was familiar with the drug allegedly
possessed by Appellant. The informant had seen Appellant
6
Appellant’s contention that his arrest was unconstitutional and
affirm the dismissal of this claim.
B. Fourth Amendment Claims
Appellees searched Appellant’s Suburban twice and also
searched his Cadillac. Each of these searches is evaluated below.
Unless otherwise stated, we review the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its ultimate determination of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness de novo. United States v. Sinisterra, 77
F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1996).
1. Both Searches of the Suburban Were Constitutional
Appellant claims that Appellees unlawfully searched his
Suburban after his arrest and later in his apartment complex
parking lot. Appellant’s argument fails. The searches were
constitutional under the automobile exception to the warrant
possessing the illegal drug within the previous forty-eight
hours. And, the informant gave Appellees a description of the
Appellant and where he lived. Appellees were able to verify that
Appellant lived and worked where the informant had stated and
that Appellant was the man seen by the informant with illegal
drugs. Gates, 462 U.S. at 242 (recognizing that an officer, in
making a warrantless arrest, may rely on an informant’s report if
the report is “reasonably corroborated by other matters within
the officer’s knowledge”). Furthermore, Appellees’ information
would have been sufficient for a magistrate to find probable
cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (stating that
law enforcement officers “must possess facts concerning the
person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that
‘probable cause’ was indeed present” when effectuating a
warrantless arrest). Therefore, given the totality of the
circumstances, Appellees had probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest.
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requirement. This exception applies when a vehicle is “readily
capable” of “being used on the highways,” and it “is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes
. . . .” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). Under the
automobile exception, officers may conduct a search if they have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of a crime. United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154
(5th Cir. 1993). “Probable cause exists when facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer would
be sufficient to cause an officer of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed.” United States v.
Carrillo-Morales, 27 F.3d 1054, 1062 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, Appellees had probable cause to search the Suburban both
times. The district court found that Officer Seals was told by the
informant that Appellant “sometimes hid marijuana in his 1999 Green
Chevrolet Suburban bearing Texas License # ILHS87.” The court also
found that the information received from the informant was
reasonably trustworthy. See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d
446, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that “reasonably trustworthy
information” is part of the facts and circumstances at the
officer’s disposal). Thus, Appellees had probable cause to search
the Suburban for contraband at the time of arrest and again at the
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apartment complex.2
2. Search of the Cadillac Was Unconstitutional
Appellees violated Appellant’s constitutional rights when they
searched his Cadillac. Appellees claim that no search took place
because they merely looked through the vehicle’s windows.
Appellant, however, alleges and presents evidence that Appellees
opened all the Cadillac’s doors and “began looking all through the
car.” Like the district court, we take the Appellant’s allegations
as true in the motion-to-dismiss context. Therefore, we proceed
with our determination assuming the Cadillac was searched.
The Cadillac was not subject to a valid warrantless search
under the automobile exception since Appellees had no probable
cause to believe that marijuana would be found in the Cadillac.
See United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994)
(determining that the seizure of a vehicle was invalid for lack of
probable cause because all of the evidence indicated that drugs
2
Appellant also appears to argue that the second search of
the Suburban was unconstitutional because the vehicle was not
parked within the curtilage of his apartment. We need not make a
curtilage determination. The automobile exception applies where
a “car [is] parked in an apartment complex parking lot.” United
States v. Williams, 124 Fed. App’x 885, 887 (5th Cir. Mar. 18,
2005) (unpublished). It applies in a parking lot since a lot is
“generally open to the public.” Id. Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit found it “inconsequential” that the searched car was in a
private apartment parking lot because the concerns of Carney–the
ready mobility of an automobile and the lesser expectation of
privacy associated with them—were still applicable. See United
States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1990). Here, the
same Carney concerns exist. Therefore, the search was carried
out in a valid manner pursuant to the automobile exception.
9
would be found in the defendant’s home or in a different vehicle,
and none of the evidence indicated that drugs would be found in the
particular vehicle that was seized). Here, the informant reported
to Appellees only that Appellant sometimes kept marijuana in his
Suburban, not the Cadillac. Furthermore, upon looking into the
vehicle, Appellees do not claim they saw or smelled something that
might lead to probable cause. Therefore, no search of the Cadillac
was allowed under the automobile exception.
The warrantless search of the Cadillac might be constitutional
if the Cadillac was parked within the apartment’s curtilage.
Appellees had a valid warrant to search Appellant’s apartment. The
question before us is whether the Cadillac was a part of the
apartment’s curtilage and therefore subject to search pursuant to
the warrant, assuming the warrant’s scope could validly include the
apartment’s curtilage. “[T]he curtilage is the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life.” Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
conclude that the Cadillac was not within the apartment’s
curtilage.
The circuits are split on the appropriate standard of review
on a curtilage determination.3 In civil cases, however, all courts
3
See United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that the question of “curtilage is ultimately a
legal one, and thus is subject to de novo review, while
10
agree that antecedent facts found by the district court pursuant to
such a determination are reviewed for clear error. Here, we need
not decide the correct review of a district court’s constitutional
determination because the district court declined to decide the
constitutional curtilage question. Instead, the court assumed
without deciding that a constitutional violation occurred and
proceeded to the qualified immunity analysis.4 The court’s factual
findings included that the Cadillac was parked in the apartment
complex parking lot (not a garage or other enclosure), the lot had
multiple spaces, and the Cadillac was parked in an assigned space.
It did not make a finding regarding the proximity of the Cadillac
to the apartment.
antecedent factual findings are reviewed for clear error); United
States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); United
States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 911-913 (9th Cir. 2001) (same);
Bleavins v. Bartels, 422 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that, in the context of a civil case evaluating a curtilage
question, the grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo);
Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1998)
(same). But see United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 24 (3d Cir.
1993) (“[T]he question of the extent of curtilage is essentially
factual and therefore we review only for clear error.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Swepston,
987 F.2d 1510, 1513 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).
4
We note that the district court’s failure to come to a
conclusion as to whether a constitutional violation occurred may
constitute error in and of itself. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232 (1991) (“A necessary concomitant to the determination of
whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is
clearly established at the time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation
of a constitutional right at all,” and courts should not “assume,
without deciding, this preliminary issue”).
11
In light of these findings of fact, we hold that this parking
space in the apartment complex parking lot is not part of the
curtilage of Appellant’s apartment. In determining whether the
space was part of the curtilage, this Court looks to the four Dunn
factors to guide our inquiry: “the proximity of the area claimed to
be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the
area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation by people passing by.” United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Based on the district court’s
findings, this Court does not know the proximity of the Cadillac to
the apartment. Applying the remainder of the Dunn factors, the
district court’s findings reveal that the parking space was in an
open parking lot, the lot is a common area used for parking with
multiple spaces, and a vehicle parked in the lot is not shielded
from view by others. Under the Dunn test, this parking lot space
is not within Appellant’s apartment’s curtilage.
This holding comports with the determinations by several other
courts that a parking lot or garage is not curtilage subject to
Fourth Amendment protections under similar factual circumstances.
See United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1979)
(“We hold that the common area parking lot on which Stanley’s
automobile was parked was not within the curtilage of his mobile
home.”); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir.
12
1976) (holding that entry into a condominium parking garage did not
violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Pyne, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10327, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2006) (unpublished)
(“[W]e conclude . . . that the [apartment complex] parking garage
was not curtilage subject to Fourth Amendment protections.”).
In sum, we hold that Appellees’ search of Appellant’s Cadillac
violated his rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Next, we
turn to whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity for
the unconstitutional search.
C. Qualified Immunity
Appellees claim the defense of qualified immunity to avoid
liability for the unlawful search of the Cadillac. Government
officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune
from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d
226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s granting
of summary judgment on this issue of qualified immunity de novo,
applying the same standards as a district court. Morris v. Dillard
Dep’t Stores, 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2001). In determining
whether a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party, the
evidence and justifiable inferences therefrom are to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
13
To determine whether Appellees are entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity, we ask whether the contours of the
constitutional right in question were sufficiently clear that a
reasonable officer would understand that what she is doing violates
that right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The warrant explicitly
authorized a search of the apartment only and did not mention the
Cadillac. The Cadillac was not part of the apartment’s curtilage
since it is in a public common area and not related to the
premises. Thus, the warrant did not authorize Appellees to search
the Cadillac.
Additionally, Appellees lacked probable cause to search the
Cadillac. Nothing the informant told Appellees implied that
Appellant kept marijuana in the Cadillac. The informant merely
stated that Appellant allegedly kept marijuana in his Suburban.
Obviously, no reasonable officer would mistake a Cadillac for a
Suburban. Cf. Knott v. Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that officers could not rely on a warrant “to search
one vehicle when all of the vehicle-specific descriptors refer to
another vehicle”). Therefore, Appellees lacked probable cause to
search the Cadillac, and, therefore, the search does not fall under
the automobile exception.
Moreover, Appellees cannot claim that the vehicle was searched
in furtherance of officer safety. See Estep v. Dallas County, 310
F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] warrantless search of the
14
passenger compartment of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if the search is conducted to protect the officer’s
safety.”). Appellant had not been driving the Cadillac the day of
his arrest and was not in the vicinity of the Cadillac when
Appellees brought Appellant back to his apartment complex. Hence,
Appellees fail to show it was a reasonable search based on officer
safety concerns. Finally, there is no evidence that Appellant
consented to the search of the Cadillac or that Appellees
mistakenly thought Appellant had consented to that search.
Appellees’ search of a car in an open parking lot without a
search warrant, without probable cause, without a concern for
officer safety, and without consent violates clearly established
law. A reasonable officer would not think the Constitution allows
a random search of a vehicle where none of the above justifications
apply. Thus, Appellees are not entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity for the unconstitutional search of the Cadillac.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s finding that qualified
immunity was available to Appellees.
D. Claims Against the City Are Sufficiently Alleged
The district court held that Appellant could not succeed on a
claim of municipal liability because he could not show that one or
more of the City’s employees violated his civil rights as a result
of a City policy or custom. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). It then dismissed all
claims of municipal liability based on its finding of no
15
constitutional violation. We have disagreed with that conclusion,
holding that Appellant sufficiently has alleged a constitutional
violation on the part of Appellees, employees of the City, when
they searched Appellant’s Cadillac. Therefore, we examine the
sufficiency of Appellant’s allegations under Monell and its progeny
against the City for the acts of its employees.
Generally, a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom that
gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury before he may prevail. Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Under section 1983, a policy
and/or custom of inadequate training is an actionable claim in
limited circumstances. Id. A claim of inadequate supervision also
is actionable under section 1983. See Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444
F.3d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2006).
In his amended complaint, Appellant alleges that it is a
policy and/or custom of the City to inadequately supervise and
train its police officers, including those who were known to have
engaged in police misconduct. Appellant further alleges that, as
a result of those policies and/or customs, Appellees believed their
actions would not be properly monitored by supervisory officers and
that misconduct would not be investigated but would be tolerated.
Appellant thus identifies a custom or policy on the part of the
City that allegedly gave rise to his injuries. See Canton, 489 at
389. He also alleges actionable claims of inadequate training and
supervision under section 1983. Id.; Rios, 444 F.3d at 427.
16
Appellant meets the liberal pleading standard of FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(a). Rule 8 requires a complaint provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim.” Id. A complaint also must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002). These
requirements apply to a section 1983 suit against a municipality
like that brought by Appellant. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
Appellant’s complaint provides sufficient notice. Thus, we hold
that Appellant has stated cognizable claims against the City under
section 1983. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s
dismissal of Appellant’s claims against the City in relation to the
search of the Cadillac.
E. Dismissal of Appellant’s State Law Claims
Appellant argues that his state law claims were improperly
dismissed for lack of notice. Section 101.101(a) of the Texas Tort
Claims Act provides that a “governmental unit is entitled to
receive notice of a claim against it under this chapter not later
than six months after the day that the incident giving rise to the
claim occurred.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a). Here, the
City received a letter from Appellant’s attorney on March 10, 2003.
Whether or not it was sufficient notice, the letter was untimely
for that purpose as it was not received within six months of March
17
8, 2002, the day after the incident. Appellant concedes that he
untimely advised the City of his injuries through formal notice but
argues that the City had actual notice of his injuries. The Texas
Tort Claims Act notice requirements do not apply if the
governmental unit has “actual notice” that the claimant was
injured. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(c).
For the purpose of bringing state law claims against the City,
Appellant fails to show that the City had actual notice of his
injuries. Appellant contends that the City had actual notice of
his injuries when “Appellant’s supervisor reported him as being
abducted and when Appellant requested an incident report regarding
the search of his home.” The Texas Supreme Court has held that
actual notice to a governmental unit requires knowledge of “(1) a
death, injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s
alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or
property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.”
Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). Appellant has
not alleged that the City had these three pieces of information.
Cf. Dallas-Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Ryan, 52 S.W.3d 426, 429
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (finding sufficient actual
notice where plaintiff sent a letter notifying defendant of the
injury, the parties involved, and its alleged fault in causing the
injury). Thus, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he
provided the City with actual notice of his injuries. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s state law
18
claims against the City.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s
challenge to the validity of the warrant; Appellant’s claim that
searches of his Suburban amounted to a constitutional violation;
and Appellant’s state law claims against the City. Because we hold
that the search of the Cadillac was unconstitutional and the police
officers conducting the search are not entitled to qualified
immunity, we VACATE the district court’s summary judgment
dismissing Appellant’s claim in relation to the search of the
Cadillac. We also VACATE the district court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s claims against the City under section 1983 in relation
to the search of the Cadillac. The case is remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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