Case: 19-10781 Document: 00515890883 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 8, 2021
No. 19-10781 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Charles Epley, also known as Pierryck Castellazzi,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Marco Gonzalez, Sergeant at Montford; David Camargo, Officer
at Montford; Julio Espinosa, III, Officer at Montford; Rafael
Guitron, III, Officer at Montford; Bobby Gutierrez, Officer at
Montford, Et. Al.,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:18-cv-00142-C
Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Following a physical altercation with prison guards, Plaintiff-
Appellant Charles Epley filed a pro se civil rights complaint, raising a number
of claims, including claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 19-10781
(“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“§ 504”). A Magistrate Judge
recommended dismissing Epley’s claims for failure to state a claim or on the
basis of frivolity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The district court
adopted the recommendation in full over Epley’s objections and dismissed
the case. The only claims on appeal are those related to allegations of
disability discrimination. We conclude that Epley has stated a claim under
the ADA and § 504, so we reverse the district court’s dismissal of those
claims and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Epley is a former inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”), where he was incarcerated for twenty-eight years.1 Epley suffers
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and Traumatic Brain
Injury (“TBI”) stemming from a physical attack that occurred in 1994. He
was granted a “single-cell medical restriction” because of these ailments and
was housed alone for the majority of his time in prison. He was also granted
a number of work-related limitations.
In 2016, Epley was transferred to the John Montford Unit, TDCJ’s
psychiatric prison. He was placed in a single cell on his arrival, but shortly
thereafter was ordered to move to a cell already occupied by three other
inmates. Epley contends this order “triggered severe PTSD symptoms
which prevented [him] from entering the cell.” When Epley asked to speak
to a psychiatrist, he was ordered to remove his clothes and was placed in an
empty room. He alleges that, at some point, prison guards sprayed a gaseous
substance into the room, which left him “incapacitated and unable to think.”
1
Because this case involves review of a motion to dismiss, we accept all well-
pleaded facts as true for the purposes of this discussion. See Stringer v. Town of Jonesboro,
986 F.3d 502, 505 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021).
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He claims that the guards then entered the room and physically assaulted
him, slamming his head to the ground, “crushing [his] body,” causing
“intense pain,” and “breaking several ribs.” Epley states that he was
handcuffed and forced to return to the multi-occupancy cell. The following
day, he was transported to a medical treatment facility in a prison bus—a 170
mile journey that, given his injuries from the day before, caused
“excruciating pain” because he was handcuffed, unable to move, and kept
“in a stress position the entire time.”
After his release from prison, Epley filed a pro se civil rights complaint
against thirty-nine defendants, including TDCJ staff members at the
Montford Unit, the Robertson Unit, and the Lynaugh Unit, among others
(collectively, “Defendants”). He asserted claims for, inter alia, excessive use
of force, denial of medical care, retaliation, due process violations,
conspiracy, assault, battery, and negligence. His case was referred to a
Magistrate Judge, who denied his motion for the appointment of counsel but
granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Before Defendants were
served, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation,
suggesting that the district court dismiss all of Epley’s claims for failure to
state a claim or on the basis of frivolity, as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).2 The district court adopted that recommendation over Epley’s
objections and dismissed his case.
Epley timely appealed. In January 2021, he was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but his motion for appointment of
counsel was denied. Nevertheless, an attorney filed an appellate brief on his
behalf, challenging only the dismissal of Epley’s ADA and § 504 claims.
2
The Magistrate Judge recommended that Epley’s state law claims be dismissed
without prejudice.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a
district court to dismiss a case taken in forma pauperis “at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). This court reviews dismissals based on the failure to
state a claim de novo, and those based on frivolity for abuse of discretion. Black
v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998).
Here, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Epley’s
discrimination claims because he “ha[d] not pleaded facts supporting a claim
under the ADA or [§ 504].” For this reason, we conclude that the Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim and
we review that decision de novo.
III. ANALYSIS
Epley accused Defendants of discriminating against him on the basis
of his disability in violation of the ADA and § 504 “due to the Texas prison
system’s culture of hostility toward prisoners with mental-disorders” and for
Defendants’ refusal to accommodate his disabilities. Specifically, he accused
the Montford prison officials of (1) forcing him into a multi-occupancy cell
despite his documented single-cell medical restriction, and (2) transporting
him for medical treatment in a prison bus rather than a medical van. The
Magistrate Judge concluded that dismissal of these claims was appropriate
because (1) Epley did not qualify as disabled; (2) Epley could not establish
evidence of intentional discrimination; and (3) these claims were merely
restatements of those for denial of medical care.
A prima facie claim under the ADA requires a plaintiff to show:
“(1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or
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being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for
which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of
his disability.” Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d
669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004).3
A. Qualifying Disability
Whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA is not a demanding
question. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (“The definition of disability . . . shall
be construed in favor of broad coverage . . . .”). A qualifying disability under
the ADA is either (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one of more of the major life activities of the individual”; (2) “a record
of such an impairment”; or (3) “being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
The Act specifies that major life activities include “seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, . . . learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working,” among others. 42 USC § 12102(2)(A). The
ADA does not explain what “substantially limits” these activities, but
regulations stress that this phrase must be broadly construed, because the
relevant consideration is “whether public entities have complied with their
obligations . . . not the extent to which an individual’s impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”4 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1). To that
3
Because “t]he rights and remedies afforded plaintiffs under Title II of the ADA
are almost entirely duplicative of those provided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,”
we apply the same analysis to both claims and refer only to Epley’s ADA claims. See
Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005).
4
This is a change from the original ADA. In 2008, Congress passed the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 to expressly abrogate several Supreme Court cases that had
applied too strict an interpretation to the term “substantially limits.” ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, PL 110–325, September 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553.
Congress specifically explained that in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
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end, an impairment qualifies under the Act “if it substantially limits the
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most
people in the general population,” but it “does not need to prevent, or
significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life
activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 28 CFR
§ 35.108(d)(v).
Epley has alleged sufficient facts that, when considered in the light
most favorable to him, demonstrate that his PTSD and TBI substantially
limit his ability to think and sleep. In addition to describing the symptoms
that these conditions cause—which include “migraine attacks, confusion
during stressful situations, sleeping disturbances, . . . anxiety and panic
attacks, vivid and distressing flashbacks and nightmares”—his factual
allegations illustrate how these conditions affected his life at the time of the
underlying incident. Epley alleges that when ordered to enter the multi-
occupancy cell, he was stricken with PTSD symptoms so severe that he was
unable to enter the space as the prison guards demanded. He also alleges that,
following his removal from the cell, he was “overwhelmed with TBI/PTSD
symptoms (e.g. confusion, fear, flashbacks, feelings of unreality).” Epley has
clearly alleged that his mental condition prevented him from complying with
the guards’ orders in a manner that would not afflict most people in the
general population. Furthermore, the applicable regulations make clear that
PTSD will, in most cases, sufficiently limit a major life activity because,
“[g]iven their inherent nature . . . it should easily be construed that . . . post-
Williams, the Supreme Court had placed too high a bar on qualifying disabilities under the
ADA by requiring that the terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted to
create a demanding standard” and that, to limit a major life activity, the impairment must
“prevent or severely restrict the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives.” Id. (quoting 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).
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traumatic stress disorder [and] traumatic brain injury . . . substantially limit[]
brain function.” 28 CFR § 35.108(d)(2), (d)(2)(k).
Additionally, Epley has sufficiently alleged that he had “a record of
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). He asserts that, based on his
conditions, TDCJ gave him a single-cell medical accommodation that had
been in effect for many years prior to his transfer to Montford. He has also
alleged that the Montford guards knew of his restriction because they (1) had
instantaneous electronic access to his medical files, which reflected the
restriction, and (2) placed him in a single cell for his first four days at the
facility. The allegation that TDCJ had a record of his impairment and the
accommodations that it warranted is further evidence that Epley sufficiently
alleged that he was qualified under the ADA.
B. Intentional Discrimination
An ADA plaintiff must also show that he was discriminated in some
fashion “by reason of his disability.” Cadena v. El Paso Cty., 946 F.3d 717,
723-24 (5th Cir. 2020). The Magistrate Judge concluded that Epley had not
satisfied this element because he had pleaded no facts illustrating that
“Defendants intentionally treated him differently because of a disability.”
We disagree.
This prong can be satisfied with evidence that the defendant failed to
make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disability. Valentine v.
Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Windham v. Harris Cty.,
Tex., 875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017)). To establish a claim for failure to
provide a reasonable accommodation, “a plaintiff must show that the entity
knew of the disability and its consequential limitations, either because the
plaintiff requested an accommodation or because the nature of the limitation
was open and obvious.” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 724. “To satisfy the knowledge
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requirement, the entity must understand the limitations a plaintiff
experienced as a result of his disability.” Valentine, 2021 WL1153097, at *11.
Here, Epley alleged that Defendants denied him access to (1) safe
housing by forcing him to enter a multi-occupancy cell and (2) safe
transportation by transporting him in a prison bus, rather than a medical van.
Specifically, Epley asserts that, even though his single-cell restriction had
never been formally revoked, the Montford officials disregarded that
restriction entirely when they forced him to spend the night in a multi-
occupancy cell. As noted above, Epley also alleged that the Montford guards
knew of that restriction, which was documented in his medical records. With
respect to transportation, Epley alleged that the Montford officials knew he
needed medical transportation because he arrived at the Montford Unit in a
medical van five days earlier, and his psychological and physical problems
had only increased since that time. We conclude that, at this early stage of
the litigation, Epley has sufficiently pleaded that the Montford officials knew
of his disabilities and the accommodation provided to him based on them,
and yet denied him the benefit of safe prison housing and appropriate
transportation by ignoring the restrictions entirely. The Magistrate Judge’s
emphasis on the lack of disability-based animus is irrelevant to this analysis.
C. Denial of Medical Care
The Magistrate Judge reasoned that dismissal was additionally
appropriate because Epley’s ADA claims were mere restatements of his
medical care claims. In two unpublished cases, we have indicated that an
ADA claim cannot rest on the exact same facts as a claim of denial of medical
care. See Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2012);
Walls v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 270 F. App’x 358, 359 (5th Cir.
2008). But that is not what Epley has done. Epley’s ADA claims are based on
the denial of reasonable housing and transportation accommodations, neither
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of which treat the underlying medical conditions that require their existence.
Being housed in a single-occupancy cell might mitigate Epley’s PTSD and
TBI symptoms, but it in no way cures him or eliminates his ailments. As
Epley explains, these restrictions merely “accommodate[] people with
disabilities, allowing them equal access to a program or service—here, safe
housing—despite their disabilities.” This independent basis given for
dismissal was erroneous.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court with respect to Epley’s ADA and §
504 claims, and REMAND for further proceedings.
9