In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-2168
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JACQUES S. GHOLSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 18-CR-30039 — Richard Mills, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 14, 2021
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit
Judges.
WOOD, Circuit Judge. Officer Erik Cowick pulled over
Jacques Gholston just after midnight on April 29, 2018, for
turning without signaling. Because Cowick suspected that
Gholston was a drug dealer, he called for a trained dog to per-
form a drug sniff at the scene. As Cowick was finishing the
routine procedures required for a minor traffic violation, the
2 No. 20-2168
dog arrived and alerted officers to the presence of metham-
phetamine.
The discovery of the drugs led in time to federal charges
for possession of five or more grams of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B). In response, Gholston filed a pretrial motion to sup-
press the evidence of the meth seized as a result of the dog
sniff. He contended that Cowick unreasonably delayed the
stop in order to allow the “K9” officer to arrive and perform
an inspection. The district court denied the motion. Gholston
then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to challenge the ruling
on the motion to suppress. We conclude that the district court
committed no reversible error in finding that Cowick did not
unlawfully prolong the stop and thus did not violate
Gholston’s Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore affirm.
I
Officer Cowick had long suspected that Gholston was dis-
tributing large quantities of methamphetamine from his
truck. Cowick had an informant, Taylour Toolate, who occa-
sionally provided information about criminal activity in
Quincy, Illinois. On one occasion at an unspecified time,
Toolate informed Cowick that she believed that Gholston was
about to pick up and deliver large quantities of methamphet-
amine using his green pickup truck, which had a toolbox in
the bed. She predicted that Gholston would store the meth-
amphetamine in a magnetic box affixed to the bottom of the
truck. Cowick also vaguely said that other people he had ar-
rested in the past told him that Gholston sold methampheta-
mine from his truck. Cowick could not identify any of them
by name, nor could he provide any details or documentation
about those supposed encounters.
No. 20-2168 3
In the early morning hours of April 29, 2018, Cowick was
patrolling a high crime area in Quincy. He spotted Gholston’s
green pickup truck with the toolbox in its bed. Evidently
Cowick had kept Toolate’s tip in mind for some time, as she
had been incarcerated since January 10, 2018. He decided to
follow Gholston to see if he could stop him for a traffic infrac-
tion.
An opportunity presented itself when, around 12:16 am,
Gholston turned right from 5th Street onto Chestnut Street
without using a turn signal. Cowick caught up to Gholston’s
truck, activating his emergency lights at 12:17 am as he made
the same turn onto Chestnut Street. By the time Cowick fin-
ished turning, Gholston had already parked the truck and
was walking away. This further heightened Cowick’s suspi-
cions, as he believes that “walk[ing] away from a traffic stop
in this area” usually means drugs are involved. Cowick radi-
oed to dispatch that he was preparing to make a stop. He then
called out for Gholston to stop, but Gholston kept walking.
This, too, disturbed Cowick, because he thought that the two
had made eye contact. Cowick decided to follow Gholston on
foot, calling after Gholston until he responded and returned
to the car. Gholston explained that he did not hear Cowick
calling him at first. He added that Cowick did not turn on his
lights until after Gholston was already out of the car, and so
he did not realize that Cowick was after him. Cowick hand-
cuffed Gholston at 12:18 am and sat him on the curb. Around
that time, Officers Hodges and Cirrincione arrived at the
scene.
Cowick began the standard procedure for writing a ticket,
but there were a few delays along the way. When asked for
his license, Gholston explained that his ID was in his truck.
4 No. 20-2168
Cowick, unprovoked, asked if there was a reason Gholston
did not want Cowick to retrieve the ID from the vehicle, to
which Gholston responded “huh.” That was the most that
Gholston said; he never stated in so many words that he did
not want Cowick to retrieve the ID from the car. Instead,
Gholston verbally conveyed his ID information to Cowick.
Cowick also conducted an additional consensual search of
Gholston’s person; it did not turn up anything. He then re-
turned to his squad car and radioed dispatch to confirm
whether Gholston had a valid driver’s license. Dispatch in-
formed Cowick that Gholston’s ID was valid but that he also
had a Notice of Violation (“Notice”) on file for improperly
parking over a year earlier.
At that point Cowick contacted two more officers to assist
him with the stop. First, at 12:24:23 am, he looked up the lo-
cation of a K9 officer, Deputy Saalborn (known as “sam12”),
who was six to seven miles away from the stop. Next, he
called for assistance in retrieving the Notice from the police
station and delivering it to the traffic stop. Sargent Elbus radi-
oed back that he could pick up the Notice. Cowick immedi-
ately responded at 12:26:43 am, using the car’s messaging ter-
minal, inviting Elbus to “take your time!!” because he was
“trying to get sam12 here.” Cowick was also communicating
with Officer Cirrincione about getting Saalborn to the scene.
At 12:28:03 am, Cirrincione messaged Cowick through his car
terminal saying that Saalborn was on the way.
Throughout the time he was completing the ticket, Cowick
continued to urge Elbus to take his time, sending him mes-
sages at 12:29:15 am and 12:29:20 am to that effect. He did the
opposite with Saalborn, urging him at 12:30:31 am to “drive
fast” because he could guarantee that Gholston had drugs in
No. 20-2168 5
his car. Cowick printed Gholston’s warning ticket for failing
to use his turn signal at 12:32:27 am, 14 minutes after he had
handcuffed Gholston.
As Cowick returned to Gholston to hand him the printed
ticket, he realized that he had not yet asked Gholston for his
insurance information. Gholston explained that his girlfriend
had the truck insured but that he did not have proof of insur-
ance on him. Cowick went back to his car to write a ticket for
that infraction. As Cowick was finishing the second ticket,
Saalborn arrived and walked the drug-sniffing dog around
Gholston’s truck. The dog alerted as the ticket was still print-
ing. The officers searched the truck and discovered 9 grams of
methamphetamine.
The government brought charges against Gholston, and as
we noted, he moved to suppress the drugs on the ground that
Cowick unreasonably extended the stop in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The district court referred the motion to
suppress to a magistrate judge, who held that Cowick did ex-
tend the stop beyond the time reasonably required so that
Saalborn could arrive and search for the methamphetamine.
Nevertheless, the magistrate judge found that the stop did not
raise constitutional concerns because Cowick had reasonable
suspicion to continue holding Gholston based on Toolate’s
tip. For the most part, the district court adopted the magis-
trate judge’s findings of fact, but it disagreed with her in one
key respect, finding that Cowick did not unreasonably extend
the stop. Cowick’s delays, it thought, were minor, and his fail-
ure to request Gholston’s insurance information at the start of
the stop was a good-faith blunder.
6 No. 20-2168
II
In cases involving an appeal of a denial of a motion to sup-
press, a mixed standard of review applies: We review the dis-
trict court’s factual findings for clear error, and we evaluate
legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.
United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2013).
Whether a lawful stop extends so long that it raises consti-
tutional concerns turns on reasonableness. As relevant for our
purposes, a seizure made in order to issue a warning ticket to
a driver “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 357 (2015). The goal is to complete such a stop in a
reasonable time. Side-inquiries into other potential crimes
such as drug-related activity represent a “detour[] from [the
original] mission.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.
While officers must act diligently, we repeatedly have de-
clined to adopt even a rule of thumb that relies on the number
of minutes any given stop lasts. We explained recently in
United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2018), that we ask
whether the defendant was detained longer than necessary
for the underlying investigation, not “exactly how many
minutes the stop lasts.” Id. at 486. A stop may call for a variety
of measures beyond printing the ticket, including “checking
the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstand-
ing warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automo-
bile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
at 355.
Guided by these principles, the district court found that
Officer Cowick did not unreasonably extend Gholston’s stop.
No. 20-2168 7
It noted that most of the alleged delays were attributable to
reasonable mistakes or forces outside of Cowick’s control. For
example, it found as a fact that Gholston’s failure to provide
Cowick with his ID increased the amount of time needed for
the stop. Cowick had to enter Gholston’s information manu-
ally rather than filling all fields with a quick scan of a barcode.
The district court further determined that Cowick made an
“innocent mistake” when he failed to acquire Gholston’s
proof of insurance at the beginning of the stop; the oversight,
the court found, was attributable to the unusual nature of the
stop. Reasonable delays such as these, the court concluded,
largely accounted for why this routine stop lasted longer than
some.
The district court next reasoned that none of Cowick’s ac-
tions unrelated to the stop meaningfully lengthened it. The
district court catalogued a few of the examples that had con-
cerned the magistrate judge: Cowick spoke with Hodges and
Cirrincione about his suspicion that Gholston had drugs in his
truck; he took time away from completing the tickets to call
several people; he sent messages to Elbus asking him to obtain
the Notice; he repeatedly urged Saalborn to arrive with the
dog as soon as possible. Despite all this, the district court con-
cluded that Cowick did not unreasonably prolong the stop.
The district court credited Cowick’s testimony that he never
stopped working on the warning between 12:24 am and 12:32
am (when he printed the warning ticket), even as he commu-
nicated with the other officers. As we noted, the district court
concluded that Cowick’s delay issuing the proof-of-insurance
ticket was an innocent mistake and that the dog alerted as the
ticket printed.
8 No. 20-2168
Gholston takes issue with the district court’s determina-
tion that Cowick did not unreasonably delay the stop. In
Gholston’s opinion, Cowick took a number of actions uncon-
nected to writing the tickets, and those steps collectively gave
rise to an unconstitutional extension of the stop.
The first period of delay to which Gholston points could
not unreasonably have prolonged the stop. Gholston argues
that Cowick had the information he needed to begin writing
Gholston’s ticket at 12:22 am, but he did not begin doing so
until 12:24 am. Why? Because he first conducted a consent
search of Gholston’s person and continually prodded
Gholston to agree to a search of the car. That has nothing to
do with Saalborn; Cowick did not contact Saalborn until after
returning to his car to begin issuing the ticket. The district
court thus correctly disregarded these events.
Gholston also disagrees with the district court’s character-
ization of Cowick’s actions while Cowick sat in his car work-
ing on the ticket and urging Saalborn to hurry to the scene.
Gholston emphasizes that Cowick sent messages to Elbus and
Saalborn multiple times while in his car and called Elbus once
to ensure that Elbus was receiving his messages. No reasona-
ble person, he contends, could think that Cowick was dili-
gently working on the ticket during that time, because Cow-
ick admitted that he had to use the same keyboard to message
the other officers and to complete the ticket.
Given the deferential standard of review that applies to
the underlying facts, however, we see no reversible error. The
district court’s conclusion, based on Cowick’s testimony, that
Cowick did not unreasonably delay the stop in order to com-
municate with other officers on unrelated topics is a finding
of fact that we review for clear error. Even if Cowick had to
No. 20-2168 9
use the same keyboard, there are many reasons why he might
have been able to communicate with his fellow officers with-
out slowing down the ticket process, including his need to
wait for dispatch to verify that Gholston’s ID was valid. We
cannot say that the district court’s factual determination was
clearly erroneous.
Nor did the district court commit clear error when it de-
termined that Cowick’s failure to ask for Gholston’s proof of
insurance at the start of the stop was an innocent mistake, not
a manipulative ruse. Recall that Cowick had to get out of his
car to catch up with Gholston, who already had left his truck.
He may simply have been focusing on catching Gholston, ra-
ther than on the details of ticket-writing. Characterizing that
omission one way or the other is a straightforward credibility
issue for the court. We have no reason to disturb it. The court’s
finding was corroborated by the fact that Cowick told his fel-
low officers that he found it frustrating that he had to enter
Gholston’s ID information a second time for the second ticket.
Similarly, it makes no difference whether Gholston refused to
allow Cowick to retrieve his ID from the truck, because
Gholston began communicating his ID information verbally.
In sum, we cannot say that the district court committed clear
error in finding that the need to enter Gholston’s ID infor-
mation manually added any appreciable time to the stop.
Gholston contends that the district court’s reasoning is in-
consistent with the holding of Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348 (2015), which rejects a de minimis rule for extensions
of a stop. Gholston correctly notes that this is the way the dis-
trict court characterized Cowick’s delays.
Although the district court may have chosen imperfect
language to describe its factual findings, in substance it stayed
10 No. 20-2168
within the bounds identified in Rodriguez. The Court there
identified a number of routine activities that accompany traf-
fic stops, including license and warrant checks and verifica-
tion of registration and insurance. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355.
The district court here found that Cowick detained Gholston
only long enough to complete these same procedures, and
that the dog alerted before Cowick had finished printing the
second ticket. This is not a case in which an officer completes
the activities for a stop and then detains the suspect longer in
order to allow time for a K9 officer to arrive. The district court
credited Cowick’s testimony that he never stopped working
on the ticket even as he communicated with other officers.
Critically, the court found that Cowick did not extend the stop
at all, not that any delay was permissibly de minimis. Based on
those factual findings, the court correctly held that this stop
did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
III
Having determined that the stop was not unreasonably
extended, we need not reach Gholston’s other arguments. The
district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. On
that understanding of the events in question, the stop was not
unconstitutionally extended beyond the time reasonably re-
quired, and so we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
No. 20-2168 11
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. “This is not how we
typically do a traffic stop.” Officer Cowick’s testimony admit-
ted the obvious: he and his colleagues slow-walked the pre-
textual traffic stop of Mr. Gholston (for turning without sig-
naling in otherwise deserted streets) while waiting on a drug-
sniffing dog. The majority opinion acknowledges the ample
evidence of this delay: texting one officer to hurry up with the
dog while texting another to take his time to bring some
needed paperwork, taking time to handcuff and frisk
Gholston, taking time to convince Gholston to agree to a more
thorough search of his person, doing the search, and trying to
convince him to consent to a search of his vehicle. Even with
all these delays, the legitimate turn-signal ticket was complete
about five minutes before the dog arrived. At that point, Of-
ficer Cowick stretched the stop out further by circling back to
the subject of proof of insurance. That tactic succeeded in pro-
longing the stop just long enough for the dog to arrive, sniff,
and alert.
Despite the evidence of delay, the majority affirms the de-
nial of Gholston’s motion to suppress primarily by deferring
to the district court’s factual finding that Officer Cowick’s late
request for insurance information was the result of an “inno-
cent mistake.” I respectfully dissent. Even if the mistake was
honest, it still unreasonably prolonged the stop. And with re-
spect, that finding of an “innocent mistake” was clearly erro-
neous. This elementary and convenient “mistake” provided
the only rationale for continuing to detain Gholston until the
dog arrived. Other judges finding facts in such cases can and
should be more skeptical about such tactics to prolong pre-
textual traffic stops.
12 No. 20-2168
Police often use a trivial traffic infraction to justify a traffic
stop that metamorphoses into an opportunity to investigate
other possible crimes, especially drug trafficking. The Su-
preme Court has held that such a stop does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if the police officer has probable cause to
believe the driver violated a traffic law, regardless of the of-
ficer’s real motive. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996). The Court has imposed important limits on this police
tactic, especially in terms of limited time and purposes. A sei-
zure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth
Amendment if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re-
quired to complete the initial mission of the stop. Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Court
provided its most detailed guidance to date on these limits.
The Court explained that a “police stop exceeding the time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made vi-
olates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable sei-
zures.” Id. at 350. During a traffic stop, the police officer must
stick to the “mission” of the seizure: ensuring road safety,
“determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, ... checking the
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 355.
If those activities and the officer’s observations provide
reasonable suspicion about criminal activity sufficient to de-
tain the subject against his will—that’s usually the aim of the
pretextual stop in the first place—the officer may then act ap-
propriately. But an officer may not prolong the stop, “absent
the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de-
taining an individual.” Id.; accord, e.g., United States v. Cole,
No. 20-2168 13
994 F.3d 844, 853 (7th Cir. 2021), rehearing en banc granted (June
9, 2021). Rodriguez held that lower courts may not shrug off
delays as “de minimis” when the subject is being detained
against his will. 575 U.S. at 356–57 (rejecting “de minimis”
rule applied by circuit court).
Applying these general rules to this case, Officer Cowick’s
stop of Gholston for the turn-signal infraction departed from
his legitimate constitutional mission in a couple of respects.
He spent several of the first minutes of the stop not on traffic
matters but on handcuffing Gholston, obtaining his consent to
a search of his person, carrying out the search, and unsuccess-
fully trying to convince Gholston to consent to a search of his
vehicle.
After Officer Cowick got around to his legitimate pur-
poses, in which he had zero interest, he completed the warn-
ing ticket for the turn-signal infraction at 12:32 am. At that
time, the drug-sniff by a police dog that was Officer Cowick’s
real goal was not yet possible. The dog and his handler were
still on their way, so Gholston should have been free to go on
about his business. Officer Cowick’s testimony made clear,
though, that he simply was not going to let Gholston leave
before the dog could arrive for a sniff of the vehicle. Further
detention for that purpose violated the Fourth Amendment
unless Officer Cowick had some other legitimate basis to re-
strain Gholston’s liberty. He did not.
The government and police officers have offered three the-
ories for continued detention: reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking; a de facto policy of detention to serve a “Notice of
Violation” on a parking infraction; and Officer Cowick’s be-
lated pivot to proof of insurance. None of these theories
should save this deliberately prolonged traffic stop.
14 No. 20-2168
Reasonable Suspicion: Officer Cowick was interested in
Gholston based on a stale tip. A meth user who occasionally
provided Officer Cowick with information of unknown relia-
bility had told him that Gholston was selling meth from his
truck. The tip was at least three and a half months old, and
Officer Cowick admitted that he had never used any infor-
mation from the tipster to arrest anyone or to obtain a search
warrant. Tr. 50. Officer Cowick said that he had heard the
same from other people on the street, but he could not iden-
tify any other sources and had never even made a note of
them. The vague, stale, and uncorroborated tips gave Officer
Cowick his motive to stop Gholston for the turn-signal infrac-
tion, but they fell well short of the reasonable suspicion
needed to restrain a person’s liberty. Nothing that occurred
during the traffic stop, until the delayed dog-sniff, added
enough to those tips to justify detaining Gholston. 1
The Parking Infraction: After Officer Cowick had hand-
cuffed and searched Gholston, he finally checked the driver’s
license information with a dispatcher. He was told that
Gholston was the subject of a “Notice of Violation” in the
Quincy police files. Officer Cowick claimed that he had au-
thority to detain Gholston until another officer delivered that
notice from headquarters to the traffic stop. And the need/op-
portunity to wait for delivery of the notice was the reason Of-
ficer Cowick repeatedly told the officer making the delivery
to “take your time” while at the same time urging the handler
1There is a minor factual dispute about how quickly Gholston real-
ized Officer Cowick was stopping him; Gholston was already out of his
truck and walking away before the officer turned on his red and blue
lights. But once Officer Cowick had Gholston’s attention, he was entirely
cooperative.
No. 20-2168 15
of the drug-sniffing dog to hurry. Cowick testified at the hear-
ing that he was not going to let Gholston go anywhere until
the notice was delivered to the scene. Tr. 45, 83.
The federal government does not defend this rationale.
Such notices are not arrest warrants. None of the officers of-
fered any legal basis for this practice of detaining drivers to
serve such notices on them, and none exists. The government
stipulated that there was nothing in the police department’s
policy and procedures manual regarding this practice of hold-
ing motorists until such notices could be served. Tr. 163–64.
Proof of Insurance: Officer Cowick had all the information
he needed to prepare the turn-signal warning by 12:22 am. Tr.
83. Even with all his texting, he finished and printed the warn-
ing ticket for the turn-signal violation at 12:32 am. He knew
then that the canine officer and the drug-sniffing dog were on
their way from a location six or seven miles away. According
to Officer Cowick, only then did he realize he had not checked
whether Gholston had proof of insurance for his vehicle. At
12:33, he asked Gholston for proof of insurance, which
Gholston did not have in the vehicle. The officer then began
preparing another ticket for violating the state law requiring
proof of insurance in the vehicle. This took four more minutes.
At 12:37 am, Cowick was working on the proof-of-insurance
ticket as the drug-sniffing dog arrived. Within thirty seconds
of arrival, the dog alerted on the vehicle. Officer Cowick was
still printing the ticket.
The magistrate judge and district judge both found that
Cowick’s failure to ask for insurance initially was “an inno-
cent mistake” rather than a ploy to prolong the pretextual
traffic stop until the dog could arrive. The majority accepts
16 No. 20-2168
that finding as decisive and not clearly erroneous. With re-
spect, I disagree on both points.
Rodriguez adopted an objective standard: the stop may
“last no longer than is necessary to effectuate” the purpose
that justified it. 575 U.S. at 354, quoting United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 684 (1985). “Authority for the seizure thus ends
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed.” Id., citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
686. Rodriguez does not require perfect efficiency, but Officer
Cowick’s “innocent mistake” did not extend the time objec-
tively necessary to complete his legitimate tasks that justified
detaining Gholston.
Even if such an “innocent mistake” could justify a pro-
longed stop, despite Rodriguez, the evidence of pretext and de-
liberate delay here was unusually strong. How else to inter-
pret Cowick’s texts telling the canine officer to hurry up—tex-
ting him to “drive fast” and that he could “guarantee” there
was “a good amount”—while telling the officer with the No-
tice of Violation to “take your time!” Officer Cowick started
with handcuffing, a frisk, another personal search, and an at-
tempt to convince Gholston to consent to a vehicle search.
And as noted, Officer Cowick virtually admitted to the delib-
erate delays when he testified more generally that “this is not
how we typically do a traffic stop.” Tr. 81.
Rodriguez listed checking proof of insurance as one of just
a handful of routinely legitimate subjects for pretextual traffic
stops. 575 U.S. at 355. Officer Cowick testified that at the be-
ginning of the stop, he was so focused on the possibility of
drugs and his supposed difficulty in getting Gholston’s atten-
tion that he just forgot to ask about insurance.
No. 20-2168 17
This was a highly improbable oversight. “License, regis-
tration, insurance” is an absolutely routine and elementary
step at the start of any traffic stop. We are supposed to believe
that Officer Cowick remembered the first two and just hap-
pened to forget the third?
“Forgetting” to ask about insurance can work too easily to
justify prolonged pretextual stops, at least if judges are will-
ing to believe the excuse. We encountered the same “forget-
fulness” recently in United States v. Cole, 994 F.3d at 853, where
the officer making the pretextual stop did not ask for insur-
ance information until at least fifteen minutes into the stop
and after he had called for a drug-sniffing dog. (Cole was de-
cided on other grounds.) For other recent examples of similar
delays in pretextual stops, see United States v. Byron, 817 Fed.
App’x 753, 755 (11th Cir. 2020) (delayed request for insurance
information; affirming suppression on other grounds where
officer prolonged traffic stop without justification); Matthews
v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2021 WL 356235, *2 (D. Nev.
Feb. 1, 2021) (officer requested insurance information fifteen
to twenty minutes after start of traffic stop); United States v.
Bullock, 2020 WL 5553562, *13 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 21, 2020) (of-
ficer delayed requesting insurance information; motion to
suppress denied on other grounds; presence of firearms in car
and questions about permits for them gave officers good rea-
sons not to focus on insurance).
A few instances of pretextual stops with delayed requests
for insurance information do not prove this is a common tactic
for prolonging such stops. Maybe it’s just a coincidence that
the officers in Cole and this case happened to make the same
convenient mistake. Yet the effects of such a delay in accom-
plishing the real purpose of a pretextual stop call for judges
18 No. 20-2168
to be less credulous. I read the majority opinion’s reliance on
the standard of review as signaling that a different finding by
the trial court on the delayed insurance request would also
have been affirmed here. With respect, though, I believe we
should reverse here.