NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1244-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHAIS K. HILL,
a/k/a CHRIS K. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted February 3, 2021 – Decided June 23, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Indictment Nos. 15-09-2161
and 17-05-0968.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Chais Hill appeals from his conviction of second-degree
distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2), and second-degree certain
persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). On appeal, defendant argues
that he did not voluntarily consent to a warrantless search of a white BMW
registered to his mother. In addition, he argues the three-and-a-half-year parole
disqualifier imposed exceeds the limit allowed by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b). 1 Having
reviewed the record and based on the governing law, we find that the motion
judge did not make sufficient factual and legal findings pursuant to State v.
King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), to facilitate appellate review. We are
therefore constrained to remand for further proceedings.
I.
This matter arises from a warrantless search of defendant's mother's car,
which was conducted in the course of the execution of a no-knock warrant at
defendant's residence. It is undisputed that the vehicle was not within the scope
of the warrant. During a two-day suppression hearing, the State presented the
testimony of two officers and produced video footage of defendant's
interrogation at the prosecutor's office following his arrest. Defendant also
testified.
1
The State does not oppose remanding the case to correct the sentencing error.
2 A-1244-18
Detective-Sergeant Nicholas Erman of the Atlantic County Prosecutor's
Office testified that in late 2013, defendant was the target of an investigation
conducted by the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office. The Narcotics Strike
Force Unit utilized confidential informants and undercover agents to investigate
defendant's sale of narcotics near his home in Egg Harbor City. Detectives used
undercover agents to purchase heroin from defendant on approximately nine
occasions. As a result of the purchases, the investigators obtained a no-knock
search warrant for defendant's residence. On December 18, 2013, at
approximately 5:00 a.m., the Narcotics Strike Force Unit, with the help of the
Atlantic County SWAT team, executed the warrant. There were six people in
the apartment: defendant, his wife, their two small children, defendant's sister,
and an uncle. Each of the occupants, with the exception of the children, were
placed in handcuffs and seated in the living room.
After defendant was placed under arrest, Erman took him into the kitchen,
alone, and questioned him about suspected contraband in the house. Defendant
allegedly revealed that he had contraband hidden in a white BMW parked
outside the building, as well as heroin in a closet inside the apartment. Prior to
3 A-1244-18
the questioning in the kitchen, defendant had not been given a Miranda 2
warning.
After asking for consent to search the BMW, Erman filled out a consent
form, read each line to defendant, then requested his signature. 3 Lieutenant
Dylan Hutton of the Egg Harbor City Police Department was then summoned
into the kitchen to act as a witness to defendant's signature. The officers
uncuffed one of defendant's hands to enable him to sign the form. The box
indicating defendant's consent to search the vehicle, however, was left
unchecked. At the suppression hearing, Hutton testified that he did not see or
hear what occurred in the kitchen before he was summoned to witness
defendant's signature. Investigators searched the BMW and found a .380 caliber
handgun and heroin in the trunk.
The judge denied the suppression motion, finding "there [was] little
indication that defendant's consent was anything but knowing, intelligent[,] and
voluntary." Relying on the signed consent form and the officers' testimony,
which he deemed credible, the judge found by clear and convincing evidence
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
Erman testified that he recognized the vehicle from music videos defendant
posted on YouTube, which he watched during the investigation.
4 A-1244-18
that consent was properly obtained. He concluded that the incomplete consent
form was not fatal when weighed against the other evidence.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant plead guilty to second-degree
distribution of heroin and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons. 4
In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges under
the twenty-count indictment, and recommended concurrent sentences of six
years' incarceration with a three-and-a-half-year period of parole ineligibility
for the distribution offense, and five years' incarceration with a five-year period
of parole ineligibility for the certain persons not to have weapons offense. The
sentencing judge accepted defendant's plea, and imposed the recommended
sentences.
On appeal, defendant presents these arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT'S] MOTION TO SUPRESS
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE FOUND IN A VEHICLE
BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS THE FRUIT OF A
[MIRANDA] VIOLATION AND THE TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES REVEAL THAT ANY
4
Before pleading guilty to the second-degree offenses, defendant was also
charged with theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4(a), in an unrelated
indictment. He plead guilty and was sentenced to an eighteen months'
incarceration, which ran concurrently to the sentences he received for the drug
and firearm-related convictions.
5 A-1244-18
CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS NOT KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY.
A. Under the State-Law Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, The Evidence Found in the
Vehicle Should be Suppressed as the Fruit of a
[Miranda] Violation.
B. The State Failed to Prove that [Defendant]
Knowingly and Voluntarily Consented to a
Search of His Vehicle Because [Defendant] Was
Handcuffed and Under Arrest When He Was
Asked to Consent.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A THREE-
AND-ONE-HALF-YEAR PERIOD OF PAROLE
INELIGIBILITY ON THE DRUG COUNT.
II.
Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is limited. State v.
Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011). In reviewing a trial judge's ruling on a motion
to suppress, "an appellate court . . . must uphold the factual findings underlying
the trial court's decision so long as those findings are 'supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)
(quoting State v. Elders, 386 N.J. Super. 208, 228 (App. Div. 2006)). This court
"should not disturb the trial court's findings merely because 'it might have
reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal' or because 'the trial court
6 A-1244-18
decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side' in a close case."
Id. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Issues of law,
however, are reviewed de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).
First, we reject defendant's invitation to join the five other states that have
adopted the exclusionary rule as a remedy when physical evidence is discovered
as the result of a Miranda violation. 5 As the United States Supreme Court
explained:
the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect
against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not
implicated by the admission into evidence of the
physical fruit of a voluntary statement. Accordingly,
there is no justification for extending the Miranda rule
to this context. And just as the Self-Incrimination
Clause primarily focuses on the criminal trial, so too
does the Miranda rule. The Miranda rule is not a code
of police conduct, and police do not violate the
Constitution (or even the Miranda rule, for that matter)
by mere failures to warn. For this reason, the
exclusionary rule . . . does not apply.
[U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004).]
5
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Ohio, Vermont, and Oregon courts have
interpreted their state constitutions to require the suppression of physical
evidence that is the "fruit" of a Miranda violation. See Commonwealth v.
Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 206-07 (Mass. 2005); State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899,
918 (Wisc. 2005); State v. Farris, 849 N.E.2d 985, 995-96 (Ohio 2006); State v.
Peterson, 923 A.2d 585, 593 (Vt. 2007); State v. Vondehn, 236 P.3d 691, 698-
700 (Or. 2010).
7 A-1244-18
In the absence of legislation or authoritative precedent, we believe it
unwise to exclude physical evidence as fruit of a Miranda violation, because
"[t]he Legislature, not the courts, is best suited to address such policy
arguments." Cnty. of Bergen Emp. Benefit Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue
Shield of N.J., 412 N.J. Super. 126, 139 (App. Div. 2010).
Turning to the issue of consent, defendant maintains that the motion judge
incorrectly deemed the search to be consensual, and that the circumstances that
produced his supposed consent were inherently coercive. The United States
Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution both guarantee the right of persons
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J.
Const. Art. 1 ¶ 7. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless,
among other exceptions, consent to the search is provided. State v. Bryant, 227
N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (quoting State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008)). "The
consent must be voluntarily given, and not the result of threat or coercion,
express or implied." State v. Speid, 255 N.J. Super. 398, 405 (1992). The
critical factor when considering voluntariness is "whether a defendant's will was
over-borne in a particular case." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226
(1973). "[I]f the individual has merely acquiesced in a show of authority, he [or
she] should not be found to have consented." U.S. v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507,
8 A-1244-18
524 (2nd Cir. 1980) (citing U.S. v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)).
"The burden of proof is on the State to establish by clear and positive testimony
that the consent was so given." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 618-19 (2019)
(quoting King, 44 N.J. at 352). Consent is generally a factual question,
determined by an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. State v.
Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 264 (1988). However, trial courts must adhere to
established legal principles in evaluating those circumstances.
In its seminal opinion on this subject in King, the Court articulated several
factors to guide courts in our state as to whether a person's supposed consent for
police to perform a warrantless search is voluntary. 44 N.J. at 352-53. As the
Court stated, these following five "King factors" weigh against voluntariness,
and tend to show that a person's consent was coerced:
(1) that consent was made by an individual already
arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial
of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the
accused had refused initial requests for consent to
search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent
search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the
accused must have known would be discovered; [and]
(5) that consent was given while the defendant was
handcuffed.
[Ibid. (citations omitted).]
9 A-1244-18
Additionally, the Court in King delineated three offsetting factors that can
weigh in favor of a finding of voluntariness. Those offsetting factors are: "(1)
that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police
would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his [or her] guilt
before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police
officers." Id. at 353 (citations omitted).
The Court in King explained that the "existence or absence of one or more
of the above factors is not determinative of the [voluntariness] issue." Ibid.
Because the factors "are only guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his
conclusion," a trial judge should determine the issue of voluntary consent by
considering "the totality of the particular circumstances of the case before him
[or her]." Ibid. Ultimately, the Court concluded in King, that "the trial judge is
in a better position to weigh the significance of the pertinent factors than is an
appellate tribunal." Ibid. More recently, in State v. Hagans, the Court reaffirmed
the continued applicability of the King factors but reminded us that they should
not be applied mechanically, and that, ultimately, the totality of circumstances
dictate the outcome. 233 N.J. 30, 42-43 (2018).
Here, the judge's decision upholding the search of defendant's car on
consent grounds recited the five King factors that tend to show coercion and
10 A-1244-18
involuntary conduct, as well as the three offsetting factors. Unfortunately, the
oral opinion did not apply those individual factors expressly to the facts in this
case. To be sure, the judge's opinion discusses the "totality of the
circumstances" conceptually. But the decision did not perform the requisite
factor-by-factor King analysis to guide the assessment of the circumstances that
led to defendant's consent. See R. 1:7-4(a) (mandating adequate statements of
reasons that support trial court rulings to enable future appellate review).
We are therefore constrained to remand this matter for the motion judge
to perform a complete factor-by-factor King analysis concerning defendant's
consent to search the vehicle. To assist in this endeavor, we note that several
(but not all) of the factors in the King analysis are clearly present or absent. As
to the five involuntariness factors, Erman conceded that King factor one
("consent was made by an individual already arrested" 44 N.J. at 352) is
established. Factor four ("consent was given where the subsequent search
resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would
be discovered") is also clearly present. Ibid. Indeed, that point is the very heart
of the State's case: that defendant knowingly possessed the drugs and firearm
that were found in the vehicle.
11 A-1244-18
The fifth King factor ("consent was given while the defendant was
handcuffed") is particularly relevant in this case. Id. at 353. Not only was
defendant in handcuffs when his consent to search the BMW was obtained, but
each of his adult family members were also in handcuffs in the next room. A
no-knock search warrant had been executed just moments before, during which
a SWAT team consisting of at least five officers entered defendant's home.
As to the offsetting King factors, we hold that offsetting factor one
("consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police
would find no contraband") is clearly absent. Ibid. The record establishes that
defendant had reason to know the drugs and firearm would be found.
The remaining positive and offsetting King factors are left to the motion
judge's careful reassessment. We do not forecast in advance what conclusions
the motion judge is likely to draw. If, on closer examination, the judge
concludes the King factors weigh against the State and the totality of
circumstances reflect involuntariness, the evidence from the BMW must be
suppressed and defendant's judgment of conviction shall be vacated, with the
State preserving its appellate rights from that ruling. Conversely, if the judge
finds the King factors weigh in the other direction and the totality of
circumstances indicate defendant's voluntary consent, the denial of the
12 A-1244-18
suppression motion shall be renewed, and defendant may bring a new appeal
from that post-remand decision. In the meantime, defendant's judgment of
conviction and sentence shall remain unaltered.
III.
Further, defendant argues that the three-and-a-half-year period of parole
ineligibility on his six-year sentence for distribution of heroin exceeded the
permissible statutory maximum. We agree. In cases where a parole disqualifier
is not mandated, the sentencing court may impose a mandatory minimum term
of up to one half the maximum term. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b). Second-degree
distribution of heroin does not require a mandatory minimum more than one-
half of the base term. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) to (2). Because defendant
was sentenced to six years' incarceration, the three-and-a-half-year parole
disqualifier is improper. The sentence must be vacated and modified on remand
to include no more than a three-year parole disqualifier on the distribution
conviction. The State does not oppose a remand to correct the sentencing error.
We reverse the September 26, 2016 order denying defendant's motion to
suppress and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
13 A-1244-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHAIS K. HILL (15-09-2161 AND 17-05-0968, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
Combined Opinion