Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
volumes go to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-CV-0324
GUANGSHA WANG, APPELLANT,
V.
1624 U STREET, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CAB-7009-19)
(Hon. Heidi M. Pasichow, Trial Judge)
(Submitted January 7, 2021 Decided June 24, 2020)
Guangsha Wang, pro se.
William D. Day was on the brief for appellees.
Before EASTERLY and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior Judge.
DEAHL, Associate Judge: Guangsha Wang owns a residential condominium
unit directly above Chi Cha Lounge, a bar operated by 1624 U Street, Inc. She sued
Chi Cha for negligence, private nuisance, and breach of a settlement agreement all
stemming from the bar’s “excessive noise,” which she claims caused tenants of her
condominium to break their lease and left her unable to find new tenants. The trial
2
court dismissed her suit for failure to state a claim. It reasoned her claims were
resolved in prior litigation so that res judicata (claim preclusion) and/or collateral
estoppel (issue preclusion) principles barred their relitigation. We disagree and
reverse the trial court’s dismissal order and remand the case.
I.
Guangsha Wang’s residential condominium unit sits directly above Chi Cha
Lounge, a bar located in the District. In October 2016, Chi Cha filed an application
seeking to renew its alcohol license and Wang filed a protest with the District of
Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. 1 In her protest, Wang argued that
renewal was not appropriate under D.C. Code § 25-313(b)(2) (2012 Repl.) because
of Chi Cha’s negative effect on “peace, order, and quiet,” owing to its non-
compliance with various noise regulations. 2
1
The Board has the authority to “[i]ssue, transfer, and renew licenses to
qualified applicants.” D.C. Code § 25-201(c)(3) (2012 Repl.). An abutting property
owner has standing to “protest the issuance or renewal of a license.” Id. § 25-
601(a)(1)(A); see also 23 D.C.M.R. § 1602.1 (2021).
2
“To qualify for . . . renewal of a license, . . . an applicant [must] demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the Board that the establishment is appropriate for the locality,
section, or portion of the District where it is . . . located.” D.C. Code § 25-313(a).
An establishment’s effect on “peace, order, and quiet, including the noise . . .
provisions set forth in []§ 22-725” is factored into this calculation. Id. § 25-
3
Wang and Chi Cha appeared to resolve their differences over renewal of the
alcohol license when they entered into a settlement agreement. Under the terms of
that agreement, Wang agreed to withdraw her protest if Chi Cha soundproofed
certain areas of its bar (per paragraph two of the settlement), 3 and if Chi Cha agreed
to “maintain an open line of communication with [Wang]” and “take reasonable
measures . . . to address . . . music emanation issue[s]” that Wang brought to its
attention (per paragraph six of the settlement). 4 Chi Cha later demonstrated to the
313(b)(2). In addition to its own noise rules, § 22-725(c) incorporates the noise level
requirements set forth in 20 D.C.M.R. §§ 2700 et seq. (2021).
3
Paragraph two of the settlement agreement states:
Chi Cha shall engage Lee Design & Interiors and Mr. John
Fiorito to fully perform all items specified in the attached
proposal from Lee Design & Interiors, specifically
proposal number 100351, taking all reasonable measure[s]
for . . . soundproofing the front area of Chi Cha Lounge.
4
Paragraph six of the settlement agreement states:
Chi Cha agrees to maintain an open line of communication
with [Wang] and will provide [her] with the contact
information of the Chi Cha management. Upon notice
from [Wang] to Chi Cha management of music emanating
from Chi Cha that may be heard in 1624 U Street, NW,
Unit 101, Washington, DC, Chi Cha management will be
permitted to verify that the noise emanation is from Chi
Cha lounge and may be heard in the aforementioned unit.
Upon such verification, Chi Cha management will take
reasonable measures, as determined by Chi Cha
4
Board’s satisfaction that it performed the required sound proofing work under
paragraph two of the settlement agreement, so the Board withdrew Wang’s protest
and renewed Chi Cha’s alcohol license. 5 Wang disagreed that Chi Cha had fulfilled
its end of the bargain and wanted her protest reinstated. She filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging Chi Cha did not perform its obligations under paragraph
two because it failed to provide her with proof that it had properly completed the
required sound mitigation work. The Board disagreed, reasoning that Chi Cha was
not required to provide her with evidence of its sound mitigation work; it was
required only to provide such proof to the Board, which it had done. Wang appealed,
but we affirmed the Board’s decision. Wang v. District of Columbia Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd., No. 18-AA-117, Mem. Op. & J. at 3–4 (D.C. Oct. 18, 2019).
Wang then filed a complaint in D.C. Superior Court, raising the following
claims against Chi Cha: (1) breach of paragraph two of the settlement agreement for
failure to provide proof of sound mitigation work; (2) breach of paragraph six of the
settlement agreement for failure to adequately respond to noise complaints raised by
management, on a case by case basis to address the music
emanation issue.
5
“If [the Board] determines that [a] settlement agreement complies with all
applicable laws and regulations and the applicant otherwise qualifies for licensure,
the Board shall approve the license application.” D.C. Code § 25-446(c).
5
Wang; (3) private nuisance; and (4) negligence. Chi Cha moved to dismiss under
Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Wang had released
all claims against Chi Cha via their settlement agreement and, in the alternative, the
action was barred by both res judicata and collateral estoppel. Opposing the motion,
Wang argued the settlement agreement and past litigation pertained “ONLY to the
protest against the liquor license,” and therefore did not restrict her “ability to pursue
further action against Chi-Cha Lounge . . . outside of the context of protesting the
liquor license.” The trial court disagreed and granted Chi Cha’s motion to dismiss.
It concluded the claims were barred by res judicata because the settlement agreement
“dealt with the same sound mitigation issue that [Wang] complains about in the
instant case.”
Wang then filed a combined motion to reconsider and motion to amend her
complaint. In her motion to reconsider, Wang conceded that she could not re-raise
the question whether Chi Cha breached paragraph two of the settlement agreement
by failing to provide her with proof of its sound mitigation efforts. But she reiterated
that she was not barred from raising breach of paragraph six of the settlement
agreement, negligence, and private nuisance, because those claims had never been
litigated. As for the motion to amend, Wang sought to add a claim for emotional
harm as well as additional damages for sound mitigation efforts she personally
6
undertook, and to remove her breach of contract claims. The trial court denied both
motions. It found Wang had not identified any mistake of law in its prior order
dismissing the matter and that any additional claims added via amendment would be
barred by res judicata, and thus futile, because Wang “had sufficient opportunity
before the . . . Board to litigate claims relating to noise from [Chi Cha].”
Wang now appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to dismiss her
complaint. Her appeal raises the same argument she made to the trial court: that her
claims (breach of paragraph six of the settlement agreement, negligence, and private
nuisance) have never been litigated and are thus not barred by res judicata. She
concedes, however, that she is barred from relitigating her claim that Chi Cha
breached paragraph two of the settlement agreement by failing to provide evidence
of its sound mitigation work.
II.
We review dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. Kovach v. District
of Columbia, 805 A.2d 957, 960 (D.C. 2002). We likewise review the “application
of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata” de novo. Whiting v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 230 A.3d 916, 926 (D.C. 2020). Applying each doctrine to the case at
7
hand, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and conclude that neither res judicata nor
collateral estoppel precludes Wang from litigating her claims.
A.
The doctrine of res judicata, sometimes referred to as claim preclusion,
prohibits “relitigation of the same claim between the same parties.” Calomiris v.
Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Elwell v. Elwell, 947 A.2d 1136,
1139–40 (D.C. 2008)). “In considering the applicability of the doctrine, our inquiry
focuses on the following questions: (1) whether the claim was adjudicated finally in
the first action; (2) whether the present claim is the same as the claim which was
raised or which might have been raised in the prior proceeding; and (3) whether the
party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the
prior case.” Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 870 (D.C. 1999). Because we answer
the second question in the negative, we conclude that Wang’s claims are not barred
by res judicata.
The trial court incorrectly found that “there [was] no dispute whether” the
claims raised in Wang’s complaint were “the same as the claim[s]” brought before
the Board. That was very much in dispute. Wang explicitly argued that the
proceeding before the Board involved claims that were entirely different from the
8
ones she raised in her civil complaint. She is right. An administrative protest to the
issuance of a license—even if grounded in a noise complaint—is not the same claim
as a civil action for private nuisance or negligence for many reasons, not the least of
which is that monetary damages are available in the civil suit alone. 6 And a
determination that Chi Cha did not breach paragraph two of the settlement agreement
says nothing about whether there was a breach of paragraph six. Contrary to the trial
court’s reasoning, Wang is not relitigating her protest of Chi Cha’s license renewal
application or the Board’s determination that Chi Cha performed sound mitigation
in accordance with paragraph two of the settlement agreement. Rather, she is raising
6
It is questionable whether private nuisance is an independent tort in the
District, as opposed to simply a theory of damages. Compare Ortberg v. Goldman
Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 165–68 (D.C. 2013) (expressing doubt over private
nuisance’s viability as a standalone tort, but nevertheless “assuming, without
deciding” that our court treats “a private nuisance claim as an independent tort rather
than as a type of damage”), with id. at 170–75 (McLeese, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Although I share the court’s view that our decisions addressing
the tort of private nuisance are far from clear, I would conclude that the better
reading of those decisions is that private nuisance exists as an independent tort.”).
As for Wang’s negligence claim, she seems to tie the claim to Chi Cha’s breach of
paragraph six of the settlement agreement. It is well established in the District that
a “tort must exist in its own right independent of the contract, and any duty upon
which the tort is based must flow from considerations other than the contractual
relationship.” Choharis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1089 (D.C.
2008). As far as we can tell, Wang’s negligence and contract claims are inextricably
intertwined and would thus run afoul of the rule espoused in Choharis. But the
viability of Wang’s private nuisance and negligence actions is not before us and was
not argued in Chi Cha’s motion to dismiss, so we say no more on the matter.
9
claims that arose out of Chi Cha’s alleged noise disturbances, including a breach of
contract claim that is based on Chi Cha’s failure to respond to noise complaints made
long after the Board proceedings had concluded. 7
Dismissal of those claims may nonetheless have been warranted—be it under
res judicata or as a contractual matter—had the settlement agreement precluded
Wang from pursuing civil actions against Chi Cha in exchange for its sound
mitigation work. But it did not. The release provision is singularly focused on
Wang’s ability to “protest” Chi Cha’s liquor license application. The release
provision states:
Dismissal of Protest in Perpetuity. Upon the full
completion of all work specified in the aforementioned
proposal, [Wang] agrees to the dismissal of her protest
against Chi Cha, agrees never to file another protest
against Chi Cha and waives all rights for any future
protests against Chi Cha. [Wang] agrees that the ABC
7
It may be that Wang should raise this claim with the Board in the first
instance, as it has its own process for handling licensees who fail to adhere to their
settlement agreements. See D.C. Code § 25-823(a)(6); D.C. Code § 25-446(e)
(“Upon a determination that a licensee has violated a settlement agreement, the
Board shall penalize the licensee according to the provisions set forth for violations
of a license in Chapter 8 of this title.”); D.C. Code § 25-446(c) (“[T]he settlement
agreement shall be enforceable by the Board.”). Typically, “[w]here a statute
provides an administrative forum to resolve disputes, the prescribed administrative
remedy must be exhausted before judicial relief may be sought.” Kovach, 805 A.2d
at 961. This argument, however, was neither the basis advanced for dismissal nor
the one adopted by the trial court.
10
Board is given full authority to dismiss this and any future
protests [Wang] or her successors and assigns may file
against Chi Cha Lounge upon the full completion of all
work specified in the aforementioned and attached
proposal. Full completion to be solely certified by Lee
Design and Interior. [Emphases added]
The provision, as its caption indicates, precludes only further protests with the
Board. Nowhere does it purport to preclude Wang from pursuing a civil action
against Chi Cha for damages caused by its alleged noise violations. Nor does it bar
Wang from bringing a breach of contract claim for failure to comply with paragraph
six of the settlement agreement, which requires Chi Cha to “take reasonable
measures” to respond to Wang’s noise complaints.
It is possible the trial court meant to say not that the claims were the same but
that the underlying “factual nucleus” was the same, so the actions Wang now raises
should have been brought together in one proceeding. Patton, 746 A.2d at 870.
After all, the doctrine of res judicata “operates to bar in the second action not only
claims which were actually raised in the first, but also those arising out of the same
transaction which could have been raised.” Id. But that nuance is of no help to Chi
Cha here.
For starters, Wang’s surviving breach of contract claim was not “ripe for
adjudication” until after the Board proceedings concluded in January 2018, Elwell,
11
947 A.2d at 1140, so it could not have been raised at the proceeding before the Board.
The factual basis for her claim that Chi Cha breached its obligations under paragraph
six of the settlement agreement stems from a letter she wrote to Chi Cha in March
2019—complaining of forty-six noise violations between March and May of 2018—
to which she contends Chi Cha was not responsive. That claim could not have been
brought during the Board proceedings—it post-dated them—and it therefore cannot
be barred by res judicata. See id. (“[T]he condition precedent to exercising [a
contractual right] had not been satisfied” so the claim was not “ripe for adjudication
at the time” and thus could not be barred by res judicata); Kovach, 805 A.2d at 961
(claim not barred by res judicata because “the challenged decision occurred five
months after [the first] adjudication and [thus] could not possibly have been raised”
in the prior adjudication).8
8
Wang suggests in her reply brief that she has a cause of action against Chi
Cha for its failure to comply with its sound mitigation obligations under paragraph
two of the settlement agreement because Chi Cha’s contractor was not properly
licensed in the District to perform the sound mitigation work. We do not consider
this argument for several reasons: (1) it was not alleged in Wang’s complaint; (2) it
was not raised before the trial court; and (3) it was not raised in Wang’s opening
brief. Even if it were properly raised, it would be barred by res judicata since Wang
could have raised the argument in the proceedings before the Board but did not do
so in a timely manner. See Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 618
(D.C. 1999) (“The doctrine bars relitigation ‘not only as to every ground of recovery
or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might
have been presented.’”) (quoting Cromwell v. Cty of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877))
(emphases omitted).
12
As for Wang’s negligence and private nuisance claims, while both seemingly
relate to Wang’s initial noise complaint submitted to the Board—and thus stem from
the same “factual nucleus” as the protest—Wang could not have brought them before
the Board either. Both claims are civil actions for monetary damages that a private
party is not permitted to raise before the Board. At most, Title 25 permits the Board
to impose civil penalties upon a licensee, see D.C. Code § 25-830, which are remitted
not to the protesting party, but to the General Fund of the District of Columbia, id. §
25-830(h). It is thus wrong to say Wang was afforded the opportunity to litigate
these claims before the Board and simply chose not to.
Nor could she have brought all of her claims in D.C. Superior Court in the
first instance. The existence of an administrative remedy—via challenging the
renewal application before the Board, D.C. Code § 25-601(a)(1)(A)—would have
prevented her from seeking an injunction to prohibit the Board from renewing Chi
Cha’s liquor license. See District of Columbia v. Grp. Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 20
(D.C. 1993) (“It is a well-established doctrine that where a statute provides an
administrative forum to resolve disputes, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dano Res. Recovery, Inc. v.
District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 485 (D.C. 1989)). In other words, there was
13
not a single forum that could have heard all of Wang’s claims. See Hurd v. District
of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Preclusion is designed to limit a
plaintiff to one bite at the apple, not to prevent even that single bite.”); see also
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (1982) (claim splitting is generally
permitted where “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or
to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”).
Chi Cha counters that its res judicata argument is supported by Molovinsky v.
Monterey Coop., Inc., 689 A.2d 531 (D.C. 1996), and in the trial court it additionally
stressed Osei-Kuffnor v. Argana, 618 A.2d 712 (D.C. 1993). Neither case is on
point. In both cases, the appellant first chose to litigate an action in small claims
court and then tried to bring a second action in D.C. Superior Court; we determined
each second action was barred by res judicata. Molovinsky, 689 A.2d at 533; Osei-
Kuffnor, 618 A.2d at 715. Unlike those cases, Wang did not choose to bring the
initial action at all and so she did not choose the forum. She merely responded to a
process (the liquor license protest process) in a forum (the Board) that Chi Cha
initiated. See Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 620 (D.C. 1999)
(noting appellant would not be claim precluded from recovering civil damages for
claims he could not pursue in an action brought by another party in landlord-tenant
14
court). And as previously noted, her surviving claims could not have been brought
in the Board proceedings in any event; the factual nucleus of one (breach of
paragraph six) had not yet arisen and the Board was not a forum where Wang could
have litigated her tort claims. See Hurd, 864 F.3d at 679 (noting inapplicability of
Osei-Kuffner and Molovinsky “where no damages whatsoever were available in the
first action”).
Because Wang’s surviving breach of contract claim, as well as her private
nuisance and negligence claims, were not raised—nor could they have been raised—
in the proceeding before the Board, res judicata does not bar Wang from raising them
now.
B.
“Even where res judicata is inapplicable, collateral estoppel”—otherwise
known as issue preclusion—“may bar relitigation of the issues determined in a prior
action.” Patton, 746 A.2d at 870. At the outset, we note that it is unclear whether
the trial court dismissed Wang’s suit purely on res judicata grounds or whether it
also found collateral estoppel barred her from relitigating issues necessary to
maintaining her claims. The court seemed to conflate the two doctrines—referring
to collateral estoppel as just another term for res judicata—without distinguishing
15
between the two. Because it is unclear whether the trial court thought collateral
estoppel also barred Wang’s claims, we think it prudent to explain why it does not.
Collateral estoppel “renders conclusive in the same or a subsequent action
determination of an issue of fact or law when (1) the issue is actually litigated and
(2) determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair
opportunity for litigation by the parties or their privies; (4) under circumstances
where the determination was essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum.”
Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Holle,
573 A.2d 1269, 1283 (D.C. 1990)). Wang is not collaterally estopped from
relitigating any issues necessary to maintaining her claims. Any argument to the
contrary falters at the first two steps of the test set forth above: none of the issues
underlying her current claims was previously resolved via litigation between the
parties.
We begin with Wang’s surviving breach of contract claim under paragraph
six. As part of its obligations under the settlement agreement, Chi Cha agreed to
“take reasonable measures . . . on a case by case basis to address . . . music emanation
issues[s]” brought to its attention by Wang. Wang alleged in her complaint, as well
as in her opposition to Chi Cha’s motion to dismiss, that Chi Cha failed to comply
16
with this provision of the settlement. This claim was not part of the proceeding
before the Board, and understandably so given that this particular breach had yet to
occur. Since it was never addressed by the Board, the essential issue of whether Chi
Cha failed to perform its obligations under paragraph six of the settlement agreement
has never been litigated. Accordingly, it cannot be barred under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. 9
As for Wang’s private nuisance and negligence claims, the Board did not
decide any disputed issues relating to those claims that might be given preclusive
effect against Wang. Perhaps it would have had the matter proceeded to a full
hearing and the Board had to confront the dispute between the parties about whether
Chi Cha’s noise levels adversely impacted Wang. See D.C. Code § 25-313(b)(2).
But it did not confront that issue because the parties settled their dispute before the
Board had any opportunity to adjudicate it.
The decision to settle is crucial to our analysis. As we emphasized recently,
“settlement agreements ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion” unless the parties
9
While we conclude that Wang’s surviving breach of contract claim is not
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel principles, we do not opine on whether
any of Wang’s claims are otherwise viable under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
17
so intended. Whiting, 230 A.3d at 926 (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
414 (2000)) (brackets and emphasis omitted). In other words, where a settlement
agreement is involved, the question is “whether by their agreement the parties not
only intended to terminate the litigation of claims but also intended to determine
finally the issues . . . presented.” Whiting, 230 A.3d at 926 n.16 (quoting United
States v. Spicer, 155 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993)). The parties expressed
no such intention in the settlement agreement. Nowhere in the four corners of the
settlement does it state the parties agreed that Chi Cha’s noise levels were
permissible. If anything, the settlement agreement evidences Chi Cha’s
acknowledgement that its noise levels were too high given its agreement to perform
sound mitigation work. Chi Cha presents no argument to the contrary. In fact, it
appears to have abandoned its argument on appeal that Wang’s claims were barred
by collateral estoppel, opting instead to rely solely on the doctrine of res judicata.
We thus conclude that Wang’s private nuisance and negligence actions are not
barred by collateral estoppel.10
10
Wang does not argue the trial court should have granted her motion to
amend, so we do not address that question. Her attempt to amend came in the wake
of the trial court’s dismissal order and—in light of our vacatur of that order—she
may no longer wish to drop her claim that Chi Cha breached paragraph six of their
settlement agreement. Finally, because we conclude the trial court erred in
dismissing Wang’s complaint, we do not address the trial court’s denial of her
motion for reconsideration.
18
III.
The Superior Court’s dismissal order is vacated and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.