NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-10240
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:05-cr-00324-MMC-2
v.
DENNIS CYRUS, Jr., AKA Daddy-O, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 21, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Dennis Cyrus, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s orders denying his
motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act and motion
for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
As an initial matter, the government is correct that Cyrus’s notice of appeal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
was untimely as to the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence
reduction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b); United States v. Lefler, 880 F.2d 233, 234-35
(9th Cir. 1989) (time to appeal is tolled only if motion for reconsideration is
timely). However, even assuming Cyrus’s appeal were timely as to both of the
district court’s orders, he is not entitled to relief. Contrary to Cyrus’s argument,
the district court was not required to reduce his sentence simply because he was
eligible for a reduction. See First Step Act § 404(c) (“Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”);
United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 2020). In light of the
seriousness of Cyrus’s criminal conduct, the court properly exercised its discretion
to deny a reduction. See Kelley, 962 F.3d at 472. Moreover, Cyrus is incorrect
that his eligibility for a sentence reduction on one of the counts of conviction
entitled him to a plenary resentencing on all of the counts of conviction. See id. at
477-78 (the First Step Act, which “plainly indicates that Congress intended to limit
courts engaging in resentencing to considering a single changed variable,” does not
authorize a plenary resentencing).
AFFIRMED.
2 20-10240