In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-21-00035-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF B.J.H.
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On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-237,173
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.J. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
B.J.H. 1 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds
exist for termination of I.J.’s parental rights, and termination of rights was in B.J.H.’s
best interest. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). I.J.’s
court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel asserts there
are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386
1
To protect the minor’s identity, we use initials for the child and her mother.
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights, but he is not a party
to this appeal.
1
U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no
pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel
certified I.J. was served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on her behalf. This
Court notified I.J. of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline for
filing the response. This Court did not receive a pro se response from I.J. We have
independently reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any
appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new
counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating I.J.’s parental rights.
We deny the motion to withdraw filed by her court-appointed appellate counsel,
because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.
2016). In the event I.J. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas,
counsel’s obligations to I.J. can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies
the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
AFFIRMED.
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CHARLES KREGER
Justice
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Submitted on June 1, 2021
Opinion Delivered June 24, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
3