NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL ANGEL RAMIREZ, Nos. 19-72784
20-73088
Petitioner,
Agency No. A097-764-017
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM*
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted June 9, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Angel Ramirez, a citizen and native of El Salvador, petitions for
review of two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s denial of his application for deferral of removal under
the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),
and we deny the petition.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1. Before the agency, Ramirez claimed that he would be tortured if
returned to El Salvador “because of his status as a deportee with a criminal record
and previous gang affiliation,” which would subject him to the registration and
reporting requirements of the Salvadoran government’s Decree 717, thereby
placing him at risk of harm. He was therefore required to establish that each “step
in this hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to happen” and “that the
entire chain will come together to result in the probability of torture.” Medina-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 979 F.3d 738, 751 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re J-F-F, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 912, 917–18 (A.G. 2006)).
Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s finding that, even if
Ramirez were “required to register or follow the preventative measures under
Decree No. 717, he has not established that it is more likely than not that he will be
harmed by either government forces or government-linked death squads.” As the
immigration judge observed, “the record evidence does not show that the
Salvadoran government is using the reporting requirements to arrest, detain, or
harm persons suspected to be affiliated with gangs,” or that the government is
sharing registry data with death squads. And the fact that security forces killed
more than 1,000 suspected gang members in 2017 does not establish that Ramirez
is more likely than not to be tortured, considering that “there are an estimated
60,000 gang members in El Salvador.” The immigration judge also explained why
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he found the testimony of Dr. Hallett insufficient, and he was not required to
accept her contrary opinion. See Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 706 n.7
(9th Cir. 2010).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that the
Salvadoran government would not acquiesce in any torture by gangs. See Del Cid
Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). The
immigration judge discussed the record evidence of ongoing gang violence but
found that the Salvadoran government is acting to combat it. Even if some
evidence supports Ramirez’s claim that the Salvadoran government is willfully
blind to gang violence, the record does not compel that conclusion. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Nor do we see any basis to doubt the immigration judge’s
“general statement that he considered all the evidence before him.” Almaghzar v.
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. Finally, the agency considered both the specific and aggregate risk of
torture from each claimed source. Cf. Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303,
1308 (9th Cir. 2015). And substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion
that, based on “all of the evidence in the record,” Ramirez failed to carry his
burden. Cf. Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2018).
PETITION DENIED.
The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 1-4 (20-73088), is DENIED as moot.
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