NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AYNA AMANDA MEPPELINK, No. 20-35667
Plaintiff-counter- D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05655-RJB
defendant-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SELENE FINANCE, LP,
Defendant-Appellee,
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND
SOCIETY, FSB, trustee for Pretium
Mortgage Acquisition Trust,
Defendant-counter-claimant-
Appellee,
and
HIDDEN ACRES HOMEOWNER’S
ASSOCIATION; OCCUPANTS OF THE
PREMISES,
Counter-defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted June 21, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Ayna Amanda Meppelink appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
on defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB’s counter claim seeking
judicial foreclosure on Meppelink’s home. Because the district court certified its
interlocutory order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the grant of partial
summary judgment. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
We affirm.
The district court properly granted partial summary judgment on
Wilmington’s counterclaim because under Washington law, Wilmington is the
holder of Meppelink’s promissory note and entitled to enforce it by commencing a
judicial foreclosure. See Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.1-201 (21)(A) (defining a holder
with respect to a negotiable instrument); Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Slotke, 367
P.3d 600, 601, 604 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that “the holder of a promissory
note secured by a deed of trust has authority to elect to commence a judicial
foreclosure of that deed of trust[;]” provisions of the Deed of Trust Act relating to
nonjudicial foreclosures of a deed of trust have “no bearing on a judicial
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 20-35667
foreclosure of a deed of trust because such a foreclosure, as the statutes make clear,
is controlled by the law of mortgages”); see also Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
285 P.3d 34, 38-39, 42-44 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (requirements for judicial
foreclosure).
Contrary to Meppelink’s contention, the district court’s entry of partial
judgment under Rule 54(b) did not create an inappropriately piecemeal litigation.
See Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth
standard of review and criteria for Rule 54(b) certification).
We lack jurisdiction to consider claims other than those certified in the
district court’s Rule 54(b) order. See Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880
F.2d 176, 179 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (no appellate jurisdiction exists over claims the
district court did not include it is Rule 54(b) order).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as without merit Meppelink’s contentions that the district court
ignored state court rulings, was biased against her, or showed favoritism towards
the defendants.
AFFIRMED.
3 20-35667
Ayna Meppelink v. Selene Finance, Lp
Combined Opinion