NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0737-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH AMOOP,
a/k/a JOESPH AMOOP,
JOSEPH MICHAEL ANOOP,
and JOSEPH M. ANOOP,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted June 9, 2021 – Decided June 30, 2021
Before Judges Fuentes and Whipple.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 08-06-1948.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew P. Slowinski, Designated Counsel,
on the briefs).
Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Kevin J. Hein, Special Deputy
Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Joseph Amoop appeals the June 19, 2018 denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was
convicted of first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3), and other
offenses 1 for an October 2013 murder following a botched drug deal in Camden.
We affirm.
At trial, the State's case in chief relied exclusively on the testimony of
Desmond McMoore, a co-defendant in this case, who testified defendant shot
the victim multiple times. According to McMoore, after the victim died,
defendant robbed the victim and two other bystanders waiting in line to buy
drugs. Defendant was sentenced on January 10, 2014, to life in prison subject
to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, to which he filed a direct
1
After a jury trial, defendant was also found guilty of first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; first-degree conspiracy to commit murder or robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). On January 10, 2014, defendant was sentenced to life in
prison for felony murder, to run consecutive to his existing sentence in
Pennsylvania, but concurrent to a five-year sentence for unlawful possession of
a handgun under count six. The robbery, conspiracy, and unlawful purpose
counts merged into the felony murder count.
2 A-0737-18
appeal. On July 7, 2016, we affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. State
v. Amoop, No. A-3837-13 (App. Div. July 7, 2016) (slip op. at 1).
In July 2017, defendant filed a timely pro se petition for PCR. In that
petition, defendant asserted multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of
counsel for various reasons, prosecutorial misconduct, and newly discovered
evidence. On June 19, 2018, the PCR court rejected all of defendant's claims
and denied his petition for PCR.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal in October 2018, contending, among
other things, that neither his PCR counsel nor the PCR court addressed his
assertion about newly discovered evidence from a witness, Jose Lopez. In a
two-page handwritten document, dated November 20, 2013, Lopez attested that
McMoore confessed to killing the victim. In January 2020, we ordered a limited
remand to allow the PCR court to address defendant's newly discovered
evidence claim.
In July 2020, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate the newly discovered evidence. The PCR court rejected
his claim because the Lopez document was not sufficiently authenticated; it
failed to comply with the New Jersey Court Rules; and no one could attest to its
veracity. Additionally, the PCR court also denied defendant's petition because
3 A-0737-18
he failed to make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: THE PCR COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD
THAT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED
BASED ON TRIAL AND PCR COUNSEL'S
INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION, INCLUDING A
FAILURE TO CONDUCT A REASONABLE
INVESTIGATION. ([U.S. Const., amend. IV, amend.
VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10])
(a) Defendant Is Entitled to Relief Under
Controlling Legal Principles Governing
Petitions for [PCR] Pursuant to R[ule]
3:22-2 et seq.
(b) Trial and PCR Counsel's Failure to
Investigate Renders Their Representation
of Defendant Ineffective as a Matter of
Law Requiring a Remand for a New PCR
Proceeding.
(c) The PCR Court Erred by Failing to
Address the Claims Raised by the Affidavit
of Jose Lopez.
POINT II: THE PCR COURT ERRED IN
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS
ATTORNEY PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE AT TRIAL IN COMMENTING ON A
NON-EXISTENT EYEWITNESS AND IN FAILING
TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER
CLOSING STATEMENT.
4 A-0737-18
POINT III: THE PCR COURT ERRED IN
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS
ATTORNEY FAILED TO PRESENT AN ALIBI
WITNESSS IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE AT
TRIAL.
POINT IV: THE PCR COURT ERRED BY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
We defer to the PCR court's factual findings on a PCR petition when
supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. State v. Harris, 181
N.J. 391, 415 (2004). The PCR court's legal conclusions, however, receive no
deference, and we review those determinations de novo. Ibid. (citing Toll Bros.,
Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)). Reviewing this appeal
under those standards, we discern no reason to disturb the court's factual
findings and legal conclusions.
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the standard
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland. 466 U.S. at
687. New Jersey subsequently adopted the standard enumerated in Strickland.
State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To meet the standard under
Strickland/Fritz, the defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) that defense
counsel's performance was deficient, and he or she made errors that were so
egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the
5 A-0737-18
Sixth Amendment; and (2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. Unless the
defendant can satisfy both prongs, a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
is fruitless. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Under the first prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel's
assistance was adequate, and he or she "made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgement." Id. at 690. Therefore, the court
must determine whether counsel's conduct, whether it be by act or omission, was
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Ibid. In other
words, ineffective assistance of counsel requires the showing "that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687.
Under the second prong, Strickland requires that the defendant prove that
he was actually prejudiced by defense counsel's deficient performance. Ibid.;
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. This prong is satisfied when the defendant can show that
there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Ibid. Therefore, to satisfy the second prong of the
6 A-0737-18
Strickland standard, the defendant must affirmatively prove sufficient prejudice.
Ibid.
Finally, an evidentiary hearing to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel should not be granted unless the defendant demonstrates a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing under the Strickland/Fritz standard. State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court must conclude that
defendant has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that his
counsel's performance was deficient because counsel did not act as a reasonably
competent attorney and that he was prejudiced at trial by that deficient conduct.
Id. at 463; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.
Here, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective due to a
failure to investigate the facts set forth in the document that Jose Lopez allegedly
wrote. However, defendant did not show that his counsel was ineffective under
prong one of the Strickland standard because he has not supported the veracity
of the Lopez document and has merely made vague, conclusory, and speculative
allegations. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997); see also State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (1999) (reasoning that defendant "must do
more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel.").
7 A-0737-18
Even if defendant had demonstrated prong one, he did not establish the
second prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard. Under prong two, the defendant
must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694.
Here, the jury acquitted defendant of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1) or (2). However, the jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). Because the jury found that defendant was guilty of
felony murder, if McMoore, rather than defendant, had murdered the victim,
defendant would still be guilty of felony murder. Defendant's additional
arguments are accordingly without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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