FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 30 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS RADCLIFFE, No. 20-16349
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:19-cv-01699-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA;
ALEXANDER CHYORNY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 21, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Carlos Radcliffe appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his pretrial
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
detention at the Santa Clara County Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir.
2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Radcliffe’s federal
claims because Radcliffe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether he properly exhausted his available administrative remedies as required by
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, or whether administrative remedies were
effectively unavailable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015)
(Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of
administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and
doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who
does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something
particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative
remedies effectively unavailable to him”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Radcliffe’s state
law claims because Radcliffe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether he complied with, or was excused from, the claim-presentment
requirements of California’s Government Claims Act (“GCA”). See Cal. Gov’t
2 20-16349
Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4; Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 74, 79 (Ct. App. 1999) (GCA applies to all actions seeking monetary
relief).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 20-16349