UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-6155
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD DUBLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (1:03-cr-00834-MBS-1)
Submitted: June 8, 2021 Decided: July 16, 2021
Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard Dublin, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Dublin appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed
pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“the Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration in light of
United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v.
Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021).
In Chambers, we held that, “when imposing a new sentence” under the Act, “a court
does not simply adjust the statutory minimum; it must also recalculate the [Sentencing]
Guidelines range.” 956 F.3d at 672 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “any
Guidelines error deemed retroactive . . . must be corrected in a First Step Act
resentencing.” Id. at 668. We also held that “the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors
apply in the § 404(b) resentencing context,” and a court “may consider post-sentencing
conduct” in determining whether to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence. Id. at 674.
Additionally, the Act “does not constrain courts from recognizing Guidelines errors,” id.
at 668, or “preclude the court from applying intervening case law,” id. at 672, in making
its discretionary determination.
Here, the district court’s sole stated reason for denying Dublin’s motion was that
Dublin’s offense level was determined by virtue of the murder cross-reference and, thus,
the Fair Sentencing Act statutory penalties had no impact on Dublin’s Guidelines range.
But the district court failed to acknowledge Dublin’s argument that a lower statutory range
now applied to his conviction. And while the district court summarily indicated that it
considered the § 3553(a) factors, the court did not address Dublin’s arguments that his
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postsentencing mitigation efforts, minor disciplinary infractions, and positive letters of
reference justified a sentence below life in prison.
In Collington, we clarified three steps a district court must take when considering a
request for relief under Section 404: (1) “district courts must accurately recalculate the
Guidelines sentence range,” (2) “district courts must correct original Guidelines errors and
apply intervening case law made retroactive to the original sentence,” and (3) “the court
must consider the § 3553(a) factors to determine what sentence is appropriate.” 995 F.3d
at 355. We further explained that “when a court exercises discretion to reduce a sentence,
the imposition of the reduced sentence must be procedurally and substantively reasonable.”
Id. at 358. Thus, a district court must “consider a defendant’s arguments, give individual
consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors,
determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains
appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.” Id. at 360.
Because the district court did not have the benefit of our decisions in Chambers and
Collington, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration. By this
disposition, we express no view on the ultimate merits of Dublin’s motion. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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