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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14045
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:94-cr-14098-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHNNY LEE LEONARD,
a.k.a. Crow,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 21, 2021)
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Johnny Lee Leonard, a federal inmate serving a life sentence of
imprisonment, appeals the district court’s partial denial, on remand, of his motion
for a total sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and section 404 of
the First Step Act of 2018, after we vacated the district court’s earlier denial of the
same motion.1 After careful review, we affirm.
In 1994, a federal grand jury charged Leonard with conspiracy to distribute a
detectable amount of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1);
distributing a detectable amount of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (Counts 2 and 3); employing a minor in the distribution of a detectable
amount of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 861 (Count 4);
and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (Count 5). The government filed a § 851 enhancement notice and
attached records of four prior felony drug convictions. At trial, a jury convicted
Leonard on all counts.
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) described the offense conduct
and noted that law enforcement conducted four controlled purchases of crack
cocaine from Leonard and his son. On one occasion, Leonard and his son were
1
United States v. Leonard, 827 F. App’x 993 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). There, we vacated
and remanded the case, holding that the district court’s orders left unclear whether it understood
the extent of its authority to resentence Leonard under the First Step Act. Id. at 996.
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assisted by two other individuals, one of whom was a juvenile. In the sale charged
in Count 2, an undercover officer purchased 5.6 grams of crack cocaine from
Leonard and his son. In the sale charged in Counts 3 and 4, Leonard sold 39.5
grams of crack cocaine to an undercover officer with the assistance of his minor
daughter, who was 15 years old at the time of her involvement. At the time of
Leonard’s arrest, law enforcement found him in possession of 85.4 grams of crack
cocaine, as charged in Count 5. The PSI stated that the total amount of crack
cocaine seized was 131.5 grams.
The PSI assigned a base offense level of 33 because Leonard’s distribution
offenses included between 50 and 150 grams of crack cocaine. It added a 4-level
enhancement because Leonard was the leader and organizer of an offense
involving at least 5 people, for an adjusted offense level of 37. The PSI noted that
Leonard was a career offender because he had at least 2 prior felony convictions
for controlled-substance offenses, which meant that, pursuant to U.S.S.G § 4B1.1,
his offense level would be reset to 37, even if his offense level had not already
been 37.
The PSI reported that Leonard had several state convictions. Leonard’s
criminal history category was VI, based on a total criminal history score of 14 and
his career-offender status. The PSI found that, based on his total offense level of
37 and a criminal history category of VI, his guideline term of imprisonment
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would have been 360 months to life. However, the PSI noted that the statutory
imprisonment range for Counts 1 and 5 was life, pursuant to the enhanced penalties
prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); 10 years to life for Counts 2 and 3,
pursuant to the enhanced penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); and 5 to 80 years
for Count 4, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 861(b). Due to the
mandatory minimum life sentences for Counts 1 and 5 respectively, his guideline
range ended up being life imprisonment.
At Leonard’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the findings in
the PSI and sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment as to each of
Counts 1–3 and 5, and 80 years as to Count 4. The district court also imposed
concurrent supervised release terms of 10 years as to Counts 1 and 5, and 8 years
as to Counts 2–4. Leonard appealed, but we affirmed his convictions and
sentences. United States v. Leonard, 116 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1997) (mem.).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act. Leonard filed a pro se request
for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act in 2019. The district court
denied Leonard’s motion, finding that his statutory range as to Counts 1, 3, and 5
would still include an enhanced maximum penalty of life imprisonment based on a
finding of over 28 grams of crack cocaine, and thus, his guideline range as a career
offender would remain the same. The district court found that Leonard’s
mandatory life sentences for Counts 1 and 5 were not affected by the First Step
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Act. It stated that his guideline sentence for Count 3 would remain life
imprisonment. However, the district court found that the maximum penalty for
Count 2 would be reduced to 30 years, as only 5.6 grams of crack cocaine were
involved. Thus, it denied Leonard’s motion in part as to Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, but
granted it in part as to Count 2 and reduced that sentence to 360 months in prison,
followed by 6 years of supervised release. The district court entered an amended
judgment on March 28, 2019, stating that Leonard’s life sentences remained on
Counts 1, 3, and 5.
In April 2019, the district court issued an order clarifying that the life
sentences for Counts 1 and 5 are “no longer mandatory.” The district court’s order
remained otherwise unchanged. Leonard moved for reconsideration, but the
district court denied the motion.
On appeal, we vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case.
United States v. Leonard, 827 F. App’x 993 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). We
held that Leonard was eligible for a reduction, and that “it [was] not clear from any
of the district court’s orders whether the district court understood the extent of its
authority to resentence Leonard under the First Step Act.” Id. at 996. Further, we
noted that the district court “focused only on guideline ranges” and “gave no
discernable analysis of Leonard’s eligibility or its authority to reduce Leonard’s
sentences under the First Step Act.” Id. As a result, it was ambiguous whether the
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court was exercising discretion. Id. We vacated and remanded for the district
court to “reconsider Leonard’s motion with a full understanding of its authority
under the First Step Act.” Id.
On remand, the district court again denied Leonard’s motion as to Counts 1,
3, 4, and 5. The district court stated in its order that it had considered the
sentencing guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, and that “the same life sentence
[was] necessary to promote respect for the law and act as a deterrent.” The court
noted that Leonard had used his son and daughter to facilitate the crimes, and that
he had multiple state court convictions. Although the court recognized several
mitigating factors—including Leonard’s good behavior in prison, his family
support, and his age—the court found that “the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors.” Accordingly, the court denied Leonard’s request for a
sentence reduction as to Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, noting that it had already reduced
his Count 2 sentence. Again, Leonard appealed.
Leonard makes two arguments, which we will consider in turn. First, he
argues that the First Step Act required the district court to consider each of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in order to properly exercise its discretion in
ruling on his motion for a total sentence reduction, and that by failing to do so, it
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abused its discretion and imposed a procedurally unreasonable total sentence.2
Second, he asserts that his total sentence was substantively unreasonable because
the district court gave excessive weight to his criminal history, at the expense of
adequately considering his rehabilitation and the intervening changes to the
sentencing regime since he was sentenced in 1995. For the reasons that follow, we
find neither argument persuasive.
We begin with Leonard’s argument that the district court erred by failing to
consider each of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Generally, we review de novo
whether a district court had the authority to modify a prison term. United States v.
Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-6841 (U.S. May
17, 2021) (mem.). District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term of
imprisonment, but they may do so to the extent that a statute expressly permits. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act to give district courts the
discretion “to apply retroactively the reduced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine
offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to movants sentenced before those
2
Leonard also contends, for the first time in his reply brief, that the district court erred by
disregarding certain arguments concerning his rehabilitation, and thus failing to set forth the
reasons for its decision in a manner sufficient to enable appellate review. He also requests, on
various grounds, that his case be reassigned to a different district judge on remand. Because he
did not properly raise the first argument, we decline to consider it. See United States v. Chalker,
966 F.3d 1177, 1195 n.8. Further, because we hold that the remaining issues raised on appeal
lack merit, the issue of reassignment is moot.
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penalties became effective.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1293. Section 404 of the First
Step Act authorizes a district court “that imposed a sentence for a covered offense”
to reduce a defendant’s sentence. First Step Act § 404(b). A “covered offense”
refers to a “violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id. § 404(a).
The First Step Act permits a district court to “impose a reduced sentence as if” the
Fair Sentencing Act had been “in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.” Id. § 404(b). The First Step Act leaves to the district court’s
discretion whether to reduce a sentence for an eligible defendant, stating that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any
sentence pursuant to this section.” Id. § 404(c).
In United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2021), we addressed
what is required of a district court when exercising its discretion under the First
Step Act. We noted that, at a minimum, a district court must adequately explain its
sentencing decision to allow for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 1317 (citing
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007)). Specifically, the district court
must show that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority. Id. Importantly, we stated
that a district court is not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors when
exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under section 404 of the First Step
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Act, although doing so may be a “best practice.” Id. at 1316, 1318; see also United
States v. Potts, 997 F.3d 1142, 1145 (11th Cir. 2021).
Our decision in Stevens forecloses Leonard’s argument that the district court
was required to consider the § 3553(a) factors when considering his motion for
sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act. Under Stevens, the
district court explained its decision in terms adequate to enable appellate review.
See 997 F.3d at 1317. It considered the § 3553(a) factors despite not being
required to, it considered Leonard’s guideline range, and it noted the aggravating
and mitigating factors it took into account. This explanation was sufficient to
establish a reasoned basis for the court’s decision.
We turn next to Leonard’s argument that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court gave excessive weight to his criminal
history. When appropriate, we will review the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence using a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant
factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering proper
factors. Id. at 1189. The weight a district court accords to the § 3553(a) factors
lies within the district court’s sound discretion, and we will not substitute our
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judgment for that of the district court. United States v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251,
1266 (11th Cir. 2020). And although we do not presume a sentence within the
advisory guideline range to be reasonable, “we ordinarily expect such a sentence to
be reasonable.” Id.
Here, because Leonard’s sentence is within the guideline range, we expect it
to be reasonable. Leonard argues that the district court neglected to adequately
consider two specific factors: (1) his rehabilitation and (2) the changes to the
sentencing regime since his original sentencing. Yet the court acknowledged
Leonard’s rehabilitation and other mitigating factors; it simply found that they
were outweighed by his criminal record and the nature of the offense. That
decision was within the court’s sound discretion. See id. As for the changes to the
sentencing regime, although Leonard disagrees with the district court’s decision
that a total life sentence was still necessary to promote respect for the law and
serve as a deterrent, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the district
court. See id. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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