[Cite as State v. Clark, 2021-Ohio-2531.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-1
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-288
:
WILLIAM H. CLARK : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2021.
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R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0020615, Prosecuting Attorney, Darke County
Prosecutor’s Office, 504 South Broadway, Greenville, Ohio 45331
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
WILLIAM H. CLARK, #A713-258, P.O. Box 5500 Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se
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EPLEY, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William H. Clark appeals from a judgment of the Darke
County Court of Common Pleas, which overruled his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
without a hearing. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In November 2014, Clark was indicted on 11 counts of rape of a person less
than 13 years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The charges stemmed from
allegations that Clark had sexually abused his minor stepdaughter from July 2011 until
August 2014 at various residences in and around Greenville.
{¶ 3} In February 2015, Clark agreed to enter an Alford guilty plea, and in
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss six rape counts and amend the other five to sexual
battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A). As part of the plea, the parties agreed to a jointly-
recommended sentence of 25 years in prison. It was also agreed that Clark would be
designated as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, the court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy and
accepted Clark’s Alford plea to the five counts of sexual battery, finding that his plea was
entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion. The trial court proceeded directly
to disposition and imposed the agreed-upon mandatory 25-year sentence.
{¶ 5} Clark did not file a direct appeal; instead, he filed a series of post-conviction
motions. In August 2015, he filed a pro se motion for a new trial despite not having a trial.
Clark claimed that he had discovered, through correspondence with his wife, that the
victim had recanted her story. Further, he alleged that the State became aware of this
information before trial, but neither he nor his counsel was made aware of it. In the
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alternative, Clark requested that the court review his motion for a new trial as a post-
conviction relief petition under R.C. 2953.21(A).
{¶ 6} The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that a motion
for a new trial was improper when there was, in fact, no trial. It did not address Clark’s
post-conviction alternative. Clark appealed, and we remanded for the trial court to review
the motion as a post-conviction relief petition under R.C. 2953.21 and to issue a ruling on
the petition in accordance with Crim.R. 35. State v. Clark, 2017-Ohio-120, 80 N.E.3d 1251
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} Clark moved for the appointment of counsel to assist him in his post-
conviction pursuit. His request was granted, and new counsel filed several motions,
including a request that the State provide copies of all discovery turned over to Clark’s
original trial counsel. The State complied, and afterward, counsel filed a supplement to
Clark’s original pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Ultimately, the trial court denied
the petition, and Clark again appealed to this court. We affirmed the trial courts judgment
and held that Clark was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel and that his
claim was barred by res judicata. State v. Clark, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2017-CA-14, 2018-
Ohio-4042.
{¶ 8} In June 2020, Clark filed a motion with the trial court to withdraw his guilty
plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, alleging newly discovered evidence. Clark claims that he
became aware of medical records in May 2020 that were “not included in the original
discovery package.” These records, Clark averred, contradicted statements made by the
victim, and had he known about them at the time, he would not have pled guilty. In fact,
he declared that the documents proved his actual innocence.
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{¶ 9} In response, the State asserted that all the documents were turned over to
defense counsel in 2015 prior to Clark’s plea. Clark insisted, however, that his original
trial counsel “withheld this valuable and vital information” from him. To settle the
discrepancy, the trial court ordered that counsel provide “copies of any communications
or other writings which describe or identify which documents and tangible evidence were
provided to the Defendant. Copies of the documents and tangible evidence shall also be
provided.” The items were disclosed under seal.
{¶ 10} In December 2020, the trial court denied Clark’s motion to withdraw his plea.
It found that the motion was “both untimely and an impermissible use of Criminal Rule
32.1,” and therefore considered Clark’s motion “as one for post-conviction relief pursuant
to R.C. 2953.21.” The court concluded that there was not any newly discovered evidence
and that Clark had “failed to establish any manifest injustice in [his] conviction.”
{¶ 11} Clark has filed a timely appeal.
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and counsel was not
ineffective
{¶ 12} Clark now argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
“recharacterized or converted” his motion to withdraw his plea into a post-conviction relief
petition. He also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to inform
him about favorable evidence, making his plea less than knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.
{¶ 13} Crim.R. 32.1 states that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct a manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant
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to withdraw his or her plea.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a pre-sentence
motion to withdraw a plea “should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).
{¶ 14} Post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, on the other hand, may
only be made to correct a manifest injustice. Crim.R. 32.1. “Manifest injustice relates to
some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or is
inconsistent with the demands of due process.” State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
03AP-1214, 2004-Ohio-6123, ¶ 5. “Under the standard of manifest injustice, a
postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Day,
2d Dist. Greene No. 2015-CA-15, 2016-Ohio-36, ¶ 18. The moving party has the burden
of showing manifest injustice. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977),
paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 15} Appellate courts review motions to withdraw guilty plea decisions for abuse
of discretion. State v. Rozell, 2018-Ohio-1722, 111 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.). Abuse of
discretion has been defined as an attitude that is “unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “It is to be expected that most
instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,
rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. “A decision is
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id.
{¶ 16} While Crim.R. 32.1 does not set out a time limitation to file a motion to
withdraw, some courts have recognized one. The Third District, for example, has held
that “a trial court has no authority to even consider a motion to withdraw a plea after a
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conviction has been affirmed on appeal; or if there was no appeal, after the time for filing
the original appeal has passed.” State v. Carter, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-36, 2011-Ohio-
6104, ¶ 11. See also State v. Caston, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-077, 2012-Ohio-5260.
{¶ 17} Other courts of appeals, such as this one, have held that an “undue delay
between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing
of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant
and militating against the granting of the motion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Cardenas,
2016-Ohio-5537, 61 N.E.3d 20, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 18} In this case, the trial court, using the logic from the Third and Sixth Districts,
determined that because the time for filing the original appeal had passed, Clark’s motion
to withdraw his plea was untimely, and it no longer had the ability to decide the motion as
filed. Instead, the court recast the motion as one for post-conviction relief pursuant to R.C.
2953.21. Converting the motion to withdraw the plea into a post-conviction relief petition,
however, was an error.
{¶ 19} Generally, courts have the ability to “recast irregular motions into whatever
category [is] necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should
be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12.
Some motions, however, may not be changed by the trial court, and this is one of those
cases. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 do not govern
a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Postsentence motions to
withdraw guilty or no contest pleas and postconviction relief petitions exist independently.”
State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 239, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522. See also Schlee
at ¶ 13.
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{¶ 20} While the trial court erred in recasting the motion, the analysis does not end
there. We must determine, pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, if denying Clark’s motion to withdraw
his plea after sentencing created a manifest injustice. As stated above, to rise to the level
of manifest injustice, the denial must equate to a miscarriage of justice or be inconsistent
with the demands of due process. Williams at ¶ 5. We do not find that here.
{¶ 21} Clark first claims that he did not have access to some “favorable evidence”
(in the form of medical records of both him and the victim) before his plea – going as far
as to say that counsel “deliberately withheld evidence from [him] which was in [his] favor,”
and accusing counsel and the State of conspiring against him to facilitate a guilty plea.
{¶ 22} The trial court addressed this contention below, ordering Clark’s trial
attorney to demonstrate that all the medical records were not just turned over by the
prosecution prior to the plea hearing, but shared with Clark. After considering the
evidence received from Clark’s counsel in response to the order, the trial court specifically
found that there was no newly discovered evidence and that “[t]he Defendant’s attorney
reviewed [the medical records] with the Defendant.” Judgment Entry at 3.
{¶ 23} Taking the facts as relayed by the trial court as true, we cannot say that
denying Clark’s request to withdraw his guilty plea resulted in a manifest injustice in this
case. The court considered Clark’s claim, investigated the trial attorney’s conduct,
received documents from the attorney, and then after reviewing them, made a reasonable
decision to deny Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It appears that Clark had all
the State’s evidence against him and chose to take the substantial benefit offered by
pleading guilty – the dismissal of numerous charges and a dramatic reduction in possible
prison time.
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{¶ 24} We now turn to Clark’s next claim that he was a victim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because, he alleges, trial counsel did not make him aware of the
medical records before his plea.
{¶ 25} It is well established that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute the
manifest injustice required to permit the post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. State
v. Banks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25188, 2013-Ohio-2116, ¶ 9. To establish
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The defendant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel’s performance was so poor
that he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. To demonstrate prejudice,
“the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1998), first paragraph of the syllabus.
{¶ 26} A guilty plea, including an Alford plea, waives all appealable errors,
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the errors
precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his or her
guilty plea. State v. Riddle, 2017-Ohio-1199, 88 N.E.3d 475, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 27} Here, the record establishes that counsel did not act deficiently, and the
analysis can stop at the first prong. Despite Clark’s contention to the contrary, the trial
court found that his trial attorney shared the required medical records with him during the
discovery process, prior to his pleading guilty. With that, Clark had the information he
stated he needed to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Any other potential
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argument is negated by the Alford plea.
{¶ 28} One final argument is weaved throughout Clark’s brief: that the State was
in possession of his medical records and purposely concealed them from him. For its part,
the State concedes that while it turned over other medical records, it did not provide Clark
with a copy of his own records prior to the guilty plea. Providing Clark with his own
records, however, was not the State’s responsibility. See Shank v. Mitchell, S.D. Ohio No.
2:00-cv-17, 2009 WL 3210350, *9 (Sept. 30, 2009) (the State has no duty to disclose
information that is readily available to the defense through exercise of its own diligence);
LeCroy v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1268 (11th Cir.2005) (“In this
case, defense counsel obviously could have obtained the defendant’s own medical and
school records by exercising reasonable diligence. Consequently, there is no Brady
violation.”); State v. Heisey, 2015-Ohio-4610, 48 N.E.3d 157, ¶ 32-33 (2d Dist.) (the State
is not obligated to conduct the defendant’s investigation for him when the defendant could
have obtained the requested information himself).
{¶ 29} Like the cases just cited, the State was under no obligation to provide Clark
with his own medical records. The purpose of discovery is to even the playing field, avoid
surprise, and in a criminal case, to allow the accused to intelligently defend him or herself.
Its purpose is not for the State to do the work of the defense attorney. Clark and/or his
attorney was certainly capable of obtaining his own medical records. Clark’s argument
that it was the State’s duty to provide him with his own records is without merit.
{¶ 30} Finally, it should be noted that even though the trial court reclassified the
motion as a post-conviction relief petition, it properly used the “manifest injustice”
language associated with motions to withdraw guilty pleas. The ultimate result was
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correct, and as we have previously held, “[a] decision that achieves the right result must
be affirmed, even if the wrong reasoning is used to justify the decision, because an error
in reasoning is not prejudicial.” John A. Baker Co., v. Jedson Eng., Inc., 2018-Ohio-3924,
121 N.E.3d 788, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). See City of Toledo v. Schmiedebusch, 192 Ohio App.3d
402, 2011-Ohio-284, 949 N.E.2d 504 (6th Dist.) (an appeals court will not reverse a trial
court’s decision that achieves the right result for the wrong reason because the error is
not prejudicial).
{¶ 31} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Clark’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and his trial counsel was not deficient. The assignment of error
is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 32} The trial court’s judgment denying Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
will be affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
R. Kelly Ormsby, III
William H. Clark
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein