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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOSE SEGURA and TABETHA GONZALEZ, )
) No. 90088-4
Petitioners, )
)
v. )
) EnBanc
ROGACIANO and RAQUEL CABRERA, )
)
Respondents. ) Filed: OCT 2 9 2015
MADSEN, C.J.-RCW 59.18.085 of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973
(RL TA), which is intended to provide relocation assistance to tenants, does not allow
recovery for emotional distress. The statute's plain language and its stated purpose
compel this result. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in so
determining. We affirm.
FACTS
Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In
2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit.
Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate
apartments.
No. 90088-4
On July 3 ~ 2011, the Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha
Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year's term. Segura paid $600 for the first month's
rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service.
Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and
found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a
permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered
Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days.
Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. On July 14, Segura gave the
Cabreras a written demand for refund of prepaid deposits and rent and for monetary
relocation assistance, as provided by RCW 59.18.085(3). The Cabreras did not respond
to the letter. Mr.: Cabrera later stated in a deposition that he ignored it because an
attorney told him "there was no problem." 1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 115-16.
On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 20 11.
Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline,
Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of
Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property.
Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the RL TA. The Cabreras
filed an answer, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no
knowledge it was illegal." CP at 199.
1
The Cabreras have appeared prose throughout the proceedings. They have, however,
submitted no responsive briefing in the Court of Appeals or in this court. The Rental Housing
Association of Washington submitted an amicus brief supporting the Cabreras.
2
No. 90088-4
On June 22, 2012, Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking $1,200.00 for
the first month's prepaid rent and the security deposit, $150.00 for the utility deposit,
$2,000.00 in relocation assistance, $200.00 in gas expenses related to moving into a new
home, $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, 2 and $5,209.55 in attorney fees and
costs.
The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the
request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under
RCW 59.18.085(3). The court denied Segura's motion for reconsideration, reasoning,
"The relationship of the parties arises from a contract to lease real property. The
misconduct on the part of the landlord was intentional but it is not an intentional tort.
The damages are limited to those identified in the statute RCW 59.18.[0]85(3)." CP at
12.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a
published, split decision. Segura v. Cabrera, 179 Wn. App. 630, 319 P .3d 98, review
granted, 181 Wn.2d 1006, 332 P.3d 985 (2014). Relying on this court's opinion in White
River Estates, the majority in the Court of Appeals held that emotional distress damages
were not recoverable because a landlord could violate RCW 59.18.085(3)(a) '"by
conduct not amounting to an intentional tort."' !d. at 63 7 (quoting White River Estates v.
Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d 761, 769, 953 P.2d 796 (1998)). The Court of Appeals also
2
Segura described these damages as "representing additional damages for the anxiety, worry,
inconvenience, and upheaval inflicted upon the plaintiffs and their children from being forced to
vacate their home on a few days' notice shortly after signing a year's lease [and] the harassment
and illegal lock-out suffered at the defendants' hands, including missing property." CP at 64.
3
No. 90088-4
reasoned that the language ofRCW 59.18.085(3)(e) "implies out of pocket or financial
damages incurred by relocation .... This interpretation better suits the statute's purpose,
which suggests the 'actual damages' provided in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) are limited to
reasonable moving expenses." Id.
This court granted Segura's petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Statutory interpretation resolves whether the RL TA allows displaced tenants to
recover emotional distress damages. See White River Estates, 134 Wn.2d at 765. The
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent and to apply it.
State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192,298 P.3d 724 (2013). When possible, we derive the
legislature's intent solely from the statute's plain language, considering the text of the
provision at issue, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme
as a whole. Id.
"Whether emotional distress damages are available following a statutory violation
will depend on the language of the particular statute at issue." Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d at
765. Reading RCW 59.18.085's provisions together reveals that the statute's purpose is
to provide assistance to relocate displaced tenants, make the landlord responsible for such
assistance, authorize the city to step in as needed to facilitate such relocation, and provide
a means for the City to seek reimbursement from the landlord where the city has stepped
in to provide such assistance.
4
No. 90088-4
Here, RCW 59.18.085 provides that a landlord shall not rent a unit that does not
meet applicable codes. RCW 59.18.085(1). If the landlord knowingly does so, the tenant
shall recover the greater of three months' rent or treble the actual damages sustained as a
result of the violation. RCW 59.18.085(2). Ifthe appropriate government agency
requires that the tenant vacate the premises, the tenant shall also recover any prepaid
deposit and rent.. !d. Additionally, the tenant may be entitled to relocation assistance as
follows:
If a governmental agency responsible for the enforcement of a building,
housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling
will be condemned or will be unlawful to occupy due to the existence of
conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations,
a landlord, who knew or should have known of the existence of these
conditions, shall be required to pay relocation assistance to the displaced
tenants.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(a). The statute sets the amount of relocation assistance ($2,000 or
three times the monthly rent, whichever is greater), notes other damages the tenant is
entitled to from the landlord, specifies how payment to the tenant is to be made, sets a
time frame for such payments, and authorizes the governmental entity to step in anq
advance the relocation assistance to the displaced tenant if the landlord fails to meet the
statutory time schedule for such payments. 3 The statute also provides a time limit in
3
Subsections (3)(b) and (c) provide:
(b) Relocation assistance provided to displaced tenants under this
subsection shall be the greater amount of two thousand dollars per dwelling unit
or three times the monthly rent. In addition to relocation assistance, the landlord
shall be required to pay to the displaced tenants the entire amount of any deposit
prepaid by the tenant and all prepaid rent.
(c) The landlord shall pay relocation assistance and any prepaid deposit
and prepaid rent to displaced tenants within seven days of the governmental
5
No. 90088-4
which the landlord must reimburse the city for any relocation assistance advancements
that the city has paid the tenant; civil penalties and interest for the landlord's
noncompliance with the stated time limits; and attorney fees and costs to the city if it
must pursue legal action against the landlord to receive such reimbursements, penalties,
and interest. See RCW 59.18.085(3)(£)-(h).
Notably, subsection (3)(e) sets the parameters of the damages available to a tenant
under the statute.
Displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any relocation assistance,
prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent required by (b) of this subsection. In
addition, displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any actual damages
sustained by them as a result of the condemnation, eviction, or
displacement that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is
payable. In any action brought by displaced tenants to recover any
payments or damages required or authorized by this subsection (3 )(e) or (c)
of this subsection that are not paid by the landlord or advanced by the city,
town, county, or municipal corporation, the displaced tenants shall also be
entitled to recover their costs of suit or arbitration and reasonable attorneys'
fees.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). In giving effect to the legislature's intent, we
look to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, reading the enactment as a whole,
harmonizing its provisions by reading them in context with related provisions. Quadrant
agency set:J.ding notice of the condemnation, eviction, or displacement order to the
landlord. The landlord shall pay relocation assistance and any prepaid deposit and
prepaid rent either by making individual payments by certified check to displaced
tenants or by providing a certified check to the governmental agency ordering
condemnation, eviction, or displacement, for distribution to the displaced tenants.
If the landlord fails to complete payment of relocation assistance within the period
required under this subsection, the city, town, county, or municipal corporation
may advance the cost of the relocation assistance payments to the displaced
tenants.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (c).
6
No. 90088-4
Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr 'gs Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224, 239-40, 110 P .3d
1132 (2005). Reading the provisions of the statute together, the plain language provides
that the tenant is entitled to receive the relocation assistance amounts as calculated in
subsection (3)(b) but may also seek, via legal action against the landlord, the tenant's
actual costs of relocation that exceed the relocation assistance amount as calculated in
subsection (3)(b). The statute provides relocation assistance; it simply does not address
or encompass emotional distress damages.
Further, if there were any doubt as to the statute's purpose, the legislature
expressly spelled it out. The statute's stated purpose is twofold: First, "to establish a
process by which displaced tenants would receive fimds for relocation from landlords
who fail to provide safe and sanitary housing after due notice of building code or health
code violations." LAws OF 2005, ch. 364, § 1 (emphasis added). And second, "to
provide enforcement mechanisms to cities, towns, counties, or municipal corporations
including the ability to advance relocation funds to tenants who are displaced as a result
of a landlord's failure to remedy building code or health code violations and later to
collect the full amounts of these relocation funds, along with interest and penalties, from
landlords." Id. The statute's plain language and the legislature's express provision of
"funds for relocation" cannot legitimately be stretched to include emotional distress
damages.
Segura cites Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976), and
Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 971 P.2d 45 (1999), for the proposition that actual
7
No. 90088-4
damages includes damages for emotional distress. But Rasor concerned damages
available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, whose
purpose is '"to protect an individual from inaccurate or arbitrary information about
himself in a consumer report that is being used as a factor in determining the individual's
eligibility for credit, insurance or employment."' Rasor, 87 Wn.2d at 520 (quoting
Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
Martini addressed claims of discrimination under Washington's Law Against
Discrimination (WLAD) (chapter 49.60 RCW). See Martini, 137 Wn.2d at 366-68. The
purpose ofWLAD is to protect the "public welfare, health, and peace of the people"
because "discrimination threatens [their] rights and proper privileges." RCW 49.60.010.
Both the FCRA and WLAD guard against harm to the person. The inclusion of
emotional distress damages in those cases is not surprising, as such provision comports
with the purpose and protections afforded by the statutes in question. But no similar
purpose is present in this case. Here, the text of the statute, as discussed above, attests
that the legislature is concerned only with return of a tenant's money and assisting the
tenant in getting relocated, not in providing redress for a personal injury or protecting
against harm to the person. There is no similarity to the types of situations presented in
Rasor and Martini, which involved different statutes with different language and different
purposes.
For the same reason, Segura's citation to Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19
Wn. App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978), and Conrad v. A/derwood Manor, 119 Wn. App. 275,
8
No. 90088-4
78 P.3d 177 (2003), as support is also unavailing. Ellingson addressed claims of
discrimination under the WLAD, and Conrad addressed claims under the abuse of ·
vulnerable adults statute (chapter 74.34 RCW). See Ellingson, 19 Wn. App. at 54;
Conrad, 119 Wn. App. at 280. These cases too are distinguishable, as they addressed
statutes and circumstances that are not present here.
We have never adopted a single definition of the term "actual damages." Indeed,
in the appropriate case, we have limited "actual damages" to include only recovery for
pecuniary harm. For example, the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) allows a
person harmed under the statute "to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her
... together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." RCW
19.86.090. As in this case, the statute included language allowing recovery for "actual
damages." Nevertheless, after analyzing the language in context, we held that the CPA
does not allow recovery for emotional distress. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. &
Ass'n v. Fisons Corp, 122 Wn.2d 299,318, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). We examined the
purpose of the statute at issue, reasoning that the CPA concerns injuries to "'business or
property,"' not personal injuries. Id. Therefore, "actual damages" did not include
emotional distress. Id.
Similarly, as the Supreme Court recently observed, "actual damages" has a
"chameleon-like quality" because "the precise meaning of the term 'changes with the
specific statute in which it is found."' Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, _U.S._, 132
S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 1449, 182 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2012) (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Aviation
9
No. 90088-4
Admin., 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding "actual damages" does not include
emotional distress damages as used in the Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5
U.S.C. § 552a)). As the Court noted, sometimes the term includes emotional distress
damages, while in other contexts it includes only pecuniary harm. !d. at 1449.
As discussed, in this case, the statute provides for the recovery of financial losses
caused by displacement; it simply does not address or reasonably encompass emotional
distress damages.
CONCLUSION
We hold that RCW 59.18.085 of the RLTA provides relocation assistance to
tenants. Recovery for emotional distress damages is not available under this statute. We
affirm.
10
No. 90088-4
11
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
No. 90088-4
GORDON McCLOUD, J. (concurring in result)-The Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, entitles displaced tenants to
recover, "[i]n addition to" "any relocation assistance," "any actual damages
sustained by them . . . that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is
payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). The majority holds that the plain language
and stated purpose of this statute compel limiting a displaced tenant's recovery to
financial losses only. 1 Majority at 10.
But the legislature's use of the broad, inclusive adjective "any" to modify
"actual damages," along with its specification that such damages are recoverable "in
addition" to relocation costs, compels the opposite conclusion. In addition, we
presume that the legislature, when it enacted the RLT A, was aware of our decisions
in Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d 516,529,554 P.2d 1041 (1976), and Martini
1
Emotional distress damages are a type of noneconomic damages. RCW
4.56.250(l)(b) defines "noneconomic damages" as "subjective, nonmonetary losses,
including, but not limited to pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or
disfigurement incurred by the injured party, emotional distress, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation, and destruction
of the parent-child relationship."
1
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357,368,370,971 P.2d 45 (1999), recognizing that actual
damages include emotional distress damages.
I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the RLTA
bars displaced tenants from recovering emotional distress damages. But I concur in
the majority's result that Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura)
cannot recover emotional distress damages here. The statute allows recovery of such
actual damages only when they exceed the statutory $2,000 of relocation assistance.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). Segura's request for $1,200 in actual damages does not
exceed that $2,000 amount. Therefore, the RL TA prohibits them from recovering
actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. O.S. T v. Regence
BlueShield, 181 Wn.2d 691, 696, 335 P.3d 416 (2014). We begin with the statute's
plain language, considering the text of the provision in question, the statute's
context, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192,
298 P.3d 724 (2013). Our objective is to determine and to apply the legislature's
intent. O.S. T, 181 Wn.2d at 696.
2
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
This case requires us to construe the statutory term "actual damages" as used
in RCW 59.18.085(3)( e) and to decide if the right to recover such "actual damages"
includes a right to recover emotional distress damages.
RCW 59.18.085 states, in relevant part,
(3)(a) If a governmental agency responsible for the enforcement
of a building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the
landlord that a dwelling will be condemned or will be unlawful to
occupy due to the existence of conditions that violate applicable codes,
statutes, ordinances, or regulations, a landlord, who knew or should
have known of the existence of these conditions, shall be required to
pay relocation assistance to the displaced tenants ....
(e) Displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any relocation
assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent required by (b) of this
subsection. In addition, displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover
any actual damages sustained by them as a result of the condemnation,
eviction, or displacement that exceed the amount of relocation
assistance that is payable ....
(Emphasis added.) As the majority notes, the RL TA contains no definition of
"actual damages," so whether the RL TA authorizes displaced tenants to recover
emotional distress damages sustained as a result of their displacement is a matter of
statutory interpretation.
3
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
III. THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED THAT TENANTS CAN RECOVER "ANY
ACTUAL DAMAGES" "[I]N ADDITION" TO THE LISTED AMOUNTS; THIS
LANGUAGE Is BROAD AND UNAMBIGUOUS
A. The Majority's Holding Conflicts with the Statute's Plain Language
The plain statutory language of the RLT A gives displaced tenants the right to
recover "any actual damages sustained by them as a result of the ... displacement,"
"[i]n addition" to economic damages specifically enumerated in the statute
("relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent"). RCW 59.18.085(3)(e)
(emphasis added). By limiting the recovery under this statute to economic damages
only, and by further limiting these damages to "relocation assistance," majority at
10, the majority's holding conflicts with both statutory phrases italicized
immediately above.
First, the statutory word "any" is a broad modifier. See State v. Sutherby, 165
Wn.2d 870, 880-82, 204 P.3d 916 (2009); State v. Westling, 145 Wn.2d 607, 611-
12, 40 P.3d 669 (2002). This broad language supports an expansive reading of the
statute.
Second, we must give full effect to the language "in addition" to. The statute
specifies that "any" actual damages are available not as part of, but "in addition" to
the enumerated damages, including damages that "exceed the amount of relocation
assistance that is payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(e). Thus, the statute's context, in
4
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
addition to its express language, reveals the legislature's intent to permit the
recovery of emotional distress damages; a contrary interpretation would render the
legislature's use of this broad language meaningless. 2
The majority relies on an argument that no party has made: that the language
"that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable" shows an intent to
limit the amount of available damages to relocation damages only. Majority at 6-7.
But this interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, it treats the concluding
language as a limit on both the amount and the nature of damages that a displaced
tenant is entitled to recover. The statute's plain language defies such a reading. The
statute says "that exceed," which refers to an amount, not a type of damages.
Second, this interpretation treats the language "that is payable" as a limit on "actual
damages" when, grammatically, it can be read only as modifying the immediately
preceding phrase "relocation assistance."
B. The Majority's Holding Conflicts with This Court's Decisions
Interpreting the Term "Actual Damages" in Other Statutes
In addition to failing to recognize the broad nature of the statutory language,
the majority rejects the definition of "actual damages" established by our prior
2
See Cornu-Labat v. Hasp. Dist. No. 2, 177 Wn.2d 221, 231, 298 P.3d 741 (2013)
("We interpret statutes to give effect to all the language used so that no portion is rendered
meaningless or unnecessary." (citing State v. JP., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318
(2003))).
5
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
decisions. Majority at 7-8. In Rasor, we interpreted the term "actual damages" as
used in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
87 Wn.2d at 529. This statute permits a plaintiff to recover "an amount equal to ...
any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure" of a credit
reporting agency to comply with the statutory requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n,
1681 o. The plaintiff in Rasor alleged that a credit report stating she had a reputation
of living with more than one man out of wedlock "damaged her personally and in
her business reputation in the small community, and that she suffered emotionally
from the experience." 87 Wn.2d at 531. We explained that Congress's intent in
enacting "this remedial legislation" was "'to protect the reputation of a consumer"'
from the improper preparation and use of inaccurate or arbitrary information in credit
reports, including protection from false rumors. !d. at 529, 520-21 (quoting Ackerley
v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974)).
Comparing the plaintiff's injury to the actual injury suffered in a defamation action,
we recognized in Rasor the "generally accepted legal meaning" of"actual damages"
for defamatory falsehood:
In reference to the type of harm suffered, the term "actual
damages" has a generally accepted legal meaning. Although it declined
to define "actual injury," the United States Supreme Court recently
noted the variety of harm which may result when damage is actually
sustained.
6
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket
loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted
by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by
appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by
competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need
be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury.
!d. at 529 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)). Noting that "actual damages" denotes
both the type of damage award and the nature of injury for which a plaintiff may
recover damages, we also stated in Rasor, "In this sense, the term has a second,
consonant and established meaning. '"actual" damages are synonymous with
compensatory damages'. Thus, actual damages, flowing from injury in fact, are to
be distinguished from damages which are 'nominal,' 'exemplary' or 'punitive."' !d.
at 530 n.3 (citations omitted) (quoting Werder v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437, 445
(M.D. Pa. 1965)). We therefore held that "actual damages" under the FCRA
includes all of the elements of compensatory awards generally, including harm to
business reputation and emotional suffering. !d. at 530.
In Martini, we again construed the term "actual damages" and reached the
same conclusion. 137 Wn.2d at 364. Martini discussed "actual damages" as used
in Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, which
7
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
mandates "liberal construction." 137 Wn.2d at 364; RCW 49.60.020. The plaintiff
alleged disability discrimination and sought front and back pay. Martini, 137 Wn.2d
at 361. The WLAD permits the recovery of "the actual damages sustained by the
person" but contains no definition of the term "actual damages." RCW
49.60.030(2). Although emotional distress damages were not directly at issue in
Martini, we cited Rasor and concluded that RCW 49.60.030(2) authorizes the
recovery of full compensatory damages, including "damages for emotional distress,"
and excluded only nominal, exemplary, or punitive damages. Martini, 137 Wn.2d
at 370, 367-68.
Since 1976, we have consistently stated that this is the established meaning of
"actual damages." Rasor, 87 Wn.2d at 530 n.3. We presume that the legislature
knew the controlling law in the area in which it was legislating when it passed RCW
59.18.085 in 2005. Wynn v. Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361, 371, 181 P.3d 806 (2008) (citing
Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wn.2d 456, 463, 886 P.2d 556 (1994)). 3 Although the
3 The Court of Appeals relied in large part on White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 134
Wn.2d 761, 953 P.2d 796 (1998). In that case, however, we held that when a statute is
silent about the damages available for its violation, emotional distress damages are
available only if the statutory violation requires conduct amounting to an intentional tort,
as opposed to mere negligence. !d. at 766. White River Estates' intentional-versus-
negligent test does not apply to the RL TA, which explicitly describes the damages
recoverable for a landlord's violation. See RCW 59.18.085(3)(e).
8
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
majority dismisses these cases as "involv[ing] different statutes with different
language and different purposes," majority at 8, nothing in Rasor or Martini suggests
that their discussions of "actual damages" were limited to the statutes at issue in
those cases. 4
The majority argues that under Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper,
_U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 182 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2012), '"the precise meaning
of the term ["actual damages"] "changes with the specific statute in which it is
found."' Majority at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. at 1449). But that case does not control here. The issue presented in Cooper
was-seemingly-whether the term "actual damages" in the civil remedies
provision of the Privacy Act of 197 4 includes compensation for mental and
emotional harm. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. But because the Privacy Act of 1974 applied to
4
The majority asserts that we said the opposite in Washington State Physicians
Insurance Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
Majority at 9. It is true that in Fisons we disallowed recovery of emotional distress
damages under the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, which affords "actual
damages." Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318. But that was not just because ofRCW 19.86.090's
language allowing an individual "to recover ... actual damages sustained." (Emphasis
added.) In fact, we explained that there was no right to emotional distress damages in that
context because the statute limited the right to sue to a "person who is injured in his or her
business or property by a violation of [the act]." RCW 19.86.090 (emphasis added). In
Fisons, we ruled, "'The phrase "business or property" also retains restrictive significance.
It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered."' Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931
(1979)). The statute at issue in this case, in contrast, contains no such limiting language.
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Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
damages from the government, the question was actually narrower: "because the
Privacy Act waives the Federal Government's sovereign immunity, the question we
must address is whether it is plausible to read the statute, as the Government does,
to authorize only damages for economic loss." Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1453 (emphasis
added). Given that narrow issue, that Court entered the narrow holding that the civil
remedies provision did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity with
respect to such recovery. Id. The Court explained, "When waiving the
Government's sovereign immunity, Congress must speak unequivocally. Here, we
conclude that it did not. As a consequence, we adopt an interpretation of 'actual
damages' limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm." Id. This case, in contrast,
does not involve the scope of sovereign immunity. In addition, this case deals with
the interpretation of a Washington, not a federal, statute; the answer to our question
is controlled by state, not federal, law.
IV. SEGURA CANNOT RECOVER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES HERE
Although the RLT A permits displaced tenants to recover emotional distress
damages as actual damages, I agree with the majority that Segura is entitled to no
actual damages in this case. RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) states that displaced tenants can
recover "any actual damages sustained by them . . . that exceed the amount of
relocation assistance that is payable." (Emphasis added.) The "relocation
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Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
assistance that is payable" to displaced tenants is "the greater amount of two
thousand dollars per dwelling unit or three times the monthly rent." RCW
59.18.085(3)(b ).
Here, Segura is entitled only to actual damages that exceed $2,000 because
this amount is greater than three times Segura's monthly rent of $600. Segura
requested $1,000 for emotional distress and $200 for gasoline expenses-both
components of"actual damages." But the $1,200 total that Segura claims as actual
damages does not exceed the $2,000 payable to Segura as relocation assistance.
Therefore, Segura can recover no actual damages under the RLTA.
CONCLUSION
The legislature detennined that a displaced tenant could recover "actual
damages." It placed no limit on these "actual damages." In fact, RCW
59.18.085(3)(e) authorizes "any" such "actual damages." The statute's plain, broad
language, as well as controlling Washington case law interpreting the legal meaning
of this term, thus authorize displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages
for a landlord's violation ofthe RLTA.
In this case, however, Segura's requested actual damages do not exceed
$2,000. For that reason, Segura may not recover actual damages, including
emotional distress damages, in this case. I therefore concur in the result.
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Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
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