FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 30 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS D. YOKOIS, No. 19-17077
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02856-DGC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of Arizona
Department of Corrections, and
individually; MICHAEL LINDERMAN,
in his individual capacity; JAMES
VICKLUND, Senior Chaplain and
individually at Eyman Complex, ADC;
JEFFREY VAN WINKLE, Former Deputy
Warden of Special Management Unit I
(“SMU-1") and individually at SMU-1,
Eyman Complex, ADC; CONSTANCE
DANIEL, Former Chaplain at SMU-1 and
individually at SMU-1, Eyman Complex,
ADC; ADAM HENRY, Current Chaplain
at SMU-1 and individually at SMU-1,
Eyman Complex, ADC; JAMES O’NEIL,
Former Warden and individually at Eyman
Complex, ADC; GERALD THOMPSON,
Warden, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Eyman Complex, Individually
and as Current Warden; CARSON
MCWILLIAMS, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Director of Operations and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
individually; ANNE CERVANTES,
Correctional Officer, CO II in SMU-1
mail/property room and individually;
TRAVIS PINNEY, South Unit, Florence
Complex, ADC, Individually and as
Assistant Deputy Warden; JOHN
MATTOS, in his individual capacity; ROY
CHERIYAN, South Unit, Florence
Complex, ADC, Individually and as
Chaplain; ALAN MISER, Senior Chaplain
and individually at Florence Complex,
ADC; KEVIN CURRAN, Individually and
as Warden at Florence Complex, ADC;
WALTER HENSLEY, Indvidually and as
Current Deputy Warden of SMU-1, Eyman
Complex, ADC; KENNETH HERMAN,
Pastoral Activities Administrator; LORI
STICKLEY, South Unit Deputy Warden in
her Official Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; STATE OF ARIZONA;
JAMES O’NEIL, Former Warden, Eyman
Complex; J. BROWN, Individually and as
Former Chaplain at SMU-1, Eyman
Complex, ADC; HERNANDEZ, COIV,
Grievance Coordinator, SMU-1; JOY
RIEFFER, Correctional Officer, COIII,
Assistant Grievance Coordinator, SMU-1;
W. HENSELY,
Defendants.
2 19-17077
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 29, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Arizona prisoner Douglas Yokois appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of many Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”)
officials on his exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the ADC officials
on Yokois’ Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims because his religious
practice was not substantially burdened.1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a),
2000cc-2(b); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978,
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Because the district court properly granted summary judgment for the ADC
officials on the merits of Yokois’ claims, we need not and do not consider whether
the district court erred when it held that he failed to exhaust administrative
remedies for two of them. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101, 126 S. Ct.
2378, 2392, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006).
3 19-17077
987–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing RLUIPA); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023,
1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the Free Exercise Clause). ADC’s policy
requiring inmates to go through authorized vendors to purchase religious items was
at most, an inconvenience, and not a substantial burden on Yokois’ ability to
acquire religious items. Similarly, the record shows that the ADC policy in
question only prevented Yokois from pinning religious materials on his bulletin
board while he was outside his cell and not using them. As a result, Yokois did not
show that these policies so burdened his right to exercise his religion that he felt
pressured to abandon his beliefs. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,
707 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2013).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yokois’ motions to
compel discovery, for appointment of counsel, and for injunctive relief. Yokois
did not show that denial of his motions to compel resulted in actual or substantial
prejudice to him. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor
did he show any exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of counsel. See
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). And because Yokois requested injunctive relief
unrelated to his exercise of religion claims, the district court properly denied his
4 19-17077
motions for a preliminary injunction. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s
Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2015).2
Finally, the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Yokois’ motion for sanctions. Yokois had filed a notice of appeal, which
“confer[red] jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divest[ed] the district court of
its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S. Ct. 400, 402, 74 L. Ed. 2d
225 (1982) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
2
We note that there was no evidence that ADC officials did hinder Yokois’
ability to litigate his case. Cf. Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.
1990).
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