IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SASHA SUGABERRY, No. 81580-6-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
YWCA SEATTLE,
Respondent.
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — In October 2018, Sasha Sugaberry sought emergency
shelter at the YWCA Seattle. When she left the shelter to attend an out-of-state
conference, the YWCA concluded Sugaberry had abandoned the personal
belongings she left behind and disposed of them in accordance with its policies.
Sugaberry sued YWCA for conversion of this personal property. The trial court
found that Sugaberry failed to prove her claim of conversion. We affirm.
FACTS
The YWCA is a nonprofit organization focused on the needs of women in
crisis. The YWCA operates a number of programs, including an emergency
domestic violence shelter. This shelter provides short-term emergency housing
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for survivors of domestic violence for 45 days. Residents have their own rooms
and meet regularly with advocates for counseling and crisis intervention.
Before entering the shelter, prospective YWCA clients undergo screening
and intake procedures. Initial screening occurs telephonically via the YWCA’s
crisis line. Shelter advocates explain to potential clients that, if they choose to
enter the shelter program, they cannot bring too many personal belongings
because space is limited and each room is small.
Clients next participate in an in-person intake appointment. During intake,
YWCA advocates explain the expectations of the shelter, give the client a tour, and
have the client fill out intake paperwork, including a set of shelter rules entitled
“Resident Rights and Responsibilities.” Each client is required to initial each of the
components to indicate an acknowledgement of the rules. One relevant provision
is the nightly curfew. Due to safety concerns, the YWCA requires clients to return
to the shelter by 10:00 p.m. If clients fail to return or contact YWCA staff within 24
hours, the client is removed from the “daily room log” and must obtain the director’s
approval before being allowed to return to the shelter. If the client fails to contact
the YWCA within this 24-hour period, the YWCA disposes of any belongings left
behind.
On September 6, 2018, Sugaberry sought emergency shelter at the YWCA.
Domestic violence advocate Dominique Scott conducted Sugaberry’s initial phone
screening and in-person intake. During her intake, Sugaberry signed the Rights
and Responsibilities form and agreed to be bound by the YWCA’s policies.
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Sugaberry stayed at the shelter until October 18, 2018. Sugaberry informed
staff that she would be traveling and requested an extension of her stay at the
shelter. According to the YWCA witnesses, Sugaberry’s request was denied and
she was informed that she would not be permitted to leave her belongings at the
shelter while she was gone. Sugaberry, however, testified that the YWCA granted
her request to extend her stay in the shelter and gave her permission to leave her
personal belongings in her room until she returned from an out-of-state trip.
When Sugaberry left on October 18, she left personal belongings at the
shelter. When she did not return within 24 hours, the YWCA deemed the
belongings abandoned and disposed of them. The YWCA staff testified that they
did not contact Sugaberry or attempt to reach her through her emergency contact
because Sugaberry had informed the YWCA that she was leaving and had been
advised to take her belongings with her.
In July 2019, Sugaberry filed a complaint alleging conversion of her
personal property. On June 29, 2020, the trial court held a bench trial. Sugaberry
appeared pro se. The trial court heard the testimony of five witnesses: Sugaberry,
her witness, Marsha Armstrong, and three YWCA staff members: Doris O’Neal,
Dominique Scott, and Jeanice Hardy. The trial court found the three YWCA
witnesses were credible. It also found that Sugaberry had signed the YWCA
documentation acknowledging its policies and that she had been provided verbal
warnings that her belongings would be disposed of if she was absent for more than
24 hours. The court concluded that Sugaberry failed to prove that the disposal of
the items she left behind was unjustified or that the YWCA willfully interfered with
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her possession of this property. It also concluded that Sugaberry had presented
no evidence to establish the value of the items allegedly converted. Accordingly,
the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. Sugaberry appeals.
ANALYSIS
Sugaberry’s arguments on appeal are difficult to follow. The YWCA
contends that Sugaberry has failed to cite authority or provide meaningful analysis
sufficient to warrant our consideration. There is merit to this argument.
As a pro se litigant, Sugaberry is held to the same standard as an attorney
and must comply with all procedural rules on appeal. In re Marriage of Olson, 69
Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). In accordance with these rules, an
appellant must provide “argument in support of the issues presented for review,
together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the
record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6). Failure to comply with procedural rules may preclude
review. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999).
Similarly, arguments that are not supported by references to the record,
meaningful analysis, or citation to pertinent authority need not be considered.
Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549
(1992). “It is not the responsibility of this court to attempt to discern what it is
appellant may have intended to assert that might somehow have merit.” Port
Susan Chapel of the Woods v. Port Susan Camping Club, 50 Wn. App. 176, 188,
746 P.2d 816 (1987).
Sugaberry has failed to identify evidence in the record supporting many of
her factual allegations and she has failed to provide citations to authority for many
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of her legal arguments. 1 We will not address these arguments on their merits. But
we can parse out some of Sugaberry’s assignments of error and will address them
as thoroughly as we can.
Evidentiary Errors
Sugaberry first argues that the trial court made a number of evidentiary
errors. Particularly, she contends the court erred in admitting two exhibits at trial,
in excluding witness testimony, and in excluding evidence related to Sugaberry’s
damages. None of these contentions is supported by the record.
“Admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court and
will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.”
In re Parentage of J.H., 112 Wn. App. 486, 495, 49 P.3d 154 (2002). “Discretion
is abused if it is based on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” Id.
Sugaberry contends the trial court “erroneously admitted evidence over
objection, and the inadmissible evidence prejudiced” her case. The trial court
admitted two documents over Sugaberry’s objection. First, the court admitted the
Rights and Responsibilities form, to which Sugaberry objected on the basis that
the document was fraudulent because the signature was not hers. She told the
trial court that the document she signed at her intake had been longer, more like a
lease for an apartment, and that she could not have written her name so
“eloquently” because of her anxiety disorder. Second, the trial court admitted
1 For example, Sugaberry argues the trial court erred by relying on the wrong case file during trial.
She makes no citation to the record and we can find nothing to support this statement. Similarly,
she assigns error to the trial court’s finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact.
However, the court made no such finding and Sugaberry was afforded a full and fair trial to litigate
her dispute.
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Scott’s electronic case notes over Sugaberry’s objection. The entire basis of
Sugaberry’s objection was that it was “blatantly untrue.” The court noted that
appropriate foundation had been laid for the admission of the document and that
Sugaberry would have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses regarding
the accuracy of the document.
Sugaberry cites no rules of evidence nor any case law suggesting that her
objections were legally valid and she offers no argument to support the contention
that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling her objections. The YWCA
laid a proper foundation for each exhibit and Sugaberry was afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses regarding the veracity of the
documents. We can discern no error.
Sugaberry further contends the trial court erroneously refused to admit
relevant evidence and witness testimony. Specifically, she contends the trial court
excluded the testimony of Marsha Armstrong “on the grounds that YWCA was not
aware of her existence until the day of trial.” This is unsupported by the record.
During a pretrial conference held just a week before trial, Sugaberry
informed the court that she planned on calling Armstrong as a witness. On the day
of trial, the YWCA moved to exclude Armstrong’s testimony because of the late
witness disclosure. Sugaberry responded that Armstrong would testify as a
witness of “the facts of systemic theft” and abuse at another shelter. The trial court
initially granted the YWCA’s motion on the basis that this proffered testimony was
not relevant.
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After opening arguments, Sugaberry asked the court if Armstrong could
testify about the luggage Sugaberry used when she was away from the shelter on
her out-of-state trip. The YWCA objected again, arguing such testimony was
irrelevant. The trial court overruled this objection and allowed Armstrong to testify
as to Sugaberry’s luggage.
Limiting Armstrong’s testimony in such a way was not an abuse of
discretion. Any testimony Armstrong might have presented regarding incidents of
theft at other emergency shelters was irrelevant to the issue of whether the YWCA
converted Sugaberry’s property. Sugaberry herself acknowledged that the YWCA
was neither related to, nor responsible for, the other shelter. “Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.” ER 402. Thus, the court did not err.
Next, Sugaberry seems to contend that the trial court miscalculated the
damages by not allowing her to present evidence as to the value of the items lost.
The record here demonstrates that Sugaberry offered no evidence of damages.
Sugaberry testified that she had lost a number of personal belongings, such as a
safe, electronic devices, and family memorabilia, among other things. But she
offered no evidence to support the purported value of those items. During closing
argument, Sugaberry made a conclusory statement that “[a] woman’s wardrobe is
very pricey” and that it would cost “in excess of $50,000” just to replace her
clothing.
There is no evidence in the record that the trial court denied any attempt
by Sugaberry to admit evidence related to damages. Therefore, the court could
not have abused its discretion.
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Motion to Compel Discovery
Sugaberry argues she was “denied any and all access to evidence and
witness via subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or professional communication.”
The record does not support this argument either.
As with evidentiary decisions, the decision to grant or deny a motion to
compel discovery is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse
the decision absent an abuse of discretion. Clarke v. State Att’y Gen.'s Office, 133
Wn. App. 767, 777, 138 P.3d 144 (2006).
On June 1, 2020, Sugaberry sent multiple emails to counsel for the YWCA.
In those emails, Sugaberry stated that she had sent subpoenas to the YWCA,
asked to confer with counsel to “determine the integrity of the defendant by asking
for criminal background check[s] and human resource checks,” and asked for
various discovery, including human resources records and database records. The
next day, Sugaberry moved to compel discovery.
On June 5, 2020, Sugaberry filed a motion for the issuance of a subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum. Sugaberry noted her intention to “call YWCA
SEATTLE STAFF AND ADVOCATES AND TWO RESIDENTS” at trial and
requested that the YWCA produce the identified documents. In an addendum to
this document, Sugaberry requested video footage, database information
pertaining to Sugaberry’s stay at the YWCA, and “all personnel records for factual
evidence of criminal background check YWCA of Seattle relied upon for the hiring
of each witness listed to testify under oath.”
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On June 10, 2020, Sugaberry sent counsel for the YWCA an email
identifying, by description only, individuals allegedly associated with the YWCA
that she sought to have present at trial. The YWCA was only able to identify one
of the witnesses described.
Because the discovery deadline had passed, the trial court denied the
motion to compel but granted Sugaberry’s request for a trial subpoena for former
YWCA employee Bridgette LaRock. The court informed Sugaberry that it was her
responsibility to serve the subpoena on LaRock. Sugaberry ultimately made no
showing that she served the subpoena on LaRock and LaRock did not appear for
trial.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel
discovery. Pursuant to King County Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 37(g), all discovery
“must be completed no later than 49 calendar days before the assigned trial date.”
Any discovery requests that do not comply with that rule will not be enforced.
KCLCR 37(g). In this case, the discovery deadline was May 11, 2020. Sugaberry
filed her motions for discovery well after the deadline had passed and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying her motions.
Sufficiency
Finally, Sugaberry contends that the trial court’s conclusions were not
adequately supported by its findings. We disagree.
We review the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence.
Merriman v. Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162 (2010). Substantial
evidence is that which would persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the
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declared premise. Id. A reviewing court will not disturb findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence. Id.
While she makes no clear argument to support this assignment of error,
Sugaberry seems to reiterate each of her arguments from trial. For example, she
argues that the YWCA authorized her to leave her belongings behind and made
assurances that they would be stored safely. But the trial court rejected
Sugaberry’s testimony as not credible. We defer to the trial court on
determinations of “the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and
conflicting testimony.” In re Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014).
Here, the testimony of the YWCA’s witnesses, which the trial court found
credible, provided substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the
YWCA told Sugaberry she could not leave her belongings behind. Scott testified
that Sugaberry agreed to be bound by the YWCA’s policies when she sought
emergency shelter there. O’Neal testified that Sugaberry left items behind when
she left the shelter and that the YWCA disposed of those abandoned belongings
in accordance with its policy. Finally, both Scott and O’Neal testified that
Sugaberry had been verbally informed that she was not permitted to leave her
belongings.
These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that Sugaberry failed to
prove “that the disposal of the items left behind at the shelter was unjustified or
that the YWCA willfully interfered with Plaintiff’s possession of her property.”
Sugaberry advances no argument that the trial court misapplied the law of
conversion or the affirmative defenses of abandonment and consent.
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The trial court did not err by dismissing Sugaberry’s complaint with
prejudice.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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