FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 3 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAY J. JOHN, No. 20-35843
Plaintiff-Appellant, DC No. 4:20-cv-05008-SAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP OF
WASHINGTON,
Defendant,
and
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY; NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE LLC, DBA Mr. Cooper,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Stanley A. Bastian, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 1, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
Before: HAWKINS, TASHIMA, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jay John appeals the order of the district court denying in
part the motion by his attorney, Scott Stafne, to withdraw as John’s attorney or in
the alternative to “delay the briefing related to Defendants’ motion to dismiss until
such time as Stafne can recoup from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on his
ability to practice law.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review
for an abuse of discretion, LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998), and we affirm.
1. The district court did not violate the principle of party presentation.
See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (explaining that
under the principle of party presentation “we rely on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))). The
district court decided only the issues Stafne raised and did not reach claims, issues,
or theories that the parties themselves did not present. In addition, the district
court had the authority to rule on Stafne’s motion without waiting for Defendants
to file a response.
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2. We reject John’s contention that the district court failed to consider
Stafne’s “personal situation” and the State’s Covid-19 orders. First, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the court failed to consider Stafne’s
contentions, and we assume that the court did so. Second, the district court was not
required to reject Stafne’s factual contentions on the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on
a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on any other
motion.”). Third, district courts are not required to state on the record their reasons
for rejecting every argument made by a moving party in support of a motion. E.g.,
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982).
3. Although John argues that the district court lacked the constitutional
authority to order Stafne to work in contravention of the State’s public health
orders, John has not shown any conflict between the State’s orders and the district
court’s order. The State’s orders required Washington residents to stay at home,
but included an exception for essential workers, including “[p]rofessional services,
such as legal or accounting and tax preparation services, when necessary to assist
in compliance with legally mandated activities and critical sector services.” Office
of the Governor, Proclamation 20-25, at p.3 & Appendix, at p. 11 (Mar. 23, 2020).
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4. The district court did not deny John his right to counsel. First, there is
no general right to counsel in civil cases. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441
(2011); United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996). Second, the
in forma pauperis statute upon which Stafne relies, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), does
not apply here. Third, even if § 1915 applied, this case did not present exceptional
circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.
2004) (“The decision to appoint such counsel . . . ‘is granted only in exceptional
circumstances.’” (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir.
1984), abrogated on other grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989))).
5. The district court did not deny John due process by ruling on
Defendants’ motion to dismiss without affording him an opportunity to oppose the
motion. The court afforded John an opportunity to respond (even granting an
extension of time), but he failed to avail himself of that opportunity.
• ! •
In sum, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Stafne’s motion. Stafne failed to establish good cause to withdraw as counsel or
delay the proceedings indefinitely. AFFIRMED.1
1
Because we affirm, we need not address John’s argument that this
case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand.
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